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This paper reviews the literature devoted to studying markets for health care services and health insurance.
There has been tremendous growth and progress in this field.  A tremendous amount of new research
has been done in this area over the last 10 years.  In addition, there has been increasing development
and use of frontier industrial organization methods.  We begin by examining research on the determinants
of market structure, considering both static and dynamic models. We then model the strategic determination
of prices between health insurers and providers where insurers market their products to consumers
based, in part, on the quality and breadth of their provider network. We then review the large empirical
literature on the strategic determination of hospital prices through the lens of this model. Variation
in the quality of health care clearly can have large welfare consequences. We therefore also describe
the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of market structure on quality of health care.
The paper then moves on to consider competition in health insurance markets and physician services
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iii1 Introduction
The incentives provided by the competitive interactions of health care providers are a central
force that shapes their behavior, aecting the price, quantity and quality of health care
services. This is particularly true in the U.S., where 56% of total health expenditures are
privately nanced (Martin et al., 2011), and hence prices, quantities, and qualities for those
services are determined by market interactions of buyers and sellers. Even when prices are
administratively set, as for they are for most publicly nanced care,1 strategic interactions
between providers aect quantity, quality and access to care. In this chapter our goal is to
review the state of knowledge on competition in health care markets, focusing on the literature
that has arisen since the rst volume of the Handbook of Health Economics published in 2000.2
The organizing principle for this chapter is loosely based on the Structure - Conduct - Per-
formance (SCP) paradigm originating with Joseph Bain and Edward Mason (see Schmalensee,
1989, for a review). From the 1950s to the 1970s this was the dominant framework through
which industrial organization economists conducted their analyses. The rise of game the-
ory and the new empirical industrial organization displaced the SCP approach (Bresnahan,
1989). Nevertheless, the SCP framework is a useful guide for structuring this chapter. First,
in order to provide some context for our discussion, we present data on recent trends in
provider market structure and some of the recent research on the underlying forces behind
the trends. Section 2 then discusses the research on the determinants of health care provider
market structure. This section examines the roles of entry, exit, mergers and productivity.
Section 3 turns to the analysis of the consequences of dierential market structure focusing
on its impact on hospital prices. Section 4 examines the impacts of these forces on hospital
quality of care. Section 5 examines evidence on competition in health insurance markets,
while Section 6 focuses on physician services markets. As will be seen, the majority of the
empirical literature on competition in health care markets is on hospitals. This is due to
the ready availability of hospital data, and the paucity of data on insurance and physician
markets. We conclude in Section 8.
1.1 Market Environment
In this section we consider the market environment in which health care rms operate. We
document some facts about market structure, mainly for hospitals and mainly for the U.S.,
but also for insurance and physician markets in the U.S. and for hospital markets in England
1This is true of the U.S. Medicare program and most health systems outside the U.S.
2See the excellent chapters by Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) and Gaynor and Vogt (2000) in that
volume for reviews of the literature to that point and for initial sketches of modeling strategies that have
guided many of the subsequent papers in the area.
1and the Netherlands. We then proceed in Section 2 to discuss models of market structure
and empirical research evidence.
Hospital and physician services comprise a large component of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). In 2009, hospital care alone accounted for 5.4% of GDP { roughly twice the size
of automobile manufacturing, agriculture, or mining, and larger than all manufacturing sec-
tors except food and beverage and tobacco products, which is approximately the same size.
Physician services comprise 3.6% of GDP (Martin et al., 2011).3 The share of the economy
accounted for by these sectors has risen dramatically over the last 30 years. In 1980, hospi-
tals and physicians accounted for 3.6% and 1.7% of U.S. GDP, respectively (Martin et al.,
2011).4 The size of these industries and their long run trends suggest that understanding
their structure, conduct and performance is not only important for the performance of the
health care industry, it is also important for understanding the economy as a whole.
Not only are these sectors large, but they have been undergoing signicant structural shifts
over the last several decades. The 1990s saw dramatic changes in the structure of hospital
markets in the U.S., and this increase will likely have long term impacts on the behavior
of hospitals. Table 1 presents numbers for the population-weighted, Herndahl-Hirschmann
Index (HHI) for selected years from 1987 to 2006.5 [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] Two things
are clear from this table. U.S. hospital markets are highly concentrated and have become even
more concentrated over time. Figure 1 displays the trends in the hospital HHI, the number
of within market hospital mergers and acquisitions, and the percentage of the population
enrolled in an HMO from 1990-2006. [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] From the table and
gure it is easily seen that hospital markets have become signicantly more concentrated.
In 1987, the mean HHI was 2,340 and by 2006 the HHI is was 3,161 { an increase of over
900 points.6 In 1992, the mean hospital concentration levels (2,440) were (barely) below the
recently updated Federal merger guidelines' (Federal Trade Commission and Department of
Justice, 1992) cut-o point for classifying a market as \Highly Concentrated" (HHI  2,500),
but by 2006 the mean concentration level (3,261) rose to well above this threshold. Town
et al. (2006) note that mergers and acquisitions are the primary reason for the increase in
hospital concentration over this period.
3The net cost of health insurance { current year premiums minus current year medical benets paid { was
1% of GDP in 2009.
4The net cost of health insurance in 1980 was 0.34%.
5The HHI is the sum of squared market shares in the market. It is the most commonly used measure of
market structure. We present population weighted, averages for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA)(based
on admissions). We limit the sample of MSA to those with a population less than 3 million in 1990. We do
this because it is likely that in MSAs with more than 3 million, there are multiple hospital markets and the
HHI of that MSA is likely mismeasured.
6It is interesting that over roughly the same period of time the nursing home industry did not see signicant
increases in market concentration, even though it was also subject to a number of mergers and acquisitions.
2While hospital markets are highly concentrated on average, there is also wide variation in
concentration. Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of the MSA level market concentration in 1990
and in 2006. [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] This gure displays two phenomena. First,
it shows the distribution of HHIs across MSAs. Most MSAs are \Highly Concentrated." In
2006, of the 332 MSAs in the U.S., 250 had HHIs greater than 2,500. Second, it is clear
from Figure 2 that the increase in hospital concentration was a broad phenomenon { the
vast majority of MSAs became more concentrated over this period. Particularly striking
is the number of moderately concentrated MSAs in 1990 that by 2006 had become highly
concentrated. By 2006, most health insurers now had to negotiate with hospital systems in
highly concentrated markets, which likely reduced their bargaining clout.7
An obvious question is why this wave of hospital consolidation occurred. Fuchs (2007)
and others point to the rise of managed care as the principal factor driving this massive
consolidation. A cursory glance at Figure 1 suggests this causal explanation. The idea is that
the rise of HMOs introduced aggressive price negotiations between hospitals and health plans,
thereby giving hospitals a strong incentive to acquire bargaining power through consolidation.
The rise of HMOs during the 1990s is widely credited with signicantly reducing health care
cost growth, primarily through tough price negotiations (see, e.g., Cutler et al., 2000). Early
suggestive evidence is provided by Chernew (1995) who nds that in the 1980s there is a
relationship between HMO penetration and the number of hospitals operating in the market.
Dranove et al. (2002) examine data from the 1981 to 1994 and nd a correlation between
metropolitan area HMO penetration in 1994 and the change in market structure. However,
Town et al. (2007) examine the change in hospital market structure and the change in HMO
penetration and nd little correlation, suggesting no direct causal link.
These results present a puzzle. Anecdotal evidence suggests that HMOs were an important
driver of the wave of hospital consolidation, yet the empirical evidence is mixed. Some have
suggested that it wasn't the realization of the rise of managed care, but the anticipation
(which in many cases was in error) that led hospitals to consolidate. Work in progress by
Town and Park (2011) provides support for this hypothesis. They nd that HMO exit, a
measure of the exuberance of expectations regarding the demand for managed care in a
location, is correlated with hospital consolidation.
The trend toward increasing concentration in hospital markets is not conned to the
U.S. Tables 2 and 3 provide information on market structure levels and trends in England
and the Netherlands. We see that the trends in these countries are very similar to the
U.S. { the total number of hospitals in both countries declined substantially over time.
For England there are HHIs for local hospital markets for a number of years. [TABLE 2
7Changes in Health Care Financing and Organization (http://www.hschange.com/index.cgi?func=pubs&
what=5&order=date) present a number of market-by-market case studies that highlight the increase in
hospital bargaining leverage over the last several decades.
3ABOUT HERE] Those reect substantial concentration, although declining slightly over
time. Figure 3 illustrates the change in the distribution of the HHI between 2003/04 and
2007/08 (scal years). [FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] It can be seen that there is a shift
of the distribution from more concentrated to less concentrated markets. Most of the shift
is in the middle of the distribution, as opposed to the tails. The decline in the hospital HHI
in England documented here is most likely due to pro-competitive reforms of the English
National Health Service that occurred in 2006 (see Gaynor et al., 2010).
Table 3 provides information on the total number of hospitals and independent outpatient
treatment centers in the Netherlands by year. [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] There is a clear
downward trend in the number of hospitals { there were 23 fewer hospitals in 2010 than in
1997. More recently, there has been a large increase in the number of independent outpatient
treatment centers. The number grew from 37 in 2005 to 184 by 2010.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of an alternative measure of market structure, LOCI (for
Logit Competition Index),8 for the Netherlands in 2010. [FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
LOCI is a measure of how much competition a rm faces in a dierentiated products market.
It varies between zero and one, where zero is pure monopoly and one is perfect competition.
The graph shows the cumulative distribution of hospitals in the Netherlands by their values
of the inverse of LOCI. As can be seen, approximately 20 percent of hospitals have values
of inverse LOCI of 2 or below. A value of 2 implies the market isn't very competitive { for
example a hospital in a duopoly that equally split the market with its rival would have a
LOCI value of 1/2, i.e, an inverse LOCI of 2. One half of all hospitals have inverse LOCI
values of 3 or less. This implies that half of Dutch hospitals operate in markets where they
face competition from a the equivalent of a triopoly or less.
Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 provide information about health insurance market structures for
the U.S. and the Netherlands. The U.S. information shows consistently high levels of con-
centration in health insurance markets. The levels of concentration in the Netherlands are
substantially lower than in the U.S., but have grown substantially over time.
The measures of HHI for HMO plus PPO markets in the U.S. in Table 4 come from reports
from the American Medical Association (AMA). [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] They show
high levels of concentration (although lower than for hospitals). The numbers show insurance
market concentration declining somewhat over time (although not monotonically). However,
there are some concerns about the accuracy of these numbers (see Capps, 2009; Dafny et al.,
2011a).
Dafny (2010) and Dafny et al. (2011b), using data on the large employer segment of the
insurance market, also show increasing concentration in health insurance markets. Dafny
8This is a competition index for dierentiated products Bertrand oligopoly with logit demand. See
Akosa Antwi et al. (2006).
4(2010, Figure 5) documents an increase in the percentage of markets with 1-4, 5-6, or 7-9
insurance carriers in the U.S. from 1998-2005, and a decrease in the percentage of markets
with 9-10 or more than 10 carriers. Dafny et al. (2011b) state that the mean HHI in their
sample increased from 2,286 to 2,984 from 1998-2006, the median four rm concentration
ratio increased from 79 to 90 percent, and the mean number of carriers per market fell from
18.9 to 9.6. They show (Figure 1 in their paper) that 78 percent of the markets they study
had increases in the HHI of 100 points or more from 2002 to 2006, and 53 percent experienced
increases of 500 points or more. Table 5 has mean HHIs by year from the data used in those
papers. [TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] These numbers indicate that the large employer
segment of the health insurance market is concentrated and has grown more so over time.
These numbers are roughly similar in magnitude to those calculated by the AMA. However
they show concentration increasing over time (by about 400 points from 2004-2008), while
the AMA numbers exhibit a slight decrease over time.
A recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability Oce (Government Account-
ability Oce, 2009) compiled information on the market structure of the small group health
insurance market in the U.S. Table 6 reproduces numbers from that report. [TABLE 6
ABOUT HERE] As can be seen, those markets appear to be fairly heavily concentrated,
and increasing in concentration. A recent paper by Schneider et al. (2008a) utilizes a unique
data source for California to construct HHIs for insurance plans at the county level for 2001.
They nd an average insurance HHI for California counties of 2,592. They report that 21
percent of counties have HHIs below 1,8009, 55 percent had HHIs between 1,800 and 3,600
and 24 percent had HHIs above 3,600. The information from these various data sources seem
broadly consistent.
Table 7 contains information on the structure of the health insurance market in the
Netherlands. [Table 7 ABOUT HERE] The mean HHI is not very high in 2005, but
increased by nearly 800 points by 2010. The mean HHI in 2010 is slightly higher than the
HHI for an equally divided 5 rm market (2,000). While not trivial, this is below the recently
revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines cuto for considering a market highly concentrated
(HHI=2,500). What is most notable is the large increase in concentration over the period,
which may be a cause for concern.
There have also been substantial changes in market structure in U.S. physician markets.
Liebhaber and Grossman (2007) report that the percent of physicians in solo or 2 person
practices declined from 40.7 percent in 1996-97 to 32.5 percent in 2004-05. Further, the pro-
portion in practices of 3-5 physicians fell over the same period. The proportion of physicians
practicing in groups of 6 or more grew from 15.9 percent to 21.8 percent. The number of
physicians in other practice settings (primarily employed by others) grew from 31.2 to 36.0
9The old Federal merger guidelines cuto for considering a market highly concentrated (Federal Trade
Commission and Department of Justice, 1992).
5percent over this period. Since the number of physicians per 1,000 persons has not really
changed (2.5) since 1997 (National Center for Health Statistics, 2011), this represents an
increase in concentration.
There is no good systematic information on the structure of local physician markets.
Those markets, especially for specialized services, may be very concentrated, but there is no
information generally available at the national level. Schneider et al. (2008a) constructed
HHIs for physician organizations in California at the county level for 2001. They nd the
average county HHI for physician organizations was 4,430, implying a high degree of con-
centration on average. They found that 17 percent of California counties had a physician
organization HHI below 1,800, 33 percent had an HHI between 1,800 and 3,600, and 50
percent had an HHI above 3,600.
In addition to information on market structure, there is some information on trends
in prices and the contribution of health care prices to overall health care cost growth.
Akosa Antwi et al. (2009) document a 100% increase in hospital prices in California from
1999-2006, although they do not nd market concentration to be a contributor to the increase.
Martin et al. (2011) decompose U.S. health spending growth into growth due to prices versus
growth due to nonprice factors (e.g., population, intensity of care). They nd that prices
account for 60% of the increase in overall spending from 2008 to 2009. The proportion of
health spending growth due to prices varies over time (see Exhibit 6 in Martin et al., 2011),
but has been growing steadily since 2001.
Some recent reports from state governments document growth or variation in health care
prices. A report from the Massachusetts Attorney General's oce (Massachusetts Attorney
General, 2010) nds that price increases caused most of the increases in health care spending
in the state in recent years. The report also nds signicant variation in prices and that
the variation is uncorrelated with quality of care, but is correlated with market leverage. A
report on Pennsylvania hospitals found substantial variation in prices for heart surgery, but
no correlation of prices with quality (Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council,
2007).
Overall, the statistics presented here paint a picture of health care and health insurance
markets that are concentrated and becoming more so over time. There is also some evidence
that prices are rising faster than quantities, and that price variation isn't related to quality
but may be due to market power. These statistics are not a complete picture, however. In
particular, they don't take account of the ease or diculty of market entry, nor of conduct
in these markets. We discuss economic models for thinking about these issues, and what we
know at present from research, in what follows as the main body of this chapter.
62 Entry, Exit and Technology Investments by Providers
Health care policies, either through intent or as an unintended consequence often aect the
incentives of health care providers to enter, exit, invest, merge and innovate. That is health
policy may aect provider market structure and thus change outcomes inuenced by market
structure, such as price, quantity, or quality, that were outside of the reach of the policy.
These incentives may dier by ownership status and thus policies may change the mix of
not-for-prot (NFP), for-prot (FP), and public organizations.
For example, the Hill-Burton program in the U.S. provided subsidies to NP and public
hospitals for construction and expansion. That policy aected the number of hospitals,
productive capacity, and ownership mix, and therefore also likely aected market outcome
such as price, quantity, and quality. Another example is public payments to providers.
Hospitals and most physicians earn a large percentage of their revenue from providing care
to publicly insured patients (in some countries all, or nearly all, of their revenues) and
those reimbursements are administratively determined. Changes in those payments aect
the returns to these providers to enter, exit, invest, merge and innovate. Thus, to fully
understand the impact of a given policy often requires an understanding of how the policy
will aect market structure through its impact on the behavior of providers. In this section,
we briey discuss recent developments in our understanding of evolution of provider market
structure.
Over the last decade signicant methodological and theoretical advances have occurred
in the analysis of (dynamic) oligopoly models in which rms are making entry, exit and
investment decisions. These decisions are dynamic in the sense that they require upfront
expenditures in which the organization will earn a return over a span of time or the decisions
are dicult to reverse. As long noted by economists, understanding the dynamic implications
of these models often requires estimating policy invariant parameters and the natural (albeit
often challenging) way to do that is to specify and estimate parameters from a model that
captures the essential features of the industry relevant for the question of interest. In this
section we outline a basic framework for examining entry, exit, and investment decisions as
well as review the small but growing literature devoted to understanding dynamic behavior
of rms. Space limitations prevent us from discussing the details on solving and estimating
fully dynamic models. However, there are several excellent summaries of this literature and
the interested reader is referred to Ackerberg et al. (2007), Doraszelski and Pakes (2007) and
the citations therein for a more complete presentation of these issues.
We present the outline of a simple model that is loosely based on the work of Gowrisankaran
and Town (1997), which in turn is heavily inuenced by the work of Ericson and Pakes (1995)
and Pakes and McGuire (1994). Static returns to the organization are modeled as depend-
ing on the current state of the (potential) market participants, the actions they take in the
7period and unobservables.10 More formally, we denote the prots in period t, (st;at;t),
that hospitals earn from the vector of state variables, one for each market participant, st 2 S
and actions, at 2 A, (actions can be investments, entry, exit, mergers, etc.) that aect the
evolution of st.11 The probability that a given action is successful is aected by i.i.d shocks,
t. Each hospital's shock is private information to the hospital. In this framework, st may
represent the bargaining leverage of the hospital, at technological investments made by the
hospital and t is a shock that aects the successful implementation of the investments. There
are a number of approaches to modeling state transitions, but in general they allow the state
to evolve according to a rst-order Markov process, where the actions of hospitals in period
t aect the distribution of the states in period t + 1. That is, st+1 = f(st;at;t) where f is
a pdf of a distribution function that captures the relevant process through which states are
updated.
So far, this set-up is generic and is not specic to a given provider setting or to a research
question. However, we can incorporate a number of the institutional features of the hospital
(or other provider) setting into this framework. For example, to endogenously account for
the presence of NFP hospitals, the NFP hospital utility function can be posited a function of
prots and its state and actions, st and at (Newhouse, 1970).12 NFP utility can operational-
ized as Ut(st;at;t) = (st;at;t) + (1   )qt(st) where qt is the number of patients treated
and  is the relative weight the hospital places on prots relative to the number of patients
treated. In this framework it is also easy to allow FP hospitals to face income and property
taxes (from which NFPs are exempt) which may dierentially aect their investment deci-
sions. The fact that most hospitals treat both private and public pay patients with variation
in payment generosity can also be incorporated into this model.
The state evolves according to a Markov process that depends on the actions of the
hospital and its competitors. Hospitals seek to maximize the present discounted value of
utility. The equilibrium concept that is generally employed in these settings is Markov
Perfect Equilibrium, which imposes that each hospital selects it actions in order to maximize
the present value of utility given its rational beliefs of the strategies of the other hospitals
and this simultaneously holds for all hospitals.
For each period, all hospitals solve:
10There are many models of static rm behavior that are consistent with this representation including the
bargaining model presented in Section 3.1.
11We suppress individual rm subscripts for clarity in notation.












s.t. st+1 = f(st;at;t)
where Et is the expectations operator given the information set available to the hospital in
period t. The solution to this problem is a mapping from each state and realization of a
hospital's shock to an action.
Entry is incorporated by allowing for a set of potential entrants who receive a random
entry cost shock, while exit is incorporated by assigning hospitals a scrap value they receive if
they exit. Hospitals will enter if the expected present discounted value of market participation
exceeds the cost of entry, while exit occurs if the expected presented discounted value of
continuing to participate in the market is less than the scrap value. If the return function is
smooth and concave and if the evolution of the state variables are also well-behaved, usually
at least one equilibrium exists. In general, there is no closed form solution for these types of
models. However, given the parameters of the model, there are well-established algorithms
for solving these models.13
The model's economic and policy implications will depend upon the parameters chosen
by the researcher. Thus, selection of \reasonable" parameter values is critical in order for
these models to provide policy guidance. A natural choice of parameter values are those
that are consistent with the patterns in the data. The static parameters { those that relate
the states to the single period returns { can be estimated by specifying a demand and
supply system and solving for the static equilibrium for every possible state. Given estimates
of the single period returns, the remaining parameters to estimate are the dynamic ones.
These parameters typically capture sunk costs of entry, scrap values from exit, xed costs
of production and parameters of the investment process. An important literature has arisen
that develops econometric methods to estimate these parameters.
Gowrisankaran and Town (1997) is the rst attempt to estimate the structural parameters
from a dynamic oligopoly model of entry, exit and quality investments. The goal of their
work is to examine the impact of dierent policy initiatives on the structure of the hospital
industry and patient welfare. In their model there are three types of patients: privately
insured, Medicare beneciaries, and uninsured and two types of hospitals: NFP and FP.
NFP hospitals seek to maximize the present discounted value of utility, which depends on
prots and the number of treated patients. FP hospitals pay property taxes on their capital
stock. To estimate the parameters they use a method of moments estimator in which for every
trial parameter value they solve for the xed point of the dynamic game. At the estimated
13See, e.g. Pakes and McGuire (1994), Gowrisankaran (1995), and Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010).
9parameter values, they nd that NFP hospitals are longer lived (FPs are both more likely
to enter and to exit), and have higher quality. Decreasing Medicare payment levels reduces
the number of hospitals { this occurs principally because FP hospitals exit the market, and
leads to higher quality adjusted prices for private pay patients. FP hospitals are more likely
to be the marginal hospital, whose market participation is more sensitive to shifts in demand
or government policy.
Several applied theoretical papers examine the entry and exit of health care providers in
simpler settings than the dynamic context described above (thus allowing for the derivation
of analytic results). Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) examine a simple, traditional, perfectly
competitive equilibrium model familiar to most economists, and add the ability of not-for-
prot rms to enter and compete with for-prot rms. In their framework, for-prot hospitals
maximize prots, while not-for-prot hospitals maximize utility, which has prots and output
(and potentially inputs) as arguments. Lakadawalla and Philipson show that when NFP
hospitals place positive weight on output they will behave as if they are prot maximizers
with lower marginal costs, and in equilibrium will always earn negative prots. In general,
NFP rms crowd out FP organizations. However, if the number of potential not-for-prot
rms is limited, then for-prot rms participate in the market. In this case the market
environment is determined by the response of for-prot rms, since they are the marginal
organizations.
Hansmann et al. (2003) highlight that for-prot hospitals are the most responsive to
reductions in demand, followed in turn by public hospitals and religiously aliated nonprof-
its, while secular nonprots are distinctly the least responsive of the four ownership types.
Glaeser (2002) notes that the governance structures on the managers of NFP institutions are
generally weak. He constructs a model of the NFP sector that examines the implications
that governing boards of NFPs are not responsible to anyone outside of the organization.
He further notes that the behavior of hospitals displays patterns consistent with capture by
management and physicians.
2.1 Structural Estimates of the Dynamic Behavior of Providers
Over the last two decades there have been signicant advances in econometric approaches
to estimating parameters from dynamic models of oligopoly. Early approaches (e.g., as
previously mentioned, Gowrisankaran and Town, 1997) solved for the equilibrium of the model
for each trial parameter value. Recently, two-step approaches have been developed. These
two-step methods alleviate the need to solve the model in order to recover the parameters,
and thus signicantly reduce the computational burden of estimation. Bajari et al. (2007),
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al. (2007) all develop approaches to estimate
10parameters from dynamic oligopoly.14
Schmidt-Dengler (2006) studies the adoption of nuclear magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) by U.S. hospitals. Specically, he examines the strategic incentives that hospitals
have to adopt the technology. Adopting the technology allows the hospital to \steal" volume
from their competitors and it may also deter or delay entry into this service line by compet-
ing hospitals. He estimates the parameters of a structural model of the timing of technology
adoption (solving for equilibrium for each trial parameter vector) in order to disentangle
these two eects. His simulations show that business stealing is the primary prot impact of
MRI adoption, and that preemption has a small but signicant impact on hospital prots.
Beauchamp (2010) estimates a dynamic model of the entry, exit and service provision of
abortion providers using the two-step method of Arcidiacono and Miller (2010). The goal
of this work is to examine the reasons underlying the increasing concentration of abortion
providers. He nds that high xed costs explain the growth of large clinics and that increased
provider regulation raised xed entry costs for small providers. Interestingly, his simulations
show that removing all regulations leads to increased entry by small providers into incumbent
markets, increasing competition and the number of abortions.
Nursing homes are an extremely large industry where the federal and state governments
are the primary payers. Two million U.S. residents reside in nursing in 18,000 nursing homes.
Because nursing homes do not set prices for most of their patients, competition is primarily
along quality dimensions. However, it is well documented that the quality of care in nursing
homes in the U.S. is low. Seventy-three percent of nursing homes were cited for quality of
care violations during routine inspections.15 In order to study the dynamic response of the
nursing home industry to dierent policy experiments, Lin (2008) estimates the parameters
of a Ericson and Pakes (1995) type model. In the most interesting of her three policy
experiments, she increases government payments for providing high quality care by 40%.
This leads to dramatic increases in both the percentage of high quality homes and the total
number of homes.
The Rural Hospital Flexibility Program that was passed in the Balanced Budget Amend-
ment of 1997 has as its overarching goal maintaining access to quality hospital care for rural
residents. To achieve this objective, the program created a new class of hospitals, Critical
Access Hospitals (CAH). Participating hospitals opt out of Medicare's standard prospective
payment system (PPS) and instead receive relatively generous cost-based reimbursements
from Medicare. In return, they must comply with a number of restrictions, principally, limits
on their capacity to 25 beds or less and patient length-of-stay to 96 hours or less. By 2006,
25% of all general acute care U.S. hospitals had converted to CAH status. Gowrisankaran
14Also see Arcidiacono and Miller (2010) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
15Oce of the Inspector General, "Trends in Nursing Home Deciencies and Complaints," OEI-02-08-00140
11et al. (2011) estimate the structural parameters of a dynamic oligopoly capacity game in
order to assess the impact of this program on rural hospital infrastructure. They extend
recent work on estimating dynamic oligopoly games by constructing a one-step ahead esti-
mator that signicantly reduces the computational burden of estimation. Preliminary results
suggest that the program only had a modest impact on the likelihood of exit, while it dra-
matically changed the size distribution of rural hospitals. The estimates suggest that the
reduction in the size of rural hospitals had a detrimental impact on rural residents and out-
weighs the benets they received from keeping open a few hospitals that would otherwise
close.
Dunne et al. (2009) estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for dentists and
chiropractors using the method of Pakes et al. (2007). Their goal is to understand the roles
of entry, xed costs and toughness of competition in determining market structure. They
nd that all three factors are important in determining market structure. To understand the
role of entry costs in aecting market structure they simulate the impact of reducing entry
costs and nd that increased price competition osets the reduction in entry costs.
As noted by Brenahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) (BR), market structure is endogenous and
the relationship between market structure (i.e., the number of rms) and market size (e.g.,
population) speaks to the nature of static price competition. The BR method uses a simple,
general entry condition to model market structure. The intuition is that if the population
(per-rm) required to support a given number of rms in a market grows with the number
of rms then competition must be getting tougher. The tougher competition shrinks prot
margins and therefore requires a larger population to generate the variable prots necessary
to cover entry costs. For example, if the size of the market needs to triple in order to
add an additional entrant, that suggests that the addition of that rm dramatically reduces
rm prots. Thus, the key data required for this method are both minimal and commonly
available: market structure and population.
Abraham et al. (2007) specify a static entry model modied from Brenahan and Reiss
(1991) to better understand the nature of hospital competition. Abraham et al. augment the
BR approach by incorporating the use of quantity data. Their method allows the separate
identication of changes in the xed costs of entry and changes in the toughness of com-
petition. Their estimates imply that the threshold per-rm population required to support
one hospital is approximately 7,000, increases to 12,600 to support two hospitals, is approx-
imately 19,000 for three hospitals, and just under 20,000 for four or more hospitals. They
also nd that increases in the number of hospitals in the market dramatically increases the
number of patients up until there are three hospitals { by 23% with the entry of the 2nd
hospital and 15% with the entry of the 3rd hospital. This implies substantial increases in
the toughness of competition with the entry of a 2nd or 3rd rm, but not afterwards. These
results point to substantial eects on competition even from having only a 2nd rm in the
market. However, the magnitude of the eects (23% increase in quantity associated with
12moving from a monopoly to a duopoly) seem extremely large.
Schaumans and Verboven (2008) specify a static entry model of pharmacy and physician
entry in which pharmacies and physicians may be complementary services. Their model is
in the spirit of Brenahan and Reiss (1991) and Mazzeo (2002). In Europe, pharmacies have
frequently received high, regulated markups over wholesale costs, and have been protected
from additional competition through geographic entry restrictions. These restrictions may
aect more than the market structure for pharmacies but may also spillover and aect entry
of other complementary services. They estimate the parameters of the model using data
from Belgium. They nd that the entry decisions of pharmacies and physicians are strategic
complements. Furthermore, the entry restrictions have directly reduced the number of phar-
macies by more than 50%, and indirectly reduced the number of physicians by about 7%.
Their model is discussed in more detail in Section 6 on markets for physician services.
2.2 Reduced Form Studies of Dynamic Behavior of Providers
Understanding the patterns of the evolution of health care provider market structure can
yield important insights into the underlying roles of policy and other factors that shape
market structure. Towards that end, several papers examine the entry, exit, investment
and technology adoption patterns of providers using reduced form techniques. Given clean
identication, these approaches can provide important insight into underlying relationships
that aect the dynamic behavior of providers. A limitation of these approaches is that it is
dicult to use these estimates to perform counterfactual policy experiments.
The most important change in U.S. health care policy over the last century was the in-
troduction of Medicare and Medicaid in the mid-1960s. Large portions of the population
that were in poor health became insured under this program. That is, the introduction of
Medicare and Medicaid constituted a large, positive shock to the demand for hospital and
physician services which, in turn, had the potential to aect the entry, exit and investment
decisions of providers. Finkelstein (2007) examines the impact of this program on hospital
dynamic behavior. She uses a long panel of American Hospital Association data and employs
a dierence-in-dierence identication strategy. This strategy relies on geographic variation
in the rates of hospital insurance prior to the introduction of Medicare/Medicaid to identify
the impact of these programs. The idea is that areas in which large percentages of the popu-
lation had insurance prior to the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid were less exposed to
the treatment (the demand shock associated with the introduction of these programs) than
areas of the country with lower insurance coverage. She nds that the Medicare program
signicantly increases the size of hospitals, increased admissions, increased hospital entry
rates, and there is some evidence that it increased the rate of adoption of new technologies.
Not only does the presence of insurance aect hospital incentives, but the nature of the
13insurance market may aect reimbursement rates and thus aect the incentives of rms to
invest in technology. In particular, managed care organizations negotiate lower payments
and restrict utilization, and thus may aect technology adoption. In a series of papers, Lau-
rence Baker and co-authors nd evidence that managed care penetration aects technology
adoption. Baker and Wheeler (1998) nd that high HMO market share is associated with
low levels of MRI availability and utilization. This suggests that managed care may be able
to reduce health care costs by inuencing the adoption and use of new medical equipment
and technologies. Baker and Brown (1999) nd evidence that increases in HMO activity are
associated with reductions in the number of mammography providers and with increases in
the number of services produced by the remaining providers. They also nd that increases
in HMO market share are associated with reductions in costs for mammography and with
increases in waiting times for appointments, but not with worse health outcomes. Baker
and Phibbs (2002) nd that managed care slowed the adoption of neonatal intensive care
units (NICUs) by hospitals, primarily by slowing the adoption of mid-level NICUs rather
than advanced high-level units. Slowing the adoption of mid-level units would likely have
generated savings. Moreover, contrary to the frequent supposition that slowing technology
growth is harmful to patients, in this case reduced adoption of mid-level units could have
beneted patients, since health outcomes for seriously ill newborns are better in high-level
NICUs and reductions in the availability of mid-level units appear to increase the chance of
receiving care in a high-level center.
The entry behavior of providers provides can be used to uncover the relative generosity
of dierent payers. Chernew et al. (2002) use this insight to measure the relative payment
generosity for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. They examine the behavior of
hospitals in California from 1985 to 1994 { a period in which CABG was diusing and hospi-
tals were actively making decisions whether to provide this procedure. Chernew et al. (2002)
use geographic variation in the distribution of patients with diering insurance arrangements
to identify returns to CABG entry as a function of the expected volumes by payor class.
They rst estimate a hospital choice model for CABG and then use the predicted volumes
by insurer type in a simple entry regression. They nd that fee-for-service (FFS) insurance
provides a high return throughout. Medicare reimbursements were initially generous but
declined throughout the study period. HMOs pay at approximately average variable costs,
and, interestingly, the return varies inversely with competition.
Chakravarty et al. (2006) examine hospital entry and exit rates through the lens of the
model of Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006). They analyze the entry and exit behavior of
hospitals from 1984 to 2000 and nd higher exit and entry rates for FP hospitals than for
NFPs. In addition, FP hospitals are more sensitive to shifts in demand. These results
are all consistent with theoretical predictions { FPs are the marginal rm. Ciliberto and
Lindrooth (2007) derive a random eects estimator of hospital exit and nd that increases
in Medicare reimbursements and improvements in eciency reduced the probability of exit.
14Deily et al. (2000) nd that during the late 1980s increases in relative ineciency increased
the probability that FP and NFP hospitals would exit, but not public hospitals.
Public policy can directly or indirectly aect hospital closure. The direct impact can
occur by closing public hospitals, forcing existing private hospitals to close, or by bailing
out failing hospitals. For example, in New York state, the recent Berger Commission Report
(Commission on Health Care Facilities in the 21st Century, 2006) requires the reconguration
and/or closure of 59 hospitals, or 25% of all hospitals in the state. Changes in payment
or regulatory policy can indirectly aect the nancial viability of hospitals and thus their
probability of exit. The welfare impact of such closures will depend upon relative costs of
the closed hospital and the value patients place upon having access to that hospital.
Lindrooth et al. (2003) examine the impact of hospital closure on the average cost of
hospital care in the community. They nd that the hospitals that closed were less ecient and
that costs per discharge declined by 2-4% for all patients and 6-8% for patients at the closed
hospital due to patients shifting to more ecient hospitals. Capps et al. (2010b) compare the
loss in consumer surplus to patients from closing a hospital to the potential cost savings from
closing inecient hospitals. They examine 5 hospital closures in Arizona and Florida and
conclude that, for the closures they study, the cost savings from closures more than oset the
reduction in patient welfare. In contrast, Buchmueller et al. (2006) nd that hospital closures
in California had negative health consequences on the surrounding population. Specically,
they nd that increases in the distance to the closest hospital increases deaths from heart
attacks and unintentional injuries. These health eects are not captured in the consumer
surplus analysis of Capps, Dranove and Lindrooth.
Entry can signicantly shape market structure and can have signicant impacts on in-
cumbent rms in the market. If rms can deter entry or if there are frictions that prevent
the entry of organizations that might otherwise become market participants, it can have
a signicant impact on providers and health care consumers. In addition to the work of
Schmidt-Dengler (2006), two other papers have addressed issues of entry deterrence and
entry frictions: Ho (2009a) and Dafny (2005).
Kaiser Permanente is a vertically integrated, sta-model MCO based in California that
owns hospitals and directly employs physicians and other health care providers. In California
and Hawaii, Kaiser is quite successful, with large market shares in many California markets.
However, outside of the west coast of the U.S., Kaiser is not a signicant factor. Much of
Kaiser's success is attributable to its ability to provide reasonably high quality care at low
cost. Kaiser members generally do not receive care outside of the Kaiser provider network and
thus they have limited provider choices. Given their comparative advantages and California
success, an interesting question is why Kaiser is unable to replicate its California business
model and enter in other markets. Kaiser has attempted to enter 7 dierent markets and only
successfully gained a foothold in three of these markets. Using simulation methods based
15on her previous work (Ho, 2006),16 Ho (2009a) examines the underlying reasons for Kaiser's
lack of success outside of the West coast. She nds that the premium reductions that Kaiser
would have oer because of their limited provider network are large and not likely oset by
any cost advantages they may possess. In addition, even in locations in which incumbent
plan quality is low, customer informational asymmetry over plan quality implies that it will
take Kaiser a long time to achieve the necessary scale economies to be protable. Finally,
she notes that Certicate of Need laws also raise the cost of entry for Kaiser, aecting their
likely success rate.
As we discuss later in this chapter (Section 4.4.3), there are signicant volume-outcome
eects in the provision of many hospital services, i.e., patients that go to hospitals that do
larger volumes of a procedure typically have better health outcomes. Hospitals therefore may
have an incentive to invest in building volume in the hopes of leaving insucient patients
for any potential entrants to attract if they were in fact to enter.17 Dafny (2005) tests for
this type of preemption for electrophysiological studies, a procedure to identify and correct
cardiac arrhythmias. Building on the ideas of Ellison and Ellison (2007), she notes that entry
preemption will most likely occur in markets where the entry probability is intermediate. In
markets in which entry probabilities are high, entry will likely occur even with incumbent
strategic behavior. In low entry probability markets, entry deterrence is unnecessary, because
entry is unlikely even without preemption. Using Medicare claims data she tests this propo-
sition and nds that incumbent volume growth for electrophysiological studies is largest in
markets in which there is only one potential entrant (an intermediate entry probability case)
and that the greater the number of entrants, the lower the incumbent volume growth. Thus,
the evidence suggests that hospitals do engage in entry deterrence in accordance with the
theory.
The analysis of entry and exit by providers other than hospitals is quite limited. Orsini
(2010) examines the impact of changes in Medicare home health reimbursement rates that
were passed in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 on home health agency exits. Orsini nds
that a decline in reimbursement of one visit per user increases the hazard of exit of a home
health care agency by 1.13 percent with no dierential response in exit by ownership type.
Bowblis (2010) studies closures in the nursing home industry and nds that FP homes are
slightly more likely to close than NFP homes. Also, homes that care for more publicly insured
patients and those with poor nancial performance were more likely to close.
16Estimating demand systems for MCOs with a given hospital network structure
17This can form a barrier due to xed costs of entry or due to a volume-outcome eect. Insucient volume
may result in such poor quality that entry will not occur.
162.2.1 The Impact of the Introduction of New Classes of Providers
The basic structure and roles and segmentation of health care providers has remained rel-
atively constant over the last half of the century. Hospitals provide a variety of inpatient
and outpatient services and depending on their specialty, physicians provide care in either
their oce and/or the hospital. Cutler (2010) comments on the lack of entrepreneurial vigor
addressing the ineciencies in the provision of health care. He cites two reasons for these
ineciencies. First, fee-for-service reimbursement schemes give providers little incentive to
reduce the cost of the care they provide. Second, information on the cost and quality of care
is generally not transparent. Thus, the returns to developing new care modalities that result
in higher quality and/or lower cost care are likely to be modest. Cebul et al. (2008) also con-
sider organizational issues in health care. They point to sociological factors, legal barriers,
and issues with information (the compatibility and deployment of information technology
specically) as the key reasons for the inecient organization of this sector. While Cutler
and Cebul et al. are right to note the organization problems and lack of large entrepreneurial
advances in health care provision, there are some important exceptions.
More broadly, the literature outside of health care generally nds that the introduction
of new products can have large positive impacts on consumer welfare (e.g. Petrin (2002),
Gentzkow (2007). However, this need not be the case in the health care sector. The large role
of public programs where prices are set administratively, the importance of private third-party
payers, and the presence of asymmetric information imply that new organizational forms
can plausibly reduce consumer well being. That is, these organizations could be designed
to exploit administrative pricing irregularities, the inability of insurers to curtail patient
utilization, or knowledge gaps between patients and providers over the quality and necessity
of the care they receive. There are at least three types of new organization types that have
been introduced over the last several decades, and we discuss them below.
There is a long history of hospitals that are devoted to specic conditions or populations
{ women's, children's, psychiatric, and tuberculosis hospitals have existed for over a century.
However, in the early 1990s a new type of \specialty" hospital was born. Specialty hospitals
are inpatient facilities that treat a limited range of conditions ( e.g. cardiac and orthopedic).
These hospitals are principally for-prot organizations, with physicians owning a signicant
stake in the hospital. Specialty hospitals are controversial. Critics argue that specialty hospi-
tals are a mechanism to exploit asymmetric information by providing kickbacks to physicians
for referrals, and they restrict the ability of general hospitals to internally cross-subsidize un-
protable services by skimming o high-margin patients. Proponents contend that there are
important gains from specialization. Specialty hospitals may oer greater economic eciency,
higher quality, more consumer-responsive products and services, and provide benecial com-
17petition to general hospitals.18 Barro et al. (2006) study the impact of specialty hospitals and
nd that in markets experiencing entry by a cardiac specialty hospital have lower spending
for cardiac care without signicantly worse clinical outcomes. In markets with a specialty
hospital, however, specialty hospitals tend to attract healthier patients and provide higher
levels of intensive procedures than general hospitals. Carey et al. (2008) nd that orthopedic
and surgical specialty hospitals appear to have signicantly higher levels of cost ineciency.
Cardiac hospitals, however, do not appear to be dierent from competitors in this respect.
Chakravarty (2010) employs a number of analyses to assess the impact of specialty hospi-
tals on general hospitals In one, he uses propensity score matching and dierence-in-dierence
analysis on a national dataset to estimate the eect of specialty hospitals on the prots of
general hospitals. He nds no statistically signicant impacts of the entry of specialty hos-
pitals on general hospital prots. In this analysis he is unable to control for the extent to
which specialty hospitals may select healthier patients. He employs a dataset from the state
of Texas with detailed clinical information to conduct an analysis controlling for the possi-
bility that specialty hospitals skim healthier patients. He nds that there is heterogeneity
in the eects of specialty hospital entry on general hospital prots: entry lowers general
hospital prots in counties where specialty hospitals have healthier patients than the median
(county), but not in other counties. He also looks at the impacts of specialty hospital entry
on general hospital exit and merger. He nds no evidence of an impact on exit, but some
evidence that specialty hospital entry increases the probability of general hospital mergers.
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASCs) were introduced in the U.S. in the 1970s as more
and more surgical procedures shifted to an outpatient setting, and have grown to become
an important type of health care provider. There are 4,500 freestanding ASCs performing
more than 15 million procedures annually (Cullen et al., 2009). ASCs provide non-emergent,
outpatient surgical services, generally focusing on specic sets of procedures (e.g., cataract
surgery, orthopedics). ASCs compete with each other and with the outpatient departments
of general acute care hospitals for the provision of these services. Weber (2010) examines
the welfare benets of ambulatory surgical centers. She does this by estimating the demand
for ASCs as a function of distance and patient and facility characteristics, using data from
the state of Florida. Her estimates show that consumers place relatively little value on
having access to an ASC. If all ASCs were closed, potential consumers of ASC services would
conservatively lose approximately $1.50 of surplus per episode for the least valued procedure
and about $27 per episode for the most valued procedure. Approximately 2/3rds of the
welfare loss comes from the loss of ASCs and their unique attributes, while the remaining
1/3rd stems from consumers facing smaller choice sets and greater travel times.
Retail clinics (or convenience clinics) are a relatively new type of health care provider
that compete with physician clinics for the diagnosis and treatment of several common, low
18See Schneider et al. (2008b) for an overview of the economics of speciality hospitals.
18acuity conditions. The rst retail clinic opened in a Cub grocery store in St. Paul, MN
in 2000. Retail clinic patients do not need an appointment, and care is provided by nurses
with advanced training (usually nurse practitioners) who are overseen by a physician (often
remotely). Currently, there are over 1,200 clinics operating in the U.S. The prices for each
service are typically posted at the clinic as well as online, making the patient nancial obliga-
tion transparent. These fees are much lower than most physician oce visit charges, making
retail clinics a more attractive option for the uninsured. The clinics also are usually located in
a retail establishment (drug store, grocery store, big box retailer) and have extensive evening
and weekend hours. Using a large, national data base of private insurer claims, Parente and
Town (2011) examine the impact of these clinics on the cost and quality of care. They nd
that the cost of care at these clinics is signicantly lower relative to the care provided in a
physician's oce, with no obvious quality dierences. As a consequence, these results suggest
that the introduction of retail clinics resulted in signicant consumer welfare gains. Some
recent results by Ashwood et al. (2011), using data from a dierent large national insurer
nd increased utilization and cost associated with retail clinics, however. Retail clinics are
associated with reductions in utilization and costs for physician oce visits and emergency
room visits. However, the increase in retail clinic visits is larger than the reductions in other
types of utilization.
3 Hospital Market Structure, Competition and Prices
3.1 A Model of Hospital Insurer Negotiation
As mentioned in the introduction, the hospital industry is one of the largest industries in
the U.S. economy. Not only is the hospital industry large, but it operates in a very unique
institutional setting. Over the last decade a series of papers have been written that model
the price setting behavior of hospitals. These models recognize that institutional features of
the hospital market in the United States are unique and these features have ramications
for the role of competition in aecting prices and the quality of care. There are at least
four key distinguishing features of hospital markets that play an important role in aecting
competitive interactions between hospitals.
First, privately insured patients primarily access hospital care through their health insur-
ance, therefore the set of available hospitals will depend on the health plan's provider network
structure. Health insurers often contract with a subset of hospitals in a given location. The
eective hospital choice set for a patient when they need to be treated will therefore depend
upon their health insurance plan (Ho, 2006). Second, patients do not pay directly for inpa-
tient care. Most of the cost of an inpatient episode is covered under the patient's insurance
and hence any price dierential between hospitals is not generally reected in the patient's
19out-of-pocket cost. Third, the health insurance choice of the patient is generally made prior
to the need for inpatient treatment. In this sense, hospitals are an option demand market.
Fourth, hospitals negotiate with private insurers over inclusion in their provider network and
the reimbursement rates the hospital will receive from treating the insurer's enrollees. These
negotiations also determine how hospital utilization will be monitored and controlled as well
as details of the billing arrangements. Health insurers, in turn, compete with each other
based on premiums (which are a function of the prices they pay hospitals) on the breadth
and quality of their provider networks. Employers, through whom most private insurance is
acquired, have preferences over hospitals which are an aggregation of their employees' prefer-
ences, and select the set of health plans they oer to their workers based on expected costs,
benet structure and provider networks.19
Below, we outline a simple model of hospital-insurer bargaining. There are several goals
we wish to accomplish with this model. First, we wish to understand the role of market power
and its source in aecting the price of hospital care. Second, a related goal is to understand
how hospital mergers aect the price of inpatient care and the impact on welfare. Third,
we provide guidance to empirical modelers so that one can estimate parameters that can be
linked, either directly or indirectly, to the underlying theory of hospital price determination.
We also note that this model, while faithful to key institutional details specic to health care,
is generic enough that it can be applied to other health care providers besides hospitals, most
prominently physicians. It also could be expanded in the direction of encompassing a richer
model of the insurer market, although one for pragmatic purposes one would then have to
simplify the insurer-provider part of the model.
The model combines the insights of research on hospital competition by Gal-Or (1997),
Town and Vistnes (2001), Capps et al. (2003), Gaynor and Vogt (2003), Ho (2009b), Haas-
Wilson and Garmon (2011), and Lewis and Pum (2011). The structure of this model is also
similar to the bargaining models of Crawford and Yurukoglu (2010) and Grennan (2010),
who study cable television distribution and the negotiations between hospital and medical
device suppliers over the price of stents, respectively. Our formulation most closely follows
the exposition in Brand et al. (2011).
Hospitals dier from most products in that the vast majority of consumers obtain their
hospital services through their health plan. In order for health insurers to oer products
that are viable in the marketplace, insurers must construct networks of hospitals from which
enrollees can receive health care services. The breadth and depth of the provider network is
a large determinant of the desirability of the dierent health plans, as consumers value access
to a variety of hospitals in the event of adverse illness shocks. At the same time, consumers
value income and so health insurance plans with lower premiums are also more attractive.
19Most large employers are self-insured and thus changes in negotiated prices between providers and health
plans are directly passed on to the employer.
20As will be seen, there is a tradeo between the inclusiveness of an insurer's network and
insurer premiums. Health plans with more inclusive networks will ceteris paribus have less
bargaining power with hospitals and thus pay higher prices, resulting in higher premiums.
We model hospital competition as taking part in three stages. First, health plans and
hospitals bargain to determine both the set of hospitals to include in the plan networks and
the payment from the health plan to the hospital for each admitted patient. Second, patients
choose health plans. Finally, patients realize illness shocks, and choose a hospital based on
their illness shock and the hospitals in their network. Hospitals and health plans are assumed
to have \passive beliefs," i.e., if a plan or hospital gets an alternative oer in the negotiating
process, this will not change their beliefs about the oers made or received by its competitors.
We describe each of the three stages of the game in turn, starting from the nal stage.
There are H health plans and N hospitals operating in the market. A set of patients,
denoted i = 1;:::I, live in the market area and may enroll in a health insurance plan and,
after they have enrolled they may become ill enough to require inpatient treatment. In
the nal stage of the game, each patient takes her health plan h and associated set Jh of
in-network hospitals as given. At the beginning of the third stage, each patient learns her
illness shock. Denote these shocks m = 1;:::;M, where each m corresponds to a particular
illness, or no illness, m = 0. Let i1;:::;iM denote the ex-ante probability of each shock.
Each diagnosis has an accompanying weight w1;:::;wM. The weights describe the relative
importance of each diagnosis in both the cost and utility function, as we discuss below. In
empirical implementations, the m's would generally correspond to Diagnosis Related Groups
(DRGs) or some other disease classication system.
Given diagnosis m, patients choose a hospital at which to obtain treatment. Patients
are assumed not to pay an out-of-pocket dierential price based on which hospital that
they select, provided the hospital is in-network. The utility that patients receive depends
on the characteristics of the hospital (e.g., the services oered and the perceived quality of
care), characteristics of the patients (e.g., demographics and diagnosis), the travel time to
the hospital, and an idiosyncratic error term.20 We let the ex-post utility for patient i from
hospital j 2 Jh with illness shock mi be given by:
uij;m = wm [f(xj;zi;dij;mi;) + eij] (2)
where xj is a vector of hospital characteristics including a hospital indicator, zi is a vector of
20In our formulation of utility, we assume that patients do not face any price dierential across hospitals.
We make this assumption primarily for expositional ease. There is some evidence that hospital prices, do in
fact, aect hospital choice (e.g., Gaynor and Vogt, 2003). This could be a consequence of patient cost-sharing
arrangements, insurers negotiating on their enrollees' behalves, or because physicians are incentivized to use
lower cost hospitals (Ho and Pakes, 2011). The advantage of allowing prices to enter patient utility is that
recovering the utility parameter on price allows for the monetization of the patient's surplus from a given
hospital network.
21patient characteristics including age, sex, and race, dij is the distance to the hospital from
the patient's home, mi is diagnosis,  is a parameter vector to be estimated and eij is an
i:i:d: error term that is distributed Type I extreme value, which is revealed to the patient at
the same time as her illness shock. In practice, uij is parameterized to be a linear function of
a hospital xed eect, travel time and interactions between hospital characteristics (such as
bed size, ownership type, teaching status, service oerings), patient characteristics, diagnosis,
diagnosis weight, and travel time.
In addition to the Jh hospitals, the patient can also choose the outside option 0, which
corresponds to going to an out-of-network or out-of-area hospital or no hospital. We normalize
the utility from the outside option to have zero base utility, so ui0 = ei0. We assume that
if the health shock m = 0 then the utility of hospital treatment is suciently low that the
patient always chooses the outside option 0.
Given the logit assumption, the probability that an individual i with illness m will seek







In turn, the ex ante expected utility that a patient receives from a given hospital choice set











Conditional on illness severities and probabilities, the distribution of xj and the geographic
distribution of hospitals, the welfare a patient receives from a health plan's network is a
function of the identities of the hospitals in the plan's network.
Turning now to the second stage, each enrollee (and potential patient) is faced with a set
of health plans, h = 1;:::;H from which they select. Each plan has a set of hospitals in
its network, Jh, and each plan simultaneously chooses its premium for its customers.22 Plan
attributes are given by a set of characteristics, ch. We posit that the expected utility for
consumer i of plan h is given by:23.
vih = Wi(Jh;) + ch + h + 
P ln(incomei   Premh) + ih;
21To ease the notational burden, we index Wi(Jh) only by JH but it is understood that it is a function of
patient and hospital characteristics and .
22BGNGT model the health plan as a cooperative whose objective is to maximize enrollee surplus. The
advantage of this approach is that it allows for an explicit solution to the hospital/insurer bargaining game
without modeling health plan competition. In that approach, consumer surplus directly enters the bargaining
solution.
23For expositional ease we treat health plan enrollees as homogenous conditional on their zi and . However,
in an empirical implementation it may be desirable to allow for random coecients over the preference
parameters, as in Berry et al. (1995).
22where Premh is the insurance premium for plan h, h captures dierences in the unmeasured
(by the econometrician) desirability of the plan,  and P are parameters, and where ih is
distributed i:i:d: Type I extreme value.24 Let ~ vih denote the unconditional expected value
of vih and let Wi and Prem denote the vectors of the plan values for these variables for all





Where J is an H  N matrix of ones and zeros which denote the hospital networks of all
the H plans and  is the H  1 vector of h's. The market share for plan h is then the
summation of the probabilities of selecting the plan across the population: Yh(J;;Prem) = P
i yih(J1;:::;JH;Prem).25 The prots the health plan earns from a given network is then:
h(J;;Prem) =
 






where ach is the other variable costs incurred by the plan outside of hospital expenditures, e.g.,
administrative and marketing costs. We assume that the plan's cost structures are known to
all the other plans. Health plans are assumed to select a single premium to maximize prot.
That is, treating their own and the competitors hospital networks as xed, the rst-order
conditions are:







The equilibrium of the premium setting game is one in which all of the plans' premiums
satisfy (4) simultaneously. Caplin and Nalebu (1991) prove that there is a unique equi-
librium in the premium setting game given the set of health plan hospital networks. The
premiums and thus the prots of all the health plans will depend upon the structure of all
the competing plans' hospital networks, their costs and the distribution of patients across
geography and incomes.
Finally, at the rst stage of the game, we assume that hospitals and health plans bargain
over the price of inpatient care. The outcome of this bargaining game determines which
hospitals and health plans will agree to a contract and the prices health plans will pay
hospitals for caring for their enrollees. Although the contract terms between hospitals and
health plans are complex, we assume that health plans and hospitals are constrained to
24In this parameterization of utility the pre-tax benet treatment of health insurance is captured, in a
reduced form way, in P.
25We ease the notational burden by subsuming the parameter index into Yh.
23negotiate a base price for each patient. The actual price paid by the health plan to the
hospital will be the base price multiplied by the disease weight, wm. Since the weights are
eectively meant to capture costs, one could implement this by using DRG weights, which
have roughly the same purpose. With the interpretation of the w terms as DRG weights, we
believe that this structure for a contract between a health plan and hospital is a reasonable
approximation of actual contracts.
We consider a model of bargaining and competition similar to Horn and Wolinsky (1988).26
There are J _ H pairs of hospitals and health plans who are negotiating over a price (pjh) the
health plan pays to the hospital for each patient the hospital treats. The hospital's marginal
cost of treating the patient is cj.27 Nature chooses a random ordering among each of these
pairs and assigns an initial oerer to each pair. The parties then engage in a bargaining
process over prices. Prior to the match, the health plan receives an i:i:d: synergistic cost
term from the match, cmjh, that is common knowledge to both rms and which will generate
randomness to the ex ante outcomes. A natural starting point for analyzing the bargaining
game is to focus on the Nash Bargaining solution.28 This solution takes examines each insurer-
hospital pair in isolation, holding the other hospital-insurer prices xed. The Nash Bargaining
solution we consider ignores the strategic interactions that a given insurer-hospital price might
have on other insurer-hospital prices. Importantly, this framework is an approximation to the
game in which prices and the entire provider networks are determined.29 Clearly, allowing a
richer set of strategic interactions would be a welcome advance.
To calculate the Nash bargaining outcome we need to specify the agreement and dis-
agreement values for the hospital and the insurer. The agreement value for the hospital is
the net revenues they earn from the insurer's ow of patients to the hospital. Under the
disagreement outcome the hospital is assumed to receive a xed net revenue, rh. For the
insurer, the agreement value is the gross revenue they earn from having hospital network Jh
in place less the expenditures on inpatient care at the hospital. Holding the other plans'







h is the vector of premiums that solves (4), and we decompose the matrix of
hospital networks into two components, plan h's network and the networks of the other
26More recent analyses of bargaining games in supplier network contexts include Stole and Zwiebel (1996),
Inderst and Wey (2003), de Fontenay and Gans (2007).
27We assume costs do not vary by health plan.
28See Dranove et al. (2007) for an examination of the \levels" of rationality that hospitals possess in the
bargaining game.
29Ho (2009b) and Pakes (2010) consider a game of hospital network formation which endogenizes the
network structure.
24plans, J h. Denote the hospital network that excludes hospital j as Jh   j. The gross
revenue from the network that excludes hospital j is then:
Fh(Jh   j) = Prem

h(Jh   j;J h)Yh(Jh   j;J h;;Prem

h) (6)






kh is the ow
of patients to network hospitals given network Jh   j. If the net surplus from the hospital-
insurer match is not greater than zero, then bargaining does not take place and the hospital
is not in the insurer's network. That is, bargaining only takes place if Fh(Jh) Fh(Jh  j) 
cjhqjh  
P
l6=j plhdjlh   cmjh > 0 where djk = (q
J j
kh   qkh).
Summarizing the agreement and disagreement values we have:
Hagree = (pjh   cj)qjh(Jh)
Hdisagree = rj
Magree = Fh(Jh)   pjhqjh(Jh)  
P
l6=j plhqlh(Jh)   cmjh
Mdisagree = Fh(Jh   j)  
P
l6=j plhqlh(Jh   j)
Under Nash bargaining each bilateral price maximizes the Nash Product of hospital net
prots and the net insurer surplus from agreement, taking the other prices as given, solving
max
p [Hagree   Hdisagree]
 [Magree   Mdisagree]
1 
where  2 [0;1] is the relative bargaining ability or non-modeled bargaining power of the
hospital relative to the insurer. Dierentiating and solving for pjh yields:30
















where we rene d as a share so djk = (q
J j
kh  qkh)=qjh and q
J j
kh is the number of patients that
ow to hospital k is the network is Jh  j. That is, djk is the diversion share from hospital j
to hospital k when hospital j is no longer available.
30Note that
@F(VJh;pjh)
@pjh = 0 by the envelope theorem.
25The Nash Bargaining solution predicts that, quite intuitively, a hospital's price will be
increasing in its costs, bargaining ability, the prices of other competing hospitals, and, impor-
tantly, the net value that the hospital brings to the insurer's network. In this framework, we
have left the insurer few tools to aect their bargaining position. There are circumstances in
which if the health plan can steer patients to lower priced hospitals it can signicantly aect
the bargaining outcome. This is true theoretically as well as empirically. Sorensen (2003)
and Wu (2009) nd that health plans who are better able to channeling patients can extract
greater discounts from hospitals.
Part of the goal of this analysis is to provide a framework for the analysis of hospital
mergers. To start this analysis assume that the hospitals negotiate separately while under
joint control but take into account the impact of disagreement on the ow of patients to the
other hospital in the system.31 This changes the threat points and thus the Nash Bargaining
prices. The agreement and disagreement outcomes are now:
Hj+k
agree = (pjh   cj)qjh + (pkh   ck)qkh(Jh)
H
j+k
disagree = (pkh   ck)qkh(Jh   j) + rj + rk
Mj+k
agree = Fh(Jh)   pjhqjh  
P
l6=j;k pkjqlh(Jh)   cmjh
M
j+k
disagree = Fh(Jh   j)  
P
l6=j pkh~ qlh(Jh   j)

















Assuming that hospital costs are not aected by the merger and holding  constant, the
change in price caused by the merger is given by:
p
j+k
jh = (1   )djkhpkh (9)
The impact of the merger on hospital k's price is symmetric. Intuitively, the increase in price
31Balan and Brand (2009) perform similar analysis in their simulation analysis of hospital merger simula-
tions.
26is a function of the diversion share between j and k. If no patients view hospital k as the
closest substitute for j when j is not available, then the merger will have no eect on price.
The impact of the merger on hospital j's price is increasing in k's price and the bargaining
leverage of hospitals.
Now let the hospitals negotiate jointly. Specically, assume that the hospitals make an
all-or-nothing oer. That is, the insurer can either have all of the hospitals in the system or
none of the hospitals in the system in their network. Here we assume that hospital j and g
merge to form a system and they will commit to charging one price for both hospitals in the
system. The post-merger agreement and disagreement values are now:
Hj+k
agree = (pjh   cj+k)(qkh(Jh) + qkh(Jh))
H
j+k
disagree = rj + rk
Mj+k





disagree = Fh(Jh   j   k)  
P
l6=j;k plhqlh(Jh   j   k)
where cj+k is the volume weighted average cost of the newly merged system.
Solving as before yields the solution:













The diversion shares, d(j+k)lh, are now relative to the merged entity and d(j+k)kh = 0. The
impact of a given hospital merger will depend on the changes in the relative threat points.
However, if the hospitals are viewed as substitutes by potential patients, then post-merger
prices will increase. To see this, let hospitals j and k be symmetric in the sense that have the
same pre-merger prices, average costs and volumes and assume that the match value terms
are unaected by the merger.32 Let J j = 1
qjh(Fh(Jh)   Fh(Jh   j)), which is the average
loss in net revenue to the insurer per patient if no agreement is reached. The corresponding
32It is straightforward but notationally cumbersome to let prices dier by hospital for this exercise.
27value for the merged hospital is J j k = 1
qjh+qkh(Fh(Jh)   Fh(Jh   j   k)). The change in






plh(dj+klh   djlh): (11)
The merger will increase price as long as the additional loss in per-patient welfare (relative
to network J) from hospital network J   h   k is greater than the loss in welfare from
hospital network J   k. This will be the case if and only if patients view hospitals j and
k as substitutes. To see this, assume that hospital j and k are not substitutes in the sense
that
djkh
qjk < a where a is a suciently small (say .05), so that Fh(Jh)   Fh(Jh   j   k) 
2Fh(Jh)   Fk(Jh   j)   Fh(Jh   k). Then J j k  J j and pjh  0.33
In order to assess the welfare impact of a change in hospital market structure, we need
to trace out the pass-through from changes in hospital prices to changes in health insurance
premiums. In this framework, hospitals are an input into the production of health insurance,
thus any change in hospital prices will only aect consumer surplus if those changes are passed
through to consumers. Given parameters on health plan utility and the appropriate data,
it is possible to quantify the impact of the hospital merger on welfare. Suppose competing
hospitals j and k successfully merge and in their new negotiations with health insurers change
hospital prices by pj+k, where pj+k is an H  1 vector. We assume the merger does not
aect the structure of any health plan's hospital network or any other health plan attributes.34
To calculate the impact of the merger on premiums at the new hospital prices, resolve the
health plan's rst-order conditions (4) for the new post-merger premiums. Denote the post-
merger premiums as Premj+k. Let v
ih(Premh;Wi;ch;h;p;) = vih   ih. The consumer














The impact of the hospital merger on consumer welfare through its impact on hospital prices
is then:
CSi = CSi(Prem
j+k)   CSi(Prem): (13)
The aggregate impact is then the summation of CSi across the aected population (e.g.
those not enrolled in public health insurance).
33In the random utility hospital choice model there will always be some non-zero substitution between
hospitals in the choice set and thus there is no two-hospitals pair for which djkh = 0.
34If they are quantiable and measurable, it is straightforward to incorporate any other changes to health
plan attributes into this analysis. For example, see Petrin (2002).
283.2 Estimating the Impact of Hospital Market Power on Price
The most active area of research in the industrial organization of health care is the analysis
of the impact of hospital concentration on an on hospital prices. There are several dierent
approaches to estimating the role of bargaining leverage on hospital prices. The approaches
dier in the nature of identication, data quality, the structure imposed on the data gener-
ating process and complexity of the econometrics. Nevertheless, virtually all the approaches
implicitly or explicitly rely on a version of the insurer-hospital bargaining framework. The
basic strategy (with some important exceptions) is to estimate the parameters in equation
(7) or, more commonly, to approximate the functional relationship in (7). With those pa-
rameter estimates in hand it is relatively straightforward to calculate merger counterfactuals
by computing the predicted post-merger price using (11). We discuss three broad classes of
empirical strategies used to estimating the impact of changes in market structure on prices:
1) Reduced form; 2) Merger case studies; and 3) Structural and semi-structural approaches.
Examining the distribution of realized hospital prices alone is informative about the func-
tioning of hospital markets. Ginsburg (2010) uses administrative claims data for 8 geographic
areas from four large insurers to construct inpatient hospital prices. He nds that there is
signicant variation both within and across regions in hospital prices. For example, San Fran-
cisco has the highest average hospital prices in 2008 with prices equal to 210% of the Medicare
reimbursement rate. The lowest rate is Miami-South Florida with mean prices that are 147%
of Medicare rates { the mean price in San Francisco is 43% higher than Miami. Within San
Francisco, the interquartile range is 116 percent of the Medicare price. Of course, there are
a number of possible reasons for this variation. Cost, quality and demand dierences will
generally imply price dierences. However, it seems unlikely that there is enough variation
across those factors to generate such wide variation in price. It is important to note that in
the bargaining framework outlined above, it is easy to generate large variations in price both
across and within markets by simply varying the ownership structure of hospitals, suggesting
to us that the variation in prices is likely related to variation in hospital bargaining leverage.
3.2.1 Reduced Form Estimates
Reduced form approaches to estimating price-concentration have a long history in the indus-
trial organization and health economics literature. In this approach, researchers construct
measures of market concentration, usually some form of the Herndahl-Hirschmann Index
(HHI),35 and regress it on the variable of interest (e.g. prices) controlling for observable
confounding variables. Reduced form approaches allow researchers to be somewhat agnos-
tic about the underlying theoretical model and thereby let the data speak directly to the
35The HHI is the sum of squared market shares.
29relationships between the variables of interest.36 While the broader industrial organization
literature has largely moved away from employing reduced form approaches, it nevertheless
remains a popular research approach in the health economics and health services research
literatures.
There are several reasons underlying the movement away from reduced form strategies.
First, in most applied settings it is dicult to square a strict functional relationship be-
tween price and the HHI with economic theory. Basic oligopoly theory posits a functional
relationship between HHI and prices only with Cournot behavior { quantity setting with
homogenous products. Homogenous product, quantity setting models are inconsistent with
the institutional facts of hospital markets, as we have previously indicated.
Some alternative models generate pricing power as a function of market shares, and
are thus related to the HHI. Akosa Antwi et al. (2006) develop a competition index for
dierentiated product oligopoly with logit demand and Bertrand pricing. They call the







(1   stj) (14)
where j is LOCI, hospitals are indexed by j, consumers are of diering types indexed by t,
Nt is the # of type t consumers, qt is the average quantity consumed by type ts, and stj is
the proportion of type t consumers going to hospital j. The pricing equation for this model
is:






where cj are hospital marginal costs and  is the marginal utility of income from the under-
lying utility function. This is a coherent economic model that generates an equation with
price as a function of market shares.
In another approach, which also utilizes logit demand, Capps et al. (2003) show that




and thus a hospital system's bargaining leverage is an aggregation of a nonlinear function of
the individual hospital choice probabilities. A common approach to calculating the HHIs is to
36See Gaynor and Vogt (2000) and Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) for summaries of early portions of
this literature.
30construct a HHI at the ZIP code level and then aggregate up to the hospital level. That gives






zk where  sj
z is the hospital's share
of its patients it culls from zip code z. This formulation of the HHI is functionally related to
WTP below and thus will be imperfectly correlated with the WTP. One might more broadly
think of the HHI as a proxy for the expected toughness of competition based on market
structure. The HHI isn't explicitly derived from an underlying theoretical framework, but is
intended to capture the potential for competition. This has some appeal, but it is important
to realize that while the HHI can be constructed to imperfectly capture geographic and
product dierentiation, nonetheless it likely contains meaningful measurement error. Many
analysts who have estimated equations using the HHI have been sensitive to this and have
attempted to deal with the problem, usually through the use of instrumental variables. As
always, the resulting estimates will be as good as the instruments.
The second concern regarding the reduced-form approaches is that market structure is
endogenous.37 There likely are unobservables, such as the quality of the services provided,
or unobserved cost dierences, that will be correlated with price and market structure. For
example, if price is not appropriately adjusted for quality, then standard regression analysis
of concentration on hospital price will yield biased coecients. Some of this concern can be
mitigated by using estimating a multinomial model of hospital choice and using the estimates
to construct hospital specic measures of market concentration. Kessler and McClellan (2000)
and Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) develop such an approach to construct measures of
market concentration and much of the recent literature as moved to constructing hospital
specic versions of the HHI. These HHI measures are generally the weighted (by hospital
patient shares) of zip code HHIs. More generally, instrumental variable approaches can be
employed to deal with the endogeneity problem, including the approach just described.
The third issue is that hospitals sell dierentiated products, and traditional approaches
to calculating the HHI do not account for this dierentiation. The hospital-specic measures
described above constitute an ad hoc approach to dealing with this problem. The LOCI
measure described above is a competition index explicitly derived for dierentiated products
oligopoly.
Fourth, reduced form approaches generally require specifying a geographic market. This
often relies on geo-political boundaries (e.g. counties or Primary Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (PMSAs)) to dene the market. Geopolitical boundaries are unlikely to correspond to
market denitions, and thus this approach will generate measurement error. As mentioned
above, many recent SCP approaches construct a hospital-specic measure of the HHI by
measuring the HHI at the ZIP code level and taking a share weighted average across ZIP
37The problem of endogenous market structure is not unique to reduced form methods. Structural ap-
proaches generally simply assume xed market structure, and so they also face the challenge of estimating
models when market structure is endogenous.
31codes to construct the hospital's HHI. This approach to calculating the HHI mitigates, at
least to some degree, the third and fourth criticisms listed above.
The principal challenge in estimating models of hospital price competition is constructing
a accurate measure of hospital price. Hospital contracts with insurers are generally compli-
cated and have numerous prices for dierent services. In general, there are three classes of
contracts: DRG-based, per-diem, and percent of changes. It is common for hospital contracts
to contain combinations of these approaches. For example, a hospital/insurer contract might
have a DRG structure for general medical/surgical services and `carve-out' obstetrics using
a per-diem formulation. These contracts give hospitals dierent incentives for resource use.
Anecdotally, bargaining leverage appears to play a signicant role in the determination of the
contract form, with hospitals preferring contracts with lower powered incentives and insurers
preferring higher powered contracts.
There is little work that considers the role of competition in determining insurer-hospital
contract structure.38 In their analysis of insurer contracts for transplant services, Bajari et al.
(2010) nd that the majority of hospital contracts rely on a non-linear, percent of charges
structure. Because of the complexity of insurer-hospital contracts, in most circumstances,
actual administrative claims data used to adjudicate payments between hospitals and insurers
will provide the best measure of price. Constructing price using administrative claims requires
adjusting for dierential severity and types of services. Unfortunately, administrative claims
data from payers and hospitals are not widely available. Researchers more commonly use
measures of price constructed from state mandated hospital nancial reports. Capps and
Dranove (2004), Tenn (2011), Haas-Wilson and Garmon (2011), Thompson (2011), Ginsburg
(2010), and Brand et al. (2011) are a subset of the papers that use insurer claims data to
construct prices in this way.
Table 8 presents a summary of the reduced form papers published since 2000. [TA-
BLE 8 ABOUT HERE] This literature as moved away from primarily using data from
California which, because of data availability issues, was the primary data source for prior
work. All but one of the papers listed in this table nds a positive relationship between
hospital concentration and price. Not surprisingly, this relationship appears to be a function
of the structure of the health plan. Specically, during the rise of MCOs during the 1990s,
this relationship strengthened and the growth in the correlation appears to wane during the
managed care backlash. In addition, the correlation is stronger in markets with high MCO
penetration or in areas with a large number of managed care organizations. The relationship
between price and measures of market structure also holds in other countries. Halbersma
et al. (2010) nd hospital-insurer prices are positively correlated with hospital concentration
and negatively correlated with insurer concentration after the introduction of market-based
38Town et al. (2011) examines the degree of physician risk-bearing in their contracts with health insurers.
They nd that physicians facing less competition are more likely to have fee-for-service contracts.
32health care reforms in the Netherlands in 2004.
3.2.2 Estimates of the Impact of Consummated Mergers on Price
The second popular approach to the analysis of the impact of hospital mergers is to study
the impact of consummated mergers. The analysis of actual mergers has obvious appeal.
The variation in market structure is driven by the phenomena of primary interest. Under-
standing the outcomes of past hospital mergers speaks directly to the role of competition and
the impact of consolidation on hospital prices, and ultimately downstream health care con-
sumers. Studying consummated mergers also suggests a natural estimation strategy. Most
of the papers in this literature rely on a dierence-in-dierence research design in which the
merging hospitals (or sometimes their close rivals) are the treatment group and researchers
locate other hospitals to use as controls. In an eort to better understand the appropriate
merger enforcement strategy, the Federal Trade Commission has embarked on a program to
retrospectively study consummated mergers. The results of these studies are published in a
recent issue of International Journal of the Business of Economics.
Despite its appeal, there are a number of challenges to implementing merger case study
analysis. Principal among these challenges is dening a sensible set of control group hospitals.
Over the last decade hospital ination has been signicant and persistent { the producer price
index for hospitals increased on average 3.8% per year. Thus, simply examining pre/post
hospital prices may lead to misleading inferences regarding the underlying change in the com-
petitive environment induced by the merger. In addition, a merger may change the quality
or the set of services provided by the merging hospitals, which may also aect inference. The
set of control hospitals should have cost and demand shocks that mimic what would have
happened to the merging hospitals under the counterfactual that the merger did not take
place.
In their study of the impact of the Evanston Northwestern Healthcare and Highland Park
Hospital merger and the St. Therese Medical Center and Victory Memorial Hospital, Haas-
Wilson and Garmon (2011) used the non-federal general acute-care hospitals in the Chicago
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area that were not involved in mergers over the relevant
time period. However, as is clear from the pricing equation (7) from our bargaining model,
hospital mergers will aect the price of competitors. That is, a hospital merger that leads to
increased bargaining power will also spillover and increase the prices of competing hospitals
that are not party to the merger. Using a set of control group hospitals that are geographically
proximate to the merging hospital will control for local demand and cost shocks, but risks
inducing a downward bias in the estimated impact due to the spillover eect. Using hospitals
that are not proximate as a control group reduces the bias from spillovers, but increases the
likelihood that demand and costs shocks will not be adequately controlled.
33Table 9 provides a summary of the papers examining the impact of consummated mergers
on estimated prices. [TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] There are several patterns worth noting.
Because of the size of this literature, we do not have the space to discuss in detail all of the
papers, and therefore highlight the patterns and the papers that are particularly noteworthy.
First, the large number of hospital mergers in concentrated markets provides many oppor-
tunities for the examination of price eects of mergers. This is reected in the numbers of
papers (9 in total) that estimate merger price eects. In the broad industrial organization
literature, the number of papers devoted to examining pricing behavior post-merger is rather
limited.39 Second, on average, the impact of consolidation on prices is positive and large.
Third, while the average impact is large, there does seem to be heterogeneity across health
plans in the change in the post-merger negotiated price. The model presented above can
account for this heterogeneity in a limited way through changes in the bargaining leverage
parameters that occur post-merger. Nevertheless, it is a puzzle why the post-merger price
eects are not more homogenous across markets and across insurers within markets.
All but one of the studies nd that, for the majority of the mergers they analyzed, prices
increased (or increased faster relative to trend) for hospitals that consolidated relative to the
control group hospitals.40 These studies can be classied into two categories. Those that
use aggregated measures of price (usually from reported accounting data) and those that
use insurer claims data to construct prices. The pricing information constructed from claims
likely contains signicantly less measurement error. Focusing on those studies, for 17 of the
23 hospital merger/MCO combinations, hospital prices increased signicantly relative to the
control group.41 The typical increase in price is often quite large. For example, Tenn (2011)
nds that the prices at Sutter hospital increased between 28 and 44% after its merger with
Alta-Bates hospital, relative to the control group.42
The pattern that mergers between competing hospitals in concentrated markets often
leads to signicant price increases also holds in international settings. While most non-U.S.
OECD countries rely on administered prices, the health reforms implemented in 2004 in
the Netherlands allow insurers and hospitals to negotiate over prices. Two hospital mergers
between competing hospitals were consummated just prior to the reforms. Kemp and Sev-
erijnen (2010) estimate the impacts of the mergers on the price of hip surgery and nd that
the hospitals involved in the most controversial merger experienced a signicant increase in
price relative to the control hospitals.
39This literature has focused primarily on mergers in the airline and banking industries.
40The one study that did not nd a price increase at merging hospitals, Spang et al. (2001), is the oldest
paper in the review and uses relatively poor measures of price and costs and the study design is not well
suited to identify hospital merger eects.
41We exclude St Therese - Victory hospital merger from this calculation.
42Since the price increase at Alta-Bates was comparable to the control group, this suggests that the hospital
system used their bargaining leverage after the merger only for higher rates at Sutter hospital.
34One concern in studies that use a dierence-in-dierence approach is that the merger is
endogenous. That is, there are unobservables (to the econometrician) that aect the returns
to merger and the prices that would have occurred absent the merger. For example, a hospital
that is in decline might be more likely to merge, and it is likely that its future prices are
likely to be lower than one would expect given observables.43 In this case, the estimating
merger eect would be biased towards zero. Dafny (2009) addresses the endogeneity issue by
constructing an indicator of whether hospitals are co-located (located within .3 miles of one
another) as an instrument. The underlying idea is if distance is predictive of mergers (which
it should be as the gains from merger are a function of the distance between hospitals), but
is uncorrelated with these unobservables, then it should correct for the selection into merger.
She then examines the impact of a hospital's rivals merging on that hospital's price using this
IV strategy and nds that OLS analyses lead to lower estimated merger eects relative to
IV, consistent with the idea that hospitals select into merger. Her analysis crucially relies on
the linear separability of the unobservable. That is, in order for the instrument to be valid,
the unobservable's impact on prots cannot be a function of the distance between rivals.
Finally, while the literature clearly shows that mergers between rivals in concentrated
settings is likely to increase prices for insurers, it is unclear how those increased prices aect
consumers. In the framework outlined above, as is clear from equations (12) and(13), the
welfare impact of a hospital merger depends on the pass-through from increased hospital
prices to insurance premiums. Two companion papers examine this pass-through, albeit in
an indirect way. Town et al. (2006) examine how changes in hospital market structure aect
rates of uninsurance. If increases in hospital prices are not passed on to consumers, then
there should be little association between hospital mergers and insurance take-up. They
nd that, in fact, hospital mergers lead to declines in the rates of insurance and the more
competitive the insurance market (measured by the number of HMOs), the larger the impact
of hospital mergers. There is little work on the equity and access consequences of provider
consolidation. Town et al. (2007) nd that the declines in health insurance take-up caused
by hospital consolidation were most pronounced for low-income and minority populations.
In sum, there is a clear message from this literature. Mergers between rival hospitals are
likely to raise the price of inpatient care in concentrated markets. While the direction of the
impact of hospital mergers is clear, the estimated magnitudes are heterogeneous and dier
across market settings, hospitals and insurers. The dierence-in-dierence approach does
not lend itself to uncovering the reasons for the wide range of price responses. Employing
methodological approaches that address the limitations of dierence-in-dierence analysis
and forming a better understanding the diversity of price responses to hospital mergers are
43The are other possible sources of bias. For example, a hospital that is a poor negotiator with MCOs
may be more likely to be acquired or the hospital may change its post-merger characteristics (e.g. quality)
which may aect is post-merger price. See discussion by Gowrisankaran (2011) and Leonard and Olley (2011)
regarding the potential biases of dierence-in-dierence estimates of merger price eects.
35areas that deserve future research attention.
3.2.3 Results from Structural and Semi-Structural Approaches
More recently, researchers have placed greater emphasis on estimating the price impact of hos-
pital mergers using structural and semi-structural techniques. The advantages of structural
approaches are clear. Structural approaches estimate the primitives of a specic economic
model and thus can predict counterfactual outcomes in an internally consistent manner.
However, there are also important disadvantages to structural estimation. It requires the
specication of a specic economic model that is unlikely to perfectly correspond to the
actual data generating process. Thus, there is likely to be some bias from model misspeci-
cation, and the importance of that bias is dicult to quantify.
Semi-structural estimation approaches also have advantages and disadvantages. They
have a foundation in economic theory and estimate some of the primitives of an economic
model but do not impose a specic economic model on the estimation. However, this ex-
ibility has consequences, as the estimated parameters may not be invariant to changes in
costs, demand, or market structure and thus might lead to inaccurate counterfactual predic-
tions. It should be noted that reduced-form methods also impose a specic data generating
process, however that data generating process is often ad hoc and might not be consistent
with any economic model. As the reduced form approaches do not estimate economic prim-
itives, the coecients may be functions of factors that might be aected by changes in the
market environment. Thus, reduced form approaches may also lead to poor counterfactual
predictions.
The inherent limitations of any empirical approach should not deter researchers from
applying these methods { empirical nihilism is not an attractive option. In particular, pol-
icymakers will continue to make policies that aect the outcomes of provider markets and
it is important for economists to produce the best evidence they can on the likely impact of
these policies. That will require economists to use the best empirical tools to make inferences
from the available data understanding and probing the limitations of their chosen empirical
strategy.
Town and Vistnes (2001) and Capps et al. (2003) (CDS) are papers that rst developed
semi-structural approaches consistent with the institutional framework in which hospitals





where Wi(Jh) is dened in (3) and Ih is the relevant health plan population to aggregate
over. Equation (17) is the gross value to health plan enrollees of having access to hospital
36network Jh. The basic idea is to structurally estimate what CDS call the willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for each hospital, WTPj = V (Jh)   V (Jh   j), using patient discharge data. From
(7), hospital prices are a function of Fh(Jh) Fh(Jn  j), divided by the expected number of
patients from that payer.44 The key assumption is that the WTP measure well approximates
Fh(Jh) Fh(Jn j) or rather the functional relationship between price and Fh(Jh) Fh(Jn j)
is well approximated by the functional relationship between price (or prots) and the WTP.
With the WTP measure in hand the researcher can then regress WTP on prices or hospital
prots. This is done by rst estimating a multinomial logit hospital choice model using
patient discharge data. These data contain information on the hospital where the patient
was admitted, home zip code, diagnosis and patient demographics, which allow the estimation
of  in equation (2). With an estimate of  and illness severity weights, it is straightforward
to calculate WTP using (3). Given the estimates from this model, the values of Wi(Jh)  
Wi(Jh j) are calculated and then the WTP is calculated by integrating over the probability
of each illness for each individual, using the empirical distribution of illnesses in the data.
The fundamental assumption is that the hospital system threatens to pull all of the hospitals
from the insurer's system if an agreement is not reached at any of its hospitals.
To calculate the price impact of a merger between hospitals j and k one can simply
compute the new value of the WTPj+k = V (Jh)   V (Jh   (j + k)) and use the regression
estimates to compute the post merger price increase. Let  be the coecient on WTP. The
impact of the merger is determined by the net increase in bargaining leverage: (
P
i V (Jh  
j)+V (Jh  k) V (Jh  (j +k))). Compared to pure reduced form approaches, the primary
advantage of this approach is that it is more closely grounded in the underlying theory.
While the semi-structural approach is better grounded in the theory, and can be thought of
as a reduced form approximation to a number of dierent bargaining games, the estimation is
nevertheless not tied to a specic theory that predicts this particular functional relationship.
Thus, the residuals from the regression have no structural interpretation. The residuals
capture all factors that aect price but are not included in the observables, which could
include bargaining ability, unobserved costs, or complementary organizational assets (e.g.
the ownership of physician groups, or health plans).
In calculating the expected post-merger price increase of a merger between hospitals j
and k, one needs to make assumptions regarding the appropriate treatment of the residuals.
One possible approach is to calculate the change in the tted prices and use that change as
the predicted price change from the merger. Another approach would be to take the average
of j and k's residuals and apply them to the newly formed hospital. Finally, if there are
important asymmetries between hospitals j and k (e.g. one hospital is part of a existing
44If price is the dependent variable then the appropriate measure of WTP will be normalized by the
expected volume of patients. The dependent variable in CDS is prots and thus their WTP measure is based
on the aggregate gross value of the network.
37large system and one hospital is a stand-alone community hospital), one might reasonably
apply the residual from the large system to all hospitals in calculating the price increase.
Here the price increase would then account for both increases in the bargaining leverage due
to the merger, as well as the impact of organizational specic attributes that aect price
(e.g. better bargaining skill, the ownership of complementary assets). In addition, another
important limitation to this approach is that it assumes that there is no spillover eect of
the merger on the pricing behavior of other hospitals in the market (i.e., it only allows for
unilateral eects).
Town and Vistnes (2001) acquired data on negotiated price between two MCOs and
hospitals in Southern California to estimate the relationship between the net value that a
hospital brings to the network and price. One of the challenges in estimating bargaining
models is specifying the counterfactual outcome that would occur if the hospital and MCO
fail to reach an agreement. In the bargaining framework outlined above, the disagreement
outcomes are quite simple and only consider the possibility that the hospital is dropped from
the network without replacement. However, there are other possible counterfactual networks
that could arise under a disagreement.
Town and Vistnes consider two counterfactual disagreement outcomes to estimate the
parameters. The rst counterfactual is that absent an agreement, the MCO will simply ex-
clude the hospital from the network. The second counterfactual they consider is that MCOs
will contract with the closest hospital not currently in the network. They then estimate a
switching regression model in which one of these two counterfactuals determines the bargain-
ing leverage of the hospital, and hence will determine the negotiated price. They nd that
hospitals with higher bargaining power (as measured by these two counterfactuals) negotiate
higher prices. They also run merger counterfactuals, and their results indicate that mergers
between neighboring hospitals can lead to signicant increases in hospital prices, even in an
urban environment with many other competing hospitals.
CDS use data from San Diego, CA to estimate the relationship between WTP and hospital
bargaining leverage. They calculate WTP as described above and regress it against hospital
prots. Rearranging (7) and aggregating over MCOs, hospital prots will be a complicated
function of the WTP. They nd a strong positive correlation between WTP and hospital
prots { a one unit increase in WTP increases hospital prots by $2,233. This implies that
hospitals that are more attractive to consumers have greater bargaining power, and hence earn
substantially higher prots. Lewis and Pum (2011) expand upon the CDS framework. They
estimate a hospital cost function and specify a simple bargaining model and nd that WTP
is correlated with market power. They also nd that systems operating in multiple markets
have higher bargaining power, indicating that focusing only on local markets in evaluating
the potential eect of a merger may be insucient. A hospital's physician arrangements and
other characteristics can also have a signicant eect on its bargaining power.
38Several papers take a signicantly more structural approach to examining hospital com-
petition. Gaynor and Vogt (2003) take a dierent approach to structurally estimating the
impact of hospital mergers. They adapt the structural models of Berry et al. (1995) (BLP),
who developed an estimation framework for dierentiated products consumer goods, to the
hospital industry. In both cases the products are dierentiated, but individuals pay directly
for consumer goods, without the intermediate step of health plans. The Gaynor and Vogt
(2003) approach modies the utility model in equation (2) so that total price paid by the
insurer is an argument in the utility function, and thus aect hospital choices. The interpre-
tation is that this is a reduced form choice function incorporating the objectives of consumers
and insurers.45 They specify a supply side, allowing for dierences between NFP and FP
hospitals.
Gaynor and Vogt use data from hospital discharge and nancial data from California.
They use the discharge data to estimate a multinomial logit model of hospital choice, and
use data on hospital revenues to construct a measure of prices. They estimate the average
elasticity of demand faced by a hospital to be -4.85, and nd that hospitals are highly spatially
dierentiated { cross-price elasticities fall sharply with the distance between two hospitals.
NFP hospitals set lower prices than FPs, but mark up prices over marginal costs by the same
amount. They then go on to simulate the impact of a hospital merger in San Luis Obispo,
California, and predict that hospital prices would increase by up to 53%, with no signicant
dierence in merger eects if the merging hospitals are NFP or FP. The advantage of using
this approach is that it allows for a rich model of consumer demand, direct information
on hospital costs is not necessary, and given the data and the parameter estimates, it is
straightforward and transparent to calculate the impact of a merger of prices.
This posted price BLP model is fairly dierent from a bargaining model. BLP-style
models have been widely applied to examine mergers for many other industries.46 There are
two issues with adapting BLP-style estimation to the hospital industry. First, using a BLP
approach requires obtaining an accurate estimate of the price elasticity of demand from the
choices of consumers. Yet, consumers rarely pay dierent out-of-pocket prices for dierent
hospitals in-network so it is not entirely clear how the variation in hospital prices aects
consumer choice. Second, in general, BLP models assume a Bertrand price equilibrium.
However, as noted by Grennan (2010), the Bertrand price equilibrium is a special case of the
Nash Bargaining equilibrium with  = 1 and no price discrimination. If  < 1, imposing a
Bertrand equilibrium will lead to misspecication. Of course, all models are simplications
45Gaynor and Vogt prove that, under fairly general conditions, insurers, in eect, act on behalf of consumers.
In this case the demand function they estimate recovers consumer preferences. Consumers may not pay
dierential prices at the point of choosing a hospital, but they do pay higher premiums if hospital prices are
higher. Insurers' objectives aren't aected by hospital characteristics, but they must attract consumers who
do care about these factors.
46For example, see Nevo (2000).
39and thus are necessarily misspecied, so it is unclear how important this misspecication is
for merger analysis. Given that bargaining models can be complicated and also subject to
misspecication, one way to think about the posted price model is that it is a reduced form
way of capturing a complicated underlying bargaining relationship.
Ho (2009b) represents a signicant break-through in the modeling of hospital competition.
The key insight she develops is that given consumer preferences over MCO characteristics
(including the structure of its hospital network), and the realized hospital network, one can
estimate the parameters of the hospital prot function. She estimates a hospital choice model
and uses those parameter estimates to construct V (Jm) (where the m subscripts insurers) for
each hospital and each insurer for the large metropolitan areas in the U.S. . She also uses the
parameters to construct counterfactual V (Km), where Jm 6= Km: the values associated with
alternative hospital networks. With the measures of V (Jm) in hand, she then posits that
insurers compete in static Nash equilibrium in prices and estimates the utility parameters of
insurer choice using the approach of BLP, where V (Jm) is included as an argument in the
consumer's utility function.
In Ho's model, all hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it oers to all plans in
the market. Then, all plans simultaneously respond. MCOs select the hospital network that
maximizes prots relative to counterfactual network congurations. That is, E(m(V (Jm)) 
E(m(V (Km)) 8Km 6= Jm where  denotes the prots for MCO m. These prots are the
revenues the MCO earns, given its hospital network, less the payments made to the hospitals
in its network.
This observation suggests the use of an inequality method of moments estimator developed
by Ho and co-authors (Pakes et al., 2006). While the underlying econometric theory is
nontrivial, the basic idea behind this estimator is straightforward. Given a set of instruments
which help address measurement error, the estimator nds the set of parameters that result in
the observed network producing the highest expected prots relative to other counterfactual
hospital networks.47 The challenge is to construct prot functions for counterfactual networks
that are consistent with the underlying bargaining model. Ho assumes `passive beliefs' { the
hospital believes that the MCO will not change its beliefs about the oers the hospitals makes
to other MCOs were it to receive the counterfactual oer. Instead of positing a structural
approach to hospital prots, she species a reduced form hospital prot function where a
hospital's prots are a function of the number of expected admissions, market and hospital
characteristics. Ho does not have access to hospital pricing information, which limits the
ability to directly estimate the bargaining model.
Ho nds that hospitals in systems take a larger fraction of the surplus and also penalize
plans that do not contract with all members. Hospitals that are attractive to consumers also
47The parameters are only set identied.
40capture high markups, and hospitals with higher costs per patient receive lower markups
per patient than other providers. The limitation of Ho's approach is that it is not directly
applicable to analyzing the impact of hospital mergers or other changes in hospital market
structure. For example, in her framework, two hospital systems that merge would not aect
the equilibrium surplus division, and thus would not have an impact on prices. In related
work, Ho (2006) notes that the realized equilibrium selective network may be inecient.
Under selective contracting, hospitals contract with a subset of the hospitals in the market
thus limiting the choice set of the patient when they select a MCO.
Brand et al. (2011) use both semi-structural and structural approaches to estimate the
impact of a proposed hospital merger in Northern Virginia between the large 1,800-bed IN-
OVA hospital system and Prince William Hospital, a 170-bed facility in Manassas, VA. The
FTC challenged this merger in 2006 and the parties abandoned the transaction. In their
structural work, Brand et al. (2011) manipulate an equation similar to (7) to recover bar-
gaining and cost parameters and then use pricing relationships similar to those in equations
(8) and (10) to calculate the impact of the merger.
Pakes (2010) furthers the ideas in Ho (2009b) and Pakes et al. (2006) by examining the
MCO/hospital network formation decision, allowing for richer error structures. Again, the
underlying idea is that the revealed choice of the insurer network can be used to infer deeper
parameters of the hospital prot function. While the focus of Pakes' work is methods devel-
opment, the estimation and simulation results reveal interesting patterns. In the simulation
results he computes the full in formation Nash equilibrium for the game in which hospitals
make take-it-or-leave-it oers to insurers and insurers decide whether to accept or reject the
oers. The equilibrium margins for hospitals are decreasing in the excess capacity, costs, the
costs relative to the other hospitals in the market. The hospital's margins are increasing in
the insurer's margins.
The structural analysis of buyer-seller networks is a young and quickly evolving literature.
While this literature is relatively new, the underlying policy implications of these papers is
similar to the other strands of the literature. Hospitals (particularly those in systems) can
acquire and exercise market power. The availability of high quality data sets combined with
recent theoretic and econometric advances point to this line of work leading to important
ndings in the near future.
3.2.4 Not-for-Prot Firm Behavior
The hospital sector is characterized by the fact that there is a mixture of rms with dierent
ownership types. Not-for-prots are the most common, but there are substantial numbers
of for-prot hospitals and public hospitals. Interesting questions arise in this context about
dierences in behavior between for-prot and not-for-prot rms (and publics), and the
41impact of the mixture of dierent types of rms in a market on rm conduct.
Some of the studies we have already reviewed (e.g., Capps et al., 2003; Gaynor and Vogt,
2003) have addressed the issue of not-for-prot/for-prot dierences in competitive conduct.
Those studies do not nd any signicant dierences in pricing behavior. A recent study by
Capps et al. (2010a) examines whether not-for-prot hospitals are more likely than for-prot
hospitals to oer more charity care or unprotable services in response to an increase in
market power. The implication is, that if there were such a dierence, not-for-prots would
be spending their prots from market power on socially benecial activities. Capps et al.
examine 7 years of data on California hospitals and nd no evidence of any such dierences
{ not-for-prots do not engage in any more socially benecial activities than do for-prots
when they possess market power.
Dafny (2005) asks whether hospitals engage in \upcoding," choosing more protable
diagnosis codes for patients when the protability of doing so increases. She uses a 1988
policy reform that generated large price increases for many, but not all, Medicare admissions
and nds evidence of substantial upcoding by hospitals. This is much more pronounced
among for-prot hospitals than among not-for-prots.
Duggan (2000) uses an increase in government reimbursements for treating indigent pa-
tients to test for dierences in behavior between for-prot, not-for-prot, and public hospitals.
He nds that both for-prot and not-for-prot hospitals responded strongly to the nancial
incentives in the policy. Both types of private hospitals treated the most protable indigent
patients and avoided unprotable ones. Public hospitals' behavior did not change. In ad-
dition, both for-prot and not-for-prot hospitals used the revenues from the indigent care
program to increase nancial assets, as opposed to improve medical care for the poor.
Duggan (2002) uses the same government policy as in his previous paper to identify
behavior. In this paper he is concerned with the mix of hospital ownership types and impacts
on behavior. He nds that not-for-prot hospitals located in areas with many for-prot
hospitals were substantially more responsive to the changed nancial incentives than not-for-
prot hospitals located in areas with few for-prots. A fruitful area for future research may
be to further examine the determinants of the mix of ownership types and impacts on other
types of conduct.
3.2.5 Impact of Hospital Mergers on Costs
It is clear that mergers can result in eciencies because of economies of scale, increased
purchasing power, the ability to consolidate services, or the the transfer of managerial tech-
niques and skill to the acquired hospital. Williamson (1968) noted that mergers that result
in signicant market power but also lead to meaningful reductions in marginal costs can
be welfare improving. However, mergers also have the potential to increase costs. Larger
42systems imply larger bureaucracies. In addition, hospital costs are not necessarily exogenous
to market structure. Hospitals that are able to bargain for higher prices may have the in-
centive to use the resulting prots for the benet of physicians and hospital executives (e.g.,
through capital expenditures that benet physicians or increases in executive compensation
or perks). This is particularly likely if there is no residual claimant (as is the case for not-for-
prot organizations) or monitoring by the residual claimant is costly. Thus, the analysis cost
impacts is central to understanding the impact of hospital mergers. The evidence presented
above suggests that, on average, hospital mergers result in increases in price. Consequently
if there are signicant cost reductions associated with mergers they are not passed onto the
purchasers of hospital services in the form of lower prices.
The analysis of the impact of hospital mergers and acquisitions on cost faces a notable
challenge in nding accurate and reliable measures of costs. Medicare Cost Reports and state
nancial data are the primary source of cost data, but these data generally lump inpatient
and outpatient expenditures into one category, are not easily adjusted for changes in patient
severity, and are subject to the vagaries of accounting methodologies. Dranove and Lindrooth
(2003) is the most convincing analysis. Using data on mergers of previously independent
hospitals that consolidate nancial reporting and operate under a single license post-merger,
they nd that, on average, these hospitals experience post-merger cost decreases of 14 percent.
System mergers in which the hospitals were not as fully integrated (as measured by the use
of multiple licenses) did not realize cost savings. These ndings suggest that integration of
merging hospitals is necessary to achieve meaningful eciencies. Harrison (2010) uses AHA
data to examine dierences in expected hospital costs, and nds that immediately following
a merger costs declined, but eventually rose to pre-merger levels. This nding that is dicult
to reconcile with the view that mergers require signicant upfront costs but have benets
accrue in later years. In sum, the evidence discussed above suggests that mergers between
competitors in concentrated markets lead to hospital price increases. That is, on average
hospital mergers in these circumstances do not appear to generate enough eciencies to
oset the gains in market power. The circumstances in which mergers are most likely to
result in meaningful cost decreases are those in which the merging facilities operate as a
more fully integrated entity.
433.3 Recent Developments in Antitrust Enforcement and Competition Policy in
Health Care
3.3.1 Antitrust Developments in the U.S.
Traditionally, the hospital sector has been one of the most active areas of antitrust enforce-
ment.48 However, the decade of the 2000s saw a signicant slowdown in the number of U.S.
antitrust cases in the health care sector. While there were not as many signicant cases as
the previous decades, there nonetheless were at least two cases that went to trial that were
important.
In a separate development, the DOJ and FTC recently revised the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, 1992) to more accurately
reect the agencies' approach to mergers. Relative to the previously issued versions, the
revised Merger Guidelines takes a more conservative and more exible approach to merger
analysis, increasing the HHI cut-o for dening\Highly Concentrated" markets to 2,500. The
Merger Guidelines also make clear that the agencies use econometric and economic theory-
based approaches to merger analysis, in addition to using the traditional methodologies.
In this section we discuss these two signicant antitrust developments since the 1990s
as well as discussing other cases that aect the current implementation of competition pol-
icy. The 1990s saw a string of losses by the U.S. federal antitrust agencies. As discussed in
Gaynor and Vogt (2000), the federal antitrust agencies lost these case for two broad reasons.
First, the courts sometimes have viewed the not-for-prot status of hospitals as mitigating
the anticompetitive impact of increased market power that might accrue to hospitals because
of the merger.49 Second, the courts have tended to side with plaintis in accepting broad ge-
ographic market denitions or viewing the presence of other possible competitors as sucient
to constrain the exercise of market power.50
While each case brings a dierent set of facts, the courts' decisions on both of these is-
sues runs counter to the general ndings from the health economics literature. The evidence
consistently shows that not-for-prot status does not aect static hospital behavior in signif-
icant ways { not-for-prot hospitals are just as willing as for-prots to exercise market power
should they possess it. Second, hospitals are dierentiated products, where patient distance
plays a major role in dierentiating hospitals. Hospital competition occurs locally, and thus
48In this segment we review the recent case developments and refer the reader to Whinston (2007) for a
more complete discussion of recent developments in the economics of antitrust. The Department of Justice
(DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) report Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition (2004)
also provides an excellent overview of the competition policy issues in health care markets
49FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1300-1301 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
50For example, see United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
44mergers involving two closely located competitors in a large urban area may result in the
ability of the merged hospitals to negotiate substantially higher prices.
The most important case in the 2000s for merger enforcement towards health care providers
is FTC v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp.51 In 2000, Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare Corporation merged with Highland Park Hospital. Both hospitals are located
in Evanston, IL, an auent suburb of Chicago. The case was initiated as part of the FTC's
post-merger retrospective, in which they reviewed a number of hospital mergers that occurred
in the late 1990s to the early 2000's. The FTC led suit in 2004, alleging that the merger
violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an Initial
Decision nding that, \[FTC] proved that the Challenged merger has substantially lessened
competition in the product market of general acute inpatient services [sold to managed care
organizations] and in the geographic market of the seven hospitals described above."
The initial relief was Evanston Northwestern was to divest Highland Park hospital and
essentially re-create the market structure that existed prior to the merger. The parties
appealed the case (which is referred to the Commissioners under the FTC administrative law
process) and the Commissioners upheld the ALJ's initial ruling but signicantly altered the
relief. The Commissioners feared that the hospitals were already too integrated to eectively
de-merge and thus ruled that hospitals could remain as a merged entity but had to maintain
separate negotiating functions that would independently negotiate with MCOs.
This case is notable for a number of reasons. First, the merger was already consummated
and the hospital operations had been integrated prior to the FTC's challenge. Because
many of the functions (including insurer negotiations) had been integrated, the impact of
the merger on prices could be directly analyzed, as pre- and post-merger insurer claims
data were available to analyze. In most merger investigations, post-merger price increases
must be inferred and predicted from the available evidence. In this case, the post-merger
prices were available to study. Both testifying economic experts found there was a signicant
post-acquisition price increases (with the hospital's expert nding a post-merger increase of
approximately 10% for inpatient services and the FTC expert nding signicantly higher
post-merger price increases).
Second, the ALJ found that the merger increased Evanston Northwestern's market power
in a suburban market with a number of other competing hospitals.52 Previously, the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies have lost cases where, under very plausible geographic market
denitions, the merger was a two to one consolidation. Thus, the implication is that mergers
in hospital markets with several competitors can lead to signicant increases in price. Of
51Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., FTC Docket No. 9315, Initial Decision (Oct. 20, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/ 051021idtextversion.pdf.
52The ALJ determined that the pre-merger HHI in 2,739 with an increase of 384 (assuming the shares are
unchanged, post-merger.)
45course, this is consistent with the framework outlined above, but the courts have traditionally
been hesitant to embrace the basic premise that market power can be exercised in settings
with more than one competitor. Finally, the ALJ and the Commissioners outlined an ap-
proach to analyzing hospital mergers that explicitly accounts for the institutional features of
the industry. Specically, that hospitals and insurers engage in negotiations that determine
prices, and that an increase in market power from a given merger will be determined by the
increase in bargaining leverage.
Since the Evanston Northwestern case, the FTC has been more aggressive in challenging
hospital mergers in urban and suburban settings. In 2008, the FTC challenged INOVA's
acquisition of Prince William Hospital. INOVA is a large, ve hospital system in Northern
Virginia and they sought to acquire the community hospital in Mannasas, VA. The FTC sued
to enjoin the transaction and the parties abandoned the merger soon after the FTC led its
case. In 2009, Scott and White merged with King's Daughter hospital { both hospitals are
located in Temple, TX. The FTC sta viewed the merger as anticompetitive, however King's
Daughter Hospital was in very poor nancial shape and would likely close soon without a
merger with another hospital. The FTC did not challenge the merger, as they determined that
there was not another, less anticompetitive purchaser for King's Daughter. More recently,
the FTC has sued to stop ProMedica's acquisition of St. Luke's Hospital. ProMedica is
a large hospital system with three hospitals in and around Toledo, OH and St. Luke's
hospital is located in the adjacent suburb of Maumee, OH. At this writing that case is
still being adjudicated, however at the initial preliminary injunction hearing in the Federal
District Court the judge ruled in the FTC's favor.53 In analyzing the competitive impact of
hospital mergers, the FTC has looked to the recent literature on hospital competition and is
incorporating the recent approaches in its analysis.
There has been very limited enforcement regarding consolidation in outpatient and physi-
cian services. While some of these transaction may well result in increases in bargaining
leverage and thus increases in prices, most of these transactions likely fall below the Hart-
Scott-Rodino thresholds which specify the value of the transaction that is necessary for the
parties to notify the federal antitrust agencies. However, in 2008, the FTC issued an admin-
istrative complaint challenging Carillon Clinic's 2008 acquisition of two outpatient clinics in
the Roanoke, VA, area.54 Carillon is a large integrated health system and they had acquired
an outpatient surgery center and an imaging center. The FTC secured a consent decree from
Carillon which divested the two clinics.
Market power need not only be exercised by selling a product but can also be used
to gain lower prices on the purchase of inputs. In health care markets this can occur when
53FTC v. ProMedica Health System, Docket No. 215, Case No. 3:11 CV 47, Findings and Conclusions
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1010167/110329promedicandings.pdf.
54See http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9338/index.shtm.
46insurers have signicant upstream market share and use this leverage to secure lower provider
prices. Hospitals may also be able to leverage their market power in the labor market by
oering nurses lower wages.55 In the consent decree in United States v. UnitedHealth Group
Incorporated and PaciCare Health Systems, Inc the U.S. Department of Justice clearly states
that they will prosecute cases in which the merger leads to increases in monopsony power.
In this case, United Health Group acquired PaciCare, a large health insurer on the West
Coast of the U.S. One of the relevant product markets where the DOJ alleged competitive
harm was the purchase of physician services. The DOJ required divesture in order to preserve
competition in this market. United States and the State of Arizona v. Arizona Hospital and
Healthcare Association and AzHHA Service Corporation is a case regarding the exercise of
monopsony power in the nurses market.56 AzHHA Registry Program is a hospital group
purchasing organization which contracts with nursing agencies to provide temporary nursing
services for most Arizona hospitals. The DOJ dened the relevant market as the \hospitals'
purchases of per diem nursing services in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas" and
claimed that the hospitals participating in AzHHA were able to obtain rates for temporary
nursing services below competitive levels. The consent decree prevented AzHHA from jointly
negotiating nurses wages for its member hospitals.
Hospitals and other integrated providers oer a number of dierent services and, impor-
tantly, the services they oer (e.g. primary, secondary and tertiary care) may dier from
their competitors.57 The fact that hospitals oer a variety of services implies that they may
have an incentive to bundle those services for exclusionary purposes when they negotiate
with insurers. In Cascade Health Solutions v. Peace Health the plaintis argued that Peace-
Health, a three hospital system in Lane County, OR with a large hospital, Sacred Heart, that
oers primary, secondary and tertiary care, bundled and tied their products in an attempt to
monopolize primary and secondary services. Cascade Health Solutions is a 114-bed hospital
that does not oer tertiary services. Specically, PeaceHealth oered insurers substantial
discounts on their entire range of services if they did not contract with Cascade Health Solu-
tions. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that when the party has monopoly power,
bundling is legal unless the discounts result in prices that are below an appropriate measure
of costs.58 This standard is in conict with the Third Circuit standard of anti-competitive
harm which does not consider the relationship between price and the appropriate measure of
costs.59
55Unlike on the selling side of the market, the welfare impact of lower input prices is less clear.
56See http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/azhha.htm.
57\Tertiary" refers to complex services like invasive cardiovascular surgery and intensive neonatal care,
whereas \primary" and \secondary" acute hospital services are more common medical services like bone-
setting and tonsillectomies.
58The parties later settled the case once the case was remanded back to the District court.
59See LePages, Inc. v. 3M. \Bundled price discounts may be anti-competitive if they are oered by
47The second antitrust case of importance that occurred during the 2000s is In the Matter
of North Texas Specialty Physicians (NTSP).60 NTSP is an organization of independent
physicians and physician groups that was formed, managed and operated by physicians.
Many of the physicians in NTSP directly compete with one another. NTSP's main functions
are to negotiate and review contract proposals for member services that are submitted by
payors, including insurance companies and health plans; to review payment issues; and to
act as a lobbyist for its members' interests.
The fundamental issue in this case was whether NTSP served as a price xing agent for
its member physicians or if the facilitation of setting premiums was an ancillary activity and
their primary function was to enable the setting of risk contracts between it and its member
physicians. Previously, the courts have found that physician organizations that set rates for
the group can be illegal under a rule of reason analysis.61 Organizations like NTSP can serve
as a conduit for establishing risk-contracts that can allow the implementation of high powered
incentives for physicians and these high-powered incentives can induce more ecient behavior
than standard, fee-for-service reimbursement. However, the use of risk-bearing contracts by
insurers has declined since the 1990s, and thus the purpose of organizations like NTSP for
such purposes is unclear.
NTSP negotiates both risk-sharing contracts and non-risk-sharing contracts for its mem-
bers, however the vast majority of the contracts were non-risk-sharing contracts. NTSP's
physicians enter into an agreement with NTSP that grants NTSP the right to receive all
payer oers and imposes on the physicians a duty to forward payer oers to NTSP promptly.
The physicians agree that they will not individually pursue a payer oer unless and until
they are notied by NTSP that it has permanently discontinued negotiations with the payer.
NTSP surveys members, uses the information to calculate the mean, median, and mode of
the minimum acceptable fees identied by its physicians, and then uses these measures to
establish its minimum contract prices.
The ALJ ruled (and the Commission later armed) that the activities of NTSP were
\inherently suspect" and, taken as a whole, amounted to horizontal price xing which is
unrelated to any pro-competitive eciencies. NTSP's conduct could be characterized as per
se unlawful under the antitrust laws. The broad lessons from this ruling are: 1) activities by
physician organizations that look inherently suspect and are likely price xing will be treated
under a per se standard; 2) if a physician organization intends to argue that eciencies justify
collection and dissemination of reimbursement rates, the organization needs to be ready to
a monopolist and substantially foreclose portions of the market to a competitor who does not provide an
equally diverse group of services and who therefore cannot make a comparable oer."
60In the Matter of North Texas Specialty Physicians, Docket No. 9312. The initial decision can be found:
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9312/041116initialdecision.pdf.
61See Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Med. Soc'y, 457 U. S. 332 356-57 (1982).
48explain why those eciencies could not be achieved without price xing. Going forward,
as physicians form accountable care organizations (ACOs) under the recently passed health
reform legislation, those activities should be limited to the implementation of the ACO and
behavior among those physicians that resembles collective negotiations of MCO contracts will
be examined closely. Unless those activities can be viewed as necessary to the implementation
of the ACO, they will likely be treated harshly by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies.62
As of this writing there is at least one antitrust case that was recently initiated and has
yet to be resolved hat may signicantly aect competition policy once decided. In United
States and State of Michigan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan the DOJ alleges that
BCBS used its monopsony power to secure most-favored nation contracts with hospitals in
which the hospitals were contractually obligated to charge competing MCOs 25% higher
rates. The apparent purpose of such contracts is to increase BCBS' rivals' marginal costs as
well as increasing entry costs. In a dierentiated products setting higher rival costs allows a
rm to charge higher prices and earn higher prots.
While the decade of the 2000s was a relatively quiet one for health care provider antitrust
policy, it seems likely that the courts will have to address important issues in the near future.
In particular, providers are becoming more integrated { hospitals are acquiring more physician
groups and other outpatient services (e.g. imaging, rehabilitation, outpatient surgery). As
these \integrated" organizations become more common the likelihood that they will attempt
to use bargaining leverage in some services to other services (or that their behavior will
be interpreted as attempting to leverage market power) through the use of tying, bundling
or other means. The recently passed health care reform provides incentives for increased
provider integration and will likely only increase the number of integrated organizations.
Thus, it seems likely that it is only a matter of time before the courts will have to examine
the legality of such behavior by integrated hospital systems.
3.3.2 Competition Policy towards Health Care in OECD Countries
There has not been nearly as much antitrust activity towards health care outside of the U.S.
This is mostly due to health care systems in other countries being more centrally controlled
and heavily regulated. However, a number of countries have pursued de-centralization and
competition in reforms of their health systems. The Netherlands, Germany, and the United
Kingdom (England in particular) are notable in this regard. Varkevisser and Schut (2009)
review antitrust policy towards hospital mergers in the Netherlands, Germany, and the U.S.
The Netherlands has a competition agency, the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa)
62In contrast to the NTSP case, the FTC's review of \TriState Health Partners" lays out an example of
where joint contracting by a collection of physicians is subordinate to the eciencies the organization may
yield. See http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/sta/090413tristateaoletter.pdf.
49for general competition policy. They oversee merger cases, in particular, including health care.
They have, however, also used the Netherlands Healthcare Authority (NZa) for oversight of
the functioning of health insurance and health care markets. It has become the primary
government agency entrusted with competition policy in health care markets, although they
do work closely with the NMa.63 The Netherlands has had a few antitrust matters arise over
the past few years. They have had concerns about hospital mergers, as in the U.S., and also
have had concerns about vertical restraints, including vertical integration, between insurers,
hospitals, and doctors. As Canoy and Sauter (2009) note, there was an uptick in merger
activity following market liberalization, and a consequent need for greater merger control.
The NMa has reviewed 9 hospital mergers. All were approved, although some were subject
to extensive review. A notable development has been the adoption of a market denition
methodology for hospitals based on a structural model (the model of Gaynor and Vogt, 2003,
estimated for the Netherlands).
Competition policy enforcement in Germany is under the control of the Federal Car-
tel Oce (Bundeskartellamt, BKA). Most of the concern in health care has been with the
acquisition of public hospitals by private hospital systems. With many local and regional
governments facing large budget decits, there has been a wave of takeovers of public hospi-
tals by private chains. The BKA has examined over 100 hospital mergers and acquisitions.
Relatively few of these have been challenged, but some have been blocked, and there was one
merger which was allowed subject to divestiture. At this point economic and econometric
modeling have not played a large role in these decisions.
In 2009 the U.K. established an agency charged with oversight of competition in the
NHS, following their reforms (in England) in 2006 designed to promote competition. The
establishment of a new agency was necessary, because the conduct of NHS entities was exempt
by at from oversight by the U.K.'s competition authority (the Oce of Fair Trading). The
Cooperation and Competition Panel (CCP) is the agency that has been established for the
oversight of competition in health care and has fairly broad authority to regulate mergers
and general conduct. Since beginning operations in 2009, the CCP has reviewed over 50
merger cases and a number of conduct cases.
4 Hospital Competition and Quality
Thus far (in Section 3) we have focused on hospital competition over prices. The product
is dierentiated, but product characteristics are not subject to choice by hospitals. As we
have seen, this is an extremely useful framework for analyzing hospital price competition.
63The NZa plays an advisory role to the NMa in hospital merger cases, for example.
50Nonetheless, quality64 is subject to hospital control, and can be an important instrument for
competition. In what follows, we rst lay out approaches to modeling quality competition,
then review the relevant literature.65 The models dier substantially depending on whether
price is set administratively (e.g., by a regulator) or if it is a strategic variable. As a conse-
quence, we cover these as separate cases, beginning rst with administratively set prices and
then progressing to market determined prices.
4.1 Hospital Choice of Quality
In what follows, we write down models in which hospitals directly choose the quality of
service they provide. This is convenient for writing down a parsimonious model. There are
some potentially important ways, however, in which this model may not conform precisely
to empirical phenomena. One reason is that hospitals may not directly choose the quality of
care they provide. Hospitals may not explicitly choose a quality level that maximizes prots
(or some other objective). Hospitals may instead choose overall eort, or slack, based on the
incentives they face. Quality of care for a given patient(s) may then be determined (in part,
perhaps stochastically) by eort. This distinction is immaterial for the purposes of modeling.
A model where quality is chosen directly is isomorphic to one where it is determined indirectly
by eort.
In empirical modeling, the most commonly used measure of quality is patient mortality.
It is important to note that mortality is not a measure of quality of service per se, but
an outcome determined (in part) by quality of service. Hospitals are thus not choosing
mortality, but choosing a quality of service level that has an impact on mortality. Patients
are heterogeneous in their responsiveness to treatment. The most common reason for this is
severity of illness. Severely ill patients are more likely to die, ceteris paribus, than healthier
ones.66 In addition, the relationship between quality of service and mortality is stochastic.
A patient's outcome cannot be predicted with certainty based on a certain quality of care,
even given patient and hospital observables. Nonetheless, a given service level generates an
expected level of mortality. As a consequence, it is immaterial whether a model is written
down in which hospitals choose service quality or expected mortality.
64At this point we use quality in a very generic sense. In particular, this encompasses both horizontal
and vertical dierentiation. To be clear, horizontal dierentiation is sometimes alternatively referred to as
\product variety," while vertical dierentiation is alternatively referred to as \product quality." Our use
of the term quality should be understood to encompass both of these except where we specically indicate
otherwise.
65For prior reviews of hospital quality competition see Gaynor (2006b), Pauly (2004), or Vogt and Town
(2006).
66See Gowrisankaran and Town (1999); Geweke et al. (2003) for an econometric approach to correcting
measured mortality for this problem, and others.
51Last, consider the fact that hospitals do not compete for all kinds of cases. In particular,
patients in urgent situations do not usually choose their hospital. A prominent example of
this which has been extensively studied in the empirical literature is AMI (acute myocardial
infarction, or \heart attack"). Heart attack patients don't choose the hospital they are taken
to, yet empirical studies (Kessler and McClellan, 2000) nd that heart attack mortality is
lower in less concentrated (and presumably more competitive) hospital markets. How can
hospitals be competing for patients who don't choose where they go?67 The story is that
hospitals choose a general level of eort for the hospital as a whole, which aects quality
of service, and thus mortality, as described above. Hospitals that are subject to tougher
competition in general choose greater eort, thus increasing the chances of survival of heart
attack patients, even though they aren't competing for heart attack patients. Again, this
can be described using a model in which hospitals choose quality directly. Here, however,
hospitals choose quality of service for the entire hospital based on a sector where choice is
possible. This hospital wide level of quality then determines patient outcomes, including
those for services where there isn't competition, like AMI.
4.2 Administratively Set Prices
In many situations, prices are set administratively (usually by regulators), rather than being
market determined. This is true of entire health systems (e.g., the British National Health
Service), or sectors of health systems (e.g., the Medicare program in the U.S.). In this sit-
uation, when competition among rms occurs it will be via non-price means. We call any
non-price output characteristic(s) quality. In what follows, we will treat this as vertical dier-
entiation68, i.e., we will treat quality as uni-dimensional. This is for ease of exposition. The
basic intuition that follows from such a treatment carries over to a horizontally dierentiated
world, although this is not truly general. We refer to literature which models horizontal
dierentiation where relevant.
The model we present here follows Gaynor (2006b). Let quality have only a vertical
dimension, i.e., \more is better." For simplicity in exposition, assume that the demand that
any rm j faces is separable in its market share, sj, and the level of market demand, D.
Firm j thus faces a demand of:
qj = sj(zj;z j)D(p;zj;z j) (18)
where sj is rm j's market share, zj is rm j's quality, z j is a vector of all other rms'
67Even if patients don't choose where they go, emergency crews may choose among hospitals based on
quality, especially in urban areas with a number of hospitals within a short distance of each other.
68Alternatively referred to as product quality.
52qualities, D is market demand, and p is the regulated price.69 Assume that j's market share
is increasing in own quality, decreasing in the number of rms, and that the responsiveness
of market share to own quality is also increasing in the number of rms.
Assume that rms all use the same technology and face the same input prices. Then they
each have costs described by:
cj = c(qj;zj) + F (19)
where c() is variable cost, and F is a xed cost of entry.
Further assume that there is free entry and exit, so that all rms earn zero prots in
equilibrium. Then, assuming Nash behavior, equilibrium is described by the solutions to the



















j = p  qj   cj = 0 (21)
Inspection of (20) yields some immediate insights. First compare equilibrium quality
under monopoly to that with multiple rms. Notice that, since a monopolist faces market
demand, the rst term in curly brackets in (20) vanishes and sj = 1. Since
@sj
@zj is positive (by
assumption), the term in curly brackets is larger with multiple rms than with a monopolist,
so equilibrium quality is higher with competition.




@zj. In particular, if @D
@zj equals zero, then increases in quality do
not shift market demand, and quality competition is simply over market share, and hence
wasteful. In health care markets that's not likely to be the case. Consumers who are ill may
not respond to changes in quality by changing the aggregate quantity consumed. Nonetheless,
increased quality may result in substantial gains in welfare if it results in improved health.
69Note that for consumers insulated from the cost of consumption, as in health care, the price they face
will be less than the price received by the rm. We ignore this in order to keep this sketch of a model simple.
It would not aect the conclusions in any event.
70We assume here that rms maximize prots. We relax that assumption below. See Section 4.2.2.
53Since
@si
@zi increases with the number of rms (i.e., the rm's demand becomes more elastic
with respect to own quality the more alternatives there are for consumers), quality competi-
tion will be more intense with entry and equilibrium quality will increase with the number
of rms in the market. This benets consumers, but may not increase social welfare. In
particular, the increase in consumer surplus from increased quality may be outweighed by
the increased costs (recall that there is a xed cost of entry for every rm in the market),
particularly if there is diminishing marginal utility from quality and diminishing returns in
quality production. As indicated previously, this may result in excessive quality levels. In
the case of health care it is most likely that quality will be excessive if it has little eect
on health. Quality that substantially improves a patient's chance of survival will be very
valuable, and such benets are more likely to outweigh costs. We can do a simple back of
the envelope calculation to illustrate this. For example, the typical estimate of the value of
one life-year is $100,000. If an increase in quality leads to one additional life-year for every
sick person and there are 1,000 sick people in the market, then costs would have to increase
by more $100 million for the increase in quality to be inecient.
The positive predictions of this model are clear. Quality is increasing in the number of
rms in the market, i.e., competition leads to more quality. Further, quality is increasing
in the regulated price. One may write down a rm's equilibrium quality function as the
(implicit) solution to equations (20) and (21),
z
e = z(p;cq;cz;sj;D) (22)
where cq and cz denote rst derivatives. The rm's level of quality depends on the level of
the regulated price, the marginal cost of quantity, the marginal cost of quality, the level of
demand, market share, and the quality elasticities of market share and market demand. This









z are the quality elasticities of market share and market demand, respectively.
Quality is increasing in price, the elasticity of demand with respect to quality, and the rm's
total demand. Quality is decreasing in the marginal costs of quantity or quality.
This has implications for econometric specications for empirical analysis. The equation
to be estimated is (22). However, measures of marginal cost, market share, and demand are
likely to be endogenous in an econometric equation. One would employ exogenous deter-
minants of these factors, such as cost shifters (W), demand shifters (XD), and the number
of rms (N). A reduced form econometric specication would thus look something like the
following,
54z
e = Z(p;W;XD;N;") (24)
where " is a random error term.
The normative implications of the model are somewhat less clear than the positive ones.
Depending on how valuable quality is (specically how responsive health is to quality), com-
petition may lead to excessive quality provision. Since every rm pays a xed cost of entry,
but does not consider the eects of demand stealing, there can be too many rms in a free
entry competitive equilibrium. Similarly, a higher regulated price may reduce welfare by
leading to excessive quality. This is less likely to be the case where quality leads to highly
eective treatment, and that treatment has a large impact on consumer well being. It is
important to note, however, that consumers are never made worse o by competition. If
competition leads only to demand stealing they are no better o as a result, but if it leads
to any increase in market demand then consumers are unequivocally better o.
4.2.1 Spillovers
Now let health outcomes, H, be determined by the following equation,
Hitj = ht(zj;it) (25)
where Hitj is the health outcome of patient i of type t treated in hospital j, ht is the health
production function for type t, zj is quality of service in hospital j, and it is a vector of
unobservable patient-type specic factors, with a known distribution.71
Now, change the model in the following way. Let there be patients of two types, t =
1;2. Type one patients choose their hospital based on the expected health outcome at that
hospital, Hj = Eit[Hitj]. Type two patients simply arrive at the hospital. For example, type
ones may be maternity or orthopedic patients, and type twos heart attack patients. To start,
assume, without loss of generality, that there is one (xed) price the hospital receives for
treating either patient type, and that costs don't depend on patient type.72 In this case, the
hospital's prots are as follows,
j = p  [sj1(Hj;H j)D1(p;Hj;H j)] + p  [sj2D2(p)]   c(sj1D1 + sj2D2;zj)   F (26)
71We could make some of the patient-type specic factors observable, but we omit that detail to avoid
additional notation.
72The only assumption that matters here is that there is one quality level for both patient types.























j = 0 (28)
Notice that the rst-order condition for the choice of quality is unaected by type twos.
They simply show up at the hospital, regardless of the level of service quality, so they have
no impact on the hospital's choice of quality. Quality is chosen to maximize prots from type
ones. This then determines expected health outcomes for type ones and type twos.
The comparative statics of this model are the same as the previous model (with a single
type). Quality is increasing in the number of rms. As competition gets tougher, rms choose
higher quality in order to attract more type one patients. Since quality is hospital wide, this
spills over into higher quality for type twos. Thus competition leads to higher quality for
type twos, even though there is no direct competition for type two patients. This is also true
with regard to to the regulated price. In the model above, there is a single regulated price
for both type ones and type twos. If we relax this assumption so there are dierent prices for
each type, then quality will be increasing in the price for type ones, but not for type twos.73
4.2.2 Non-Prot Maximizing Behavior
The model outlined above is not specic to health care. In particular, the majority of rms
in the hospital industry are not-for-prot or public. Let us now write down a simple model
that captures this aspect of the health care industry. There have been many models of not-
for-prot hospitals (Pauly and Redisch, 1973; Newhouse, 1970; Lee, 1971; Lakdawalla and
Philipson, 1998; Capps et al., 2010a) While there is no agreement on a general model, most
models posit an objective function which includes prots and some other argument, such as
quantity or quality. Therefore, let us assume that not-for-prot hospitals have an objective
function which includes quality and prots (as a shorthand for everything else they care
about). Further, for simplicity, let this function be additively separable in quality and prots
and linear in prots:
73This is a testable hypothesis.
56Ui = u(zi;i) = v(zi) + i: (29)
We can now revisit the rst-order conditions for quality choice (20), modied to take





















Notice that the only dierence with the rst-order conditions for an industry of prot
maximizing rms is the presence of the last term, @v
@zi. Since this term is positive, the value
that not-for-prot rms put on quality acts like a reduction in the marginal cost of producing
quality, i.e., not-for-prot rms will act like for-prot rms with a lower marginal cost of
quality.74 This implies that quality will be higher in equilibrium. The comparative statics,
however, are identical with an industry of prot maximizing rms. Quality is increasing in
the number of rms and the regulated price, as before.
In the case of the spillover model with two patient types, we might imagine that a not-for-
prot or public hospital may care directly about the health outcomes of each patient type.
































As before, this implies that quality will be higher for non-prot maximizers than for prot
maximizers, but that the comparative statics are unchanged.
4.3 Market Determined Prices
We now turn to examining quality determination in an environment where prices are market
determined. We expand the model of a bargaining game in prices among hospitals previously
74This is the same specication and result as for not-for-prot rms that care about quantity, as opposed
to quality. See Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998); Gaynor and Vogt (2003).
57described in Section 3.1 to allow for hospital choice of quality. In that game hospitals are
dierentiated, but that dierentiation is not a strategic choice. Here we relax that assumption
to allow hospitals to choose quality. As before, we treat quality as vertically dierentiated.
Hospitals choose their qualities in a (new) rst stage, then the price bargaining game in
Section 3.1 ensues, treating qualities as xed. The other two stages in the model, patient
choice of health plan and patient choice of hospital, then ensue, as before. This expanded
model now has four stages, with the quality game among hospitals being the rst stage.
Let demand be determined by underlying utility functions, as in the model of the price
bargaining game in Section 3.1. These aggregate up to demand functions facing each hospital.
Let each hospital j choose quality, zj to maximize utility, as follows.
max
zj
Uj = pj(zj)  Dj(pj(zj);zj;Xij)   c(Dj(pj(zj);zj;Xij);zj;Wj) + v(zj) (32)
Xij is a vector of rm and consumer characteristics. Wj is a vector of input prices. Both
are regarded as xed by the rm. The price pj is determined in the bargaining game in the
next stage. In this stage hospitals take account of the eects of their quality choices on price















Our goal here is to understand the eect of competition on quality (in this stage) and
subsequently on price, in the continuation game. We can obtain the basic intuition about
impacts on price by employing the equation derived in the previous section that describes
the eect of a merger of two hospitals on price,
p
j+k
jh = (1   )djkh  pkh:
The impact on price is determined by the diversion ratio (holding  and hospital k's price
constant). The diversion ratio is larger the more that consumers view hospitals j and k as
substitutes. If hospital j's quality is higher than hospital k's, then consumers will view them
as less close substitutes than if they had the same levels of quality. As a consequence, a
merger would not have a large impact on prices. If, however, hospitals are symmetric, so
j and k choose the same quality levels, then there is (at least to a rst approximation) no
impact of quality on the change in prices due to merger.
We now turn to the impact of competition on quality. Treating the pricing equation (7)
58as a function of quality and dierentiating the objective function with respect to zj we get

































Now consider the impact of competition. Assume that competition increases the quality
responsiveness of demand since there are closer substitutes for hospital j (e.g., a hospital
enters nearby). We assume that competition has no impact on costs or the hospital's marginal
utility from quality ( @v
@zj). With regard to the rst-order condition for price, competition will
increase the terms @D
@z and
@Dj
@pj . The eect on
@pj
@zj is indeterminate in general. If however,
we focus only on the eects on price through the net value a hospital brings to an insurer's
network (the terms Fh(Jh)   Fh(Jh   j)), then the eect of quality on price is positive.75



































In general, this derivative can't be signed. Assuming price is greater than marginal cost,
the rst two terms are positive, while the second two terms are negative.76 If we assume,
however, that demand is not responsive to price (which can be reasonable for hospital care
where consumers are largely insulated from prices by the presence of health insurance) then
the derivative is positive, i.e., competition will lead hospitals to optimally increase their
quality. Assuming symmetry and Nash behavior, all hospitals will increase their qualities.
In equilibrium this may not actually lead to increased prices. It may be that hospitals
increase quality, but do not change their relative attractiveness to insurers. In that case,
hospitals' bargaining positions haven't changed, so in equilibrium there is no eect on price.
It may be, however, that this is not the case. Suppose that hospitals have dierent costs of
producing quality. In this situation, some hospitals will choose higher quality than others
and their relative values to an insurer's network will change. This will lead to some hospitals
75The impact on an insurer's revenue of having a higher quality hospital in its network is higher when there
is more hospital competition. With more competition a hospital's demand is more responsive to quantity, so





@pj@n are negative { demand slopes down and even more so in the presence of more rms.
59(those with lower marginal costs of quality) having more bargaining power with insurers and
commanding higher prices.
4.4 Econometric Studies of Hospital Competition and Quality
There is a rapidly growing empirical literature on competition and quality in health care. At
present the evidence from this literature is entirely on hospital markets. In what follows we
review this literature. We rst review the results from econometric studies of markets with
administered prices, and then market determined prices.77
The studies reviewed here employ a variety of econometric approaches. The modal ap-
proach is what we call a \Structure-Conduct-Performance" (SCP) specication. These econo-
metric models are derived from a conceptual model that hypothesizes a causal link from
market structure to rm conduct and then to industry performance.78 Most SCP models
applied to health care focus on the link between market structure and rm conduct, and
omit industry performance. The typical conduct measure in the general industrial organi-
zation literature is price or price-cost margin. The typical measure of market structure is
the Herndahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares of all rms' market
shares.79 The equation usually estimated has roughly the following appearance,
p = 0 + 1q + 2XD + 3W + 4HHI + " (35)
where XD represents demand shifters and W captures cost shifters. The SCP studies of
quality simply employ a measure of quality as the dependent variable in this equation, rather
than price.
The SCP approach has a number of well recognized problems when price is the dependent
variable (see Bresnahan, 1989; Schmalensee, 1989, on these issues). These problems also apply
when quality is the dependent variable, and there are some additional issues. First, the use
of the HHI in a pricing equation can be explicitly derived only from a homogeneous goods
Cournot model of conduct.80 Obviously an SCP regression with quality as the dependent
variable does not derive from this framework. In the case of administered prices, theory does
point to an econometric model with a measure of market structure on the right hand side
77We focus on work that occurred after the publication of the rst volume of the Handbook of Health
Economics in 2000. Most of the empirical literature on quality is relatively recent, and so occurs after that
date.




i, where si is rm i's market share, and there are N rms in the market.
80In that case, the coecient on the HHI in an SCP regression captures the elasticity of demand, not rm
conduct (which is already assumed to be Cournot).
60(see equation (24)). Even in this case, or even if one thinks of a quality SCP regression as
deriving from a broad conceptual framework as opposed to a specic theoretical model, a
number of issues remain. The HHI (or any market structure measure) is usually regarded
as endogenous. Unmeasured variation in demand and cost factors aect both quality and
market structure. For example, a rm with low costs is likely to have both a high market
share (leading to a high HHI) and choose high quality.
Two additional specication issues arises in regard to SCP studies of markets with ad-
ministered prices. When rms set prices it is clear that price and quality are determined
simultaneously, so an SCP model might either include price and treat it as endogenous, or
simply include exogenous determinants of price. Typically price is not included in the studies
reviewed here, although it is not clear whether the authors were explicitly trying to include
exogenous determinants of price. When price is regulated, however, price (or the price cost
margin) should appear as an exogenous determinant of quality (again, see equation (24)). In
some studies price is omitted based on the argument that, since price is regulated, price does
not aect demand (e.g., for Medicare beneciaries). The regulated price should be included,
however, because it is a determinant of supply, not demand. In addition, it is possible that the
regulated price may be correlated both with quality and concentration. For example, irms in
unconcentrated markets may produce higher quality due to tougher competition. They may
also have higher costs due to producing higher quality, and therefore receive higher regulated
prices. Therefore, omitting price may lead one to overestimate the eect of concentration on
quality.
There is another complication due to the nature of hospitals. The major purchasers of
hospital services in the U.S. are Medicare and private health insurers. Medicare sets regulated
prices. Prices from private health insurers are determined in the market. Since hospitals
generally sell in both markets, one must either account for this or presume that there are
no complementarities between the two (e.g., demand and cost are completely separable in
Medicare and private output). Many of the studies that focus on Medicare seemingly make
the implicit assumption of separability. This is not generally an issue in other countries,
where there is essentially a single payer for health care services.81
While the majority of the studies we review here employ an SCP framework, some employ
dierent approaches. Some studies evaluate the impact of mergers, some evaluate the im-
pact of regulatory changes (e.g, price deregulation), and a number estimate the relationship
between hospital volume of a surgical procedure and patient health outcomes. In addition,
there are a small number of studies that take a structural approach: there are some that
estimate demand, and some that examine the determinants/impacts of the number of rms.
Each of these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. We discuss these in the
81Most countries do have some private insurers, but they are generally so small that their roles can be
safely ignored.
61context of evaluating the various studies.
Before proceeding, however, we want to note that the results of the majority of these
studies provide evidence only on positive questions, e.g., \Does competition increase qual-
ity?". Few of these studies allow for normative analysis. This rst wave of studies consists
for the most part of policy evaluation and reduced form studies.82 It is not generally possible
to evaluate eects on welfare with these kinds of studies. This should not be taken as a
criticism of these studies, but simply a recognition of what sorts of inferences can be drawn
from them.
4.4.1 Studies with Administered Prices
There are a number of studies of the impact of competition on hospital quality under an
administered price regime. These derive from the U.S. Medicare program and from the
English NHS, which made a transition to administered prices in a reform in 2006. The amount
a Medicare beneciary pays is the same, regardless of where she obtains care (again, in a given
area at a given point in time). As a consequence, price is not a strategic variable for hospitals
serving Medicare patients. Patients in the NHS pay nothing, so price plays no strategic role
in that system either. Table 10 presents a summary of these studies and their ndings.
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] The entry in the column labeled \Eect of Competition
on Quality" indicates the direction of the relationship between the competition measure and
the quality measure. For example, in the rst row, the entry \Increase" in that column
indicates that the quality is higher in more competitive markets. For the study cited in the
rst row (Kessler and McClellan, 2000), quality is measured by mortality and competition
is measured by the HHI. Quality is inversely related to mortality { lower mortality is higher
quality. Competition is inversely related to the HHI { the HHI is lower in more competitive
markets. So, the nding that competition increases quality is based on a positive empirical
relationship between mortality and the HHI { mortality is higher in less competitive markets.
Kessler and McClellan (2000) is one of the rst studies attempting to make inferences
about a causal eect of competition on quality for hospitals. This is a study of the impact
of hospital market concentration on risk-adjusted one year mortality from acute myocardial
infarction (AMI, i.e., a heart attack) for Medicare patients. Expenditures on these patients
are also studied. The study included data on all non-rural Medicare beneciaries with AMI
during selected years from 1985 to 1994. Kessler and McClellan use the SCP framework
discussed above, with some modications. They instrument for the HHI with hospital market
shares predicted from a model of patient choice of hospital, where patient choice is largely
82By policy evaluation studies, we mean econometric specications that evaluate the impact of some policy
or (economic) environmental factor, but are not derived from an explicit economic model. By reduced form,
we mean an econometric specication that is the reduced form of a specic economic model.
62determined by distance from the hospital. They also employ zip code xed eects. As a
consequence, the eects of hospital market concentration are identied by changes in the
predicted HHI. The specication they employ, however, omits the regulated Medicare price.
A number of hospital and area characteristics are included, HMO enrollment among them.
It is unclear whether they are considered demand or cost shifters.
The results from this study are striking. Kessler and McClellan nd that risk-adjusted
one year mortality for Medicare AMI patients is signicantly higher in more concentrated
markets. In particular, patients in the most concentrated markets had mortality probabilities
1.46 points higher than those in the least concentrated markets (this constitutes a 4.4 percent
dierence) as of 1991. This is an extremely large dierence { it amounts to over 2,000 fewer
(statistical) deaths in the least concentrated vs. most concentrated markets. The results
with regard to expenditures have a somewhat dierent pattern. Prior to 1991, expenditures
were higher in less concentrated markets, while the reverse is true as of 1991.
The positive inferences from this study are clear. Mortality from heart attacks for Medi-
care patients is lower in less concentrated markets. The eects of concentration are stronger
beginning in 1991 and are reinforced by HMO enrollment. The omission of the regulated
price is unfortunate, although for this omission to lead to biased estimates the changes in the
omitted price would have to be correlated with the within zip code changes in the predicted
HHI. It is unclear whether the inclusion of market and hospital characteristics is intended
to control for possible hospital complementarities between Medicare and private output. So
long as it is unlikely there are important omitted factors there should be no problem with
bias. While it is clear that concentration aects hospital quality, the mechanism by which
this works is not.
It seems unlikely that hospitals deliberately choose lower quality in the form of an in-
creased probability of death. What may be happening is that hospitals in more concentrated
markets take some of their excess prots by exerting lower eort. Low eort in the hospital
may have the unintended consequence of higher mortality. Another issue with regard to this
application is whether hospitals compete for heart attack patients. Tay (2003) states that
one-half of heart attack patients arrive at the hospital via ambulance. It seems unlikely that
these patients have any choice of hospital, hence hospitals cannot compete for these patients.
I think the most likely story is that heart attack patients are the \canary in the mine shaft."
Hospitals in more competitive environments are pressured to be better across the board, and
that manifests itself clearly in a very sensitive area { heart attack patient mortality.
While the basic positive results from this study are clear, we do not believe that there are
clear normative inferences. The results show that both expenditures and mortality are lower
in less concentrated markets, implying gains in benets with a reduction in costs. Kessler and
McClellan state that this implies there is a welfare gain from competition. This may be so,
but the inference isn't entirely clear. The measure of Medicare expenditures they use is not
63a measure of economic cost. Therefore, the nding that quality is higher in less concentrated
markets tells us that consumers are likely better o, but does not tell us if social welfare has
necessarily been improved.
Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) estimate the eects of hospital market concentration on
risk-adjusted mortality rates for AMI and pneumonia, for both Medicare and HMO patients.
We discuss their ndings with regard to Medicare patients here, since the price is regu-
lated for them, and discuss the ndings with respect to HMO patients in the next section.
Gowrisankaran and Town use data from Los Angeles county from 1991-1993 for AMI and
1989-1992 for pneumonia. Their approach is similar to that of Kessler and McClellan. They
use an SCP framework, instrumenting for the HHI with hospital market shares predicted
from a patient choice equation, where distance is the main determinant of hospital choice.
An innovation is that they construct separate, hospital-specic, HHIs based on (predicted)
hospital market shares for Medicare, HMO, Medicaid, indigent and self-pay patients, and
indemnity patients.
Gowrisankaran and Town nd, in contrast to Kessler and McClellan, that mortality is
worse for Medicare patients treated in hospitals with lower Medicare HHIs. The implica-
tion is that competition reduces quality for Medicare patients. Gowrisankaran and Town
hypothesize that Medicare margins are small or negative, or that hospitals may deviate from
prot-maximizing behavior. If Medicare margins are indeed negative (i.e., p < MC), then
the results are consistent with theory. It seems unlikely, however, that this is true for AMI.
Heart treatments for Medicare patients are widely thought to be protable. Indeed, there
is substantial entry of hospitals specializing only in the treatment of heart disease. Since
Medicare patients are a substantial portion of heart patients, it seems as if Medicare margins
must be signicant in order to generate the observed entry. Small or negative Medicare mar-
gins for pneumonia, however, do seem plausible. We do not observe the entry of hospitals
specializing in pneumonia, or pulmonary disorders generally.
This study also omits Medicare price. Since Gowrisankaran and Town only examine Los
Angeles county there may be little or no variation in Medicare price across hospitals for a
given year. Although there should be temporal variation, they have only a short time period.
As a consequence, there may not be enough variation in their sample to estimate a parameter
for Medicare price. It includes some hospital characteristics, although it is unclear if these
characteristics are considered demand or cost shifters.
It is hard to know why the results of this study contrast so markedly with the previous
one. It may be that the Medicare price is below marginal cost (on average) for the hospitals
in Gowrisankaran and Town's study, while the opposite is true for the hospitals in Kessler and
McClellan's study. Since neither study included Medicare price it is impossible to evaluate
this hypothesis. It is also possible that the estimated relationship between the HHI and
mortality is sensitive to the choice of instruments. Gowrisankaran and Town and Kessler and
64McClellan use similar, but not identical, instrumenting strategies. Obviously identication is
driven by the instruments, so it is possible that the dierences in instruments are driving the
dierences between the studies. This is only speculation, however. The opposite results from
the two studies suggest caution in drawing strong conclusions about the impact of market
structure on hospital mortality.
Kessler and Geppert (2005) extend the framework employed by Kessler and McClellan
to consider the impact of concentration on dierences in quality between patients. Their
work is inspired by the theoretical result that oligopolists will nd it optimal to engage in
product dierentiation in order to relax price competition (see Tirole, 1988, section 7.5.1).
These theory papers are not directly relevant for Kessler and Geppert's empirical exercise,
since the theory examines quality dispersion when rms set prices. Kessler and Geppert
examine Medicare patients, for whom price is set via regulation. Clearly any incentive to
engage in product dierentation is not related to a desire to relax price competition for
Medicare patients. It is possible that hospitals may be attempting to relax price competition
for private patients, and are unable to quality discriminate between Medicare and private
patients, perhaps for legal or ethical reasons. It seems like it should be a straightforward result
from models where rms choose both product variety and product quality that oligopolists
operating in a market with a regulated price have an incentive to dierentiate themselves
with regard to product variety in order to avoid the kind of quality competition described
previously.83
Kessler and Geppert examine outcomes (readmissions, mortality) and expense (expen-
ditures, various measures of utilization) for Medicare heart attack patients, as in Kessler
and McClellan. They contrast outcomes and expenditures for high-risk and low-risk patients
in highly concentrated vs. unconcentrated markets. High-risk patients are those who were
hospitalized with a heart attack in the previous year, whereas low-risk patients had no such
hospitalization. They nd that low-risk patients receive more intensive treatment in highly
concentrated markets, but have no statistically signicant dierence in outcomes. High-risk
patients, on the other hand, receive less intensive treatment in highly concentrated markets,
and have signicantly worse outcomes. They conclude that competition leads to increased
variation in patient expenditures, and that it is welfare enhancing, since on net outcomes are
better and expenditures are lower. Medicare price is omitted, as in previous studies.
This paper adds to the evidence that concentration is signicantly correlated with readily
83If one takes the kind of model used in Lyon (1999) or Kamien and Vincent (1991), where rms locate on
a line, it seems evident that rms will have an incentive to locate as far apart from each other as possible (at
the ends of the line), rather than nearby (in the middle). If they locate in the middle, the rms are identical,
so the one that produces the highest product quality will take the entire market. Thus rms will engage in
erce product quality competition, up until the point that prots are dissipated. If rms are located at the
ends of the line, then each rm will be considerably more attractive to consumers located very close to it.
This will dampen quality competition.
65observable measures of quality for hospitals. The statistical relationship between quality
dispersion and concentration is surprising and interesting. So far as we know, this is the only
paper to examine quality dispersion. What economic behavior generated these patterns in
the data is an intriguing puzzle.
Mukamel et al. (2001) examine risk-adjusted hospital mortality for Medicare patients in
134 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in 1990. They focus on the impact of HMOs,
but also examine hospital market concentration. Mukamel et al. (2001) nd that HMO
penetration (the percent of the MSA population enrolled in an HMO) has a negative im-
pact on excess hospital mortality (the dierence between observed mortality and predicted
risk-adjusted mortality), i.e., HMO penetration is associated with better quality. Hospital
market concentration (measured by the HHI) has no statistically signicant impact on mor-
tality. HMO market concentration is also included as an explanatory variable, although it is
not signicant. Medicare price is omitted. It is unclear what to make of these results. First,
Mukamel et al.'s specication includes inpatient expenditures, which are certainly endoge-
nous, as well as hospital HHI, HMO HHI, and HMO penetration, which may very well be
endogenous, so it is unclear that the resulting estimates are consistent. It is possible that
hospital concentration does truly have an impact on mortality, but that it is not consistently
estimated in this study. Second, it is not clear how enrollment in private HMO plans aects
the mortality of Medicare patients. Presumably there has to be some spillover eect, but the
nature of the mechanism is unclear, as Mukamel et al. acknowledge.
A study that is notable for taking account of Medicare price eects is Shen (2003). Shen
examines the impact of nancial pressure from reduced Medicare payments and HMO pene-
tration on mortality from AMI, controlling for the hospital's competitive environment.84 She
examines data from 1985-1990 and 1990-1994 for most nonrural hospitals in the U.S. Shen's
measure of market structure is an indicator for whether there are ve or more other hospitals
within a 15 mile radius of a hospital. This is interacted with a measure of the change in the
Medicare price and the change in HMO penetration. There are direct eects of Medicare
price and HMO penetration, but not market structure.
Shen nds a negative and signicant relationship between the change in Medicare price
and mortality. The interaction between the market structure and Medicare price variable is
negative and signicant for 1990-1994, but has no signicant impact on mortality for 1985-
1990. These results are consistent with standard theory. Hospitals respond to an increase
in the regulated price by increasing quality. This response is amplied when hospitals face
more competitors.
The eects of HMO penetration also appear to be roughly consistent with theory. Shen
84There have been a number of studies assessing the impact of the change in Medicare hospital payment
from cost-plus to xed price (the Medicare Prospective Payment system). See, for example, Kahn et al.
(1990); Cutler (1995).
66nds that HMO penetration leads to higher mortality, and that hospitals in markets with
more competitors appeared to respond to HMO penetration with quality reductions in 1985-
1990, although not thereafter. HMOs are hypothesized to increase the price elasticity of
demand facing hospitals. If so, then the increased price elasticity will likely lead to a quality
reduction. This should be amplied in markets with more competitors, since that should
also increase the price elasticity. Shen also does a simple normative analysis of the eects of
nancial pressure, but not the eects of competition.
A paper by Tay (2003) takes a more structural approach. Tay species and estimates
a structural econometric model of hospital choice by Medicare enrollees with AMI.85 Tay
uses data on urban enrollees in conventional Medicare, located in California, Oregon, and
Washington in 1994. She examines the eect of a number of aspects of quality and distance
on the probability a patient is admitted to a particular hospital. The quality measures
include two clinical outcomes: the mortality rate and the complication rate; a measure
of input intensity: nurses per bed; and whether the hospital can perform two high-tech
cardiac services: catheterization or revascularization. All measures of quality are treated as
exogenous.
Tay nds that hospital demand is negatively aected by patient distance and positively
aected by quality. She then simulates the eects of changes in the various aspects of a hospi-
tal's quality, holding the total number of heart attack patients xed, the locations of patients
and hospitals xed, and the qualities of all other hospitals xed. Adopting a catheterization
lab is predicted to increase demand by 65 percent, while adding revascularization in addi-
tion to catheterization increases demand by 76 percent. If the number of nurses per bed is
increased by one percent, then demand is predicted to increase by 24 percent.
Tay shows that hospital demand is signicantly aected by quality and distance, thus
there are potentially high payos to hospitals increasing quality. While this represents an
advance over the previous literature by using more detailed modelling, there are nonetheless
some limitations to the inferences that can be drawn from this study.
As with the previous studies, the Medicare price is omitted. It is possible that this
omission is inconsequential, but we see no way to tell. Tay assumes that hospitals set the
same level of quality for Medicare and non-Medicare patients. This is also an untested
assumption, although it is at least explicit.
More fundamentally, the supply side of the market is not modelled. As a consequence,
85A number of papers have previously examined whether choice of hospital is aected by quality (Luft et al.,
1990; Burns and Wholey, 1992; Chernew et al., 1998). These studies nd that clinical quality, as measured by
deviation between expected and actual mortality rates, has a signicant impact on hospital choice { hospitals
with lower mortality are more likely to be chosen. The responsiveness found in these studies indicates the
potential for quality competition among hospitals, although how much is not clear, since the studies were
not designed to assess this.
67competition itself is not modelled and can not be examined explicitly. There is no structure
in place for dealing with the potential endogeneity of the quality variables. There is the usual
reason to be concerned about endogeneity, since quality is chosen by the rm. In addition, it
has been observed for a number of hospital procedures that hospital volume causes patient
outcomes (see section 4.4.3 below for a review of some studies). This suggests endogeneity
of the mortality and complication rates.
Further, the simulation is an out of equilibrium prediction. Tay's predicted eects of
adding a catheterization lab or other services on demand are likely too large, since they hold
rivals' responses xed. If rivals respond by also adopting catherization labs or other services,
then the equilibrium eects should be smaller, potentially even zero. It is also unclear
whether rms would actually make the predicted choices. If rivals respond strongly to a
rm's adoption of services, the responses may make adoption unprotable. As a consequence
it is hard to assess the magnitude of quality eects. Last, as Tay acknowledges, without a
supply side no welfare analysis can be performed.
Two recent studies (Cooper et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2010) examine the impact of
competition on hospital quality using a recent reform in the English National Health Service
(NHS). The NHS introduced a reform in 2006 intended to promote competition among hos-
pitals. Prices were administratively determined based on patient diagnoses, via a method
very similar to that employed by the U.S. Medicare system. As a consequence, hospitals
were to compete solely on non-price dimensions. Although they dier in the precise methods
employed, both Cooper et al. (2010) and Gaynor et al. (2010) nd that, following the reform,
risk-adjusted mortality from AMI fell more at hospitals in less concentrated markets than at
hospitals in more concentrated markets.
Gaynor et al. (2010) also look at mortality from all causes and mortality from all causes,
excluding AMI, and nd the same qualitative results as for AMI, although the estimated
eects are smaller in magnitude. They also examine measures of utilization and expenditure,
and nd that length of stay rose in less concentrated markets relative to more concentrated
markets after the reform, but there were no impacts on expenditures. Quantitatively, Gaynor
et al. (2010) nd that the reform reduced heart attack mortality by 0.2 percent.86 Since the
reform saved lives without increasing costs, they conclude it was welfare improving. The
measure of costs is hospital expenditures. As noted before, this may not accurately capture
economic costs, so welfare inferences are not necessarily clear. Gaynor et al. also control
for the impact of the NHS administered prices on outcomes. They estimate a positive, but
statistically insignicant eect.
86Both the Cooper et al. (2010) and Gaynor et al. (2010) estimates of the impact of competition post-
reform are quantitatively similar. Cooper et al. (2010) calculate that a one standard deviation increase of
their measure of competition would lead to a reduction in the heart attack mortality rate of 0.3 percent per
year. Gaynor et al. (2010)'s estimates imply that a one standard deviation decrease in concentration reduces
heart attack mortality by 0.33 percent per year.
68Gaynor et al. (2011) estimate a structural model of demand for heart bypass surgery
(CABG) in England to evaluate the eect of the reform studied by Cooper et al. and Gaynor
et al.. In particular, one part of the reform required referring physicians to give patients
ve choices of hospitals (previously they'd been required to give none). Gaynor et al. use
individual data on patient treatment to estimate a multinomial logit model of demand faced
by individual hospitals for CABG surgery. They nd that the demand elasticity with respect
to a hospital's (risk-adjusted) mortality rate is greater after the reform than before. Post-
reform the elasticity with respect to the adjusted mortality rate in the post-reform time-period
is roughly equal to 0.3. In the case of the mortality rate, an increase of one standard deviation
(about a 20 percent increase) implies a drop in the choice probability of about 6 percent.
This elasticity is signicantly larger than the pre-reform mortality rate elasticity. They also
nd substantial geographic dierentiation { cross-elasticities between hospitals with respect
to their mortality rates fall dramatically with distance. This indicates that close by hospitals
compete with each other over quality, but not with hospitals far away. There is considerable
individual heterogeneity in patient responsiveness. More seriously ill patients (as measured
by a higher co-morbidity count) are more sensitive to the hospital mortality rate than the
average patient. With the introduction of the reform their preference for quality, relative
to the average patient, increases even more. They also nd larger eects of the reform on
low income patients. This study takes a structural approach toward studying the eect
of competition on quality. The English reform was intended to increase competition, and
apparently did increase demand responsiveness.
Some insight into the mechanisms underlying the relationship between market structure
and quality identied in Cooper et al. and Gaynor et al. is provided by Propper et al. (2010).
Propper et al. use data for the English NHS and employ a measure of management quality
developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) to examine the impact of market structure on
management quality and, ultimately, on hospital quality (AMI mortality, emergency surgery
mortality, and other measures). The nd that having more close by competitors has a strong
and signicant impact on management quality and hence on clinical quality of care. Their
estimates imply that adding a rival hospital close by increases the measure of management
quality by one-third of a standard deviation and thereby reduces heart attack mortality by
10.7 percent. This study employs only cross-sectional data (2006), so the methods dier
from those in Cooper et al. and Gaynor et al.. Identication of the eect of market structure
is achieved by using political marginality of a hospital's geographic area. Because hospital
openings, mergers and closures are determined by a government agency (Department of
Health), they are subject to political inuence.
694.4.2 Studies with Market Determined Prices
We now turn to econometric studies of competition and quality where prices are determined
in the market.87 Most of these employ the SCP model, while some examine the impacts of
mergers or price deregulation. A smaller number are structural (or related) and estimate
entry behavior.
The results are summarized in Table 11. [TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] In the table
the entry in the column labelled \Eect of Competition on Quality" indicates the direction
of the relationship between the competition measure and the quality measure. The measure
of quality used in the study is listed under the column heading \Quality Measure," and the
measure of competition is listed in the column labeled \Competition Measure."
There have been a number of recent studies of competition and quality in hospital markets.
These all cover time periods from the 1990s or later, when it is generally agreed that price
competition had emerged in hospital markets. We rst discuss SCP studies, then cover merger
studies, then nally move to studies of price deregulation. In considering these studies we need
to refer back to economic theory for guidance. Unlike the case of regulated prices, economic
theory on competition and quality is less clear (see Gaynor, 2006b). Nonetheless, theory
does provide a guide to what to look for, and what economic factors might be underlying an
estimated relationship.
Some insights into the determinants of quality levels can be gained from the model of
Dorfman and Steiner (1954). Their model is nominally about choice of price and advertising,
but can also be interpreted as about price and quality (although in a somewhat restrictive
way).88
Using this model, we can obtain the following formula, known as the Dorfman-Steiner










where d is the average cost of quality per unit of quantity, i.e., cost = cq +dz q, where q
is quantity.
This says that the ratio of quality to price should go up if the quality elasticity of demand
increases or the price elasticity of demand declines, and vice versa. An increase in the quality
87We omit older studies of the \Medical Arms Race." For a review that includes these studies see Gaynor
(2006b).
88Dorfman and Steiner model a monopolist's behavior. We can consider this an approximation to the
behavior of a monopolistically competitive rm if we think of the demand function as a reduced form demand,
e.g., an oligopolist's residual demand curve (see, e.g., Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000).
70elasticity increases the payo to increased quality. A decrease in the price elasticity increases
the price-cost margin, which also increases the payo.
Some other papers which provide a similar intuition, although the models are quite dif-
ferent from Dorfman and Steiner. Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) consider the eects of
information on price and quality when consumers are imperfectly informed about both. They
nd that if consumers have better information about price than about quality, then this can
lead to an equilibrium with suboptimal quality. Intuitively this is similar to what happens
in the Dorfman-Steiner framework with an increase in the price elasticity of demand, and
no increase in the quality elasticity. The price-cost margin will fall, leading to a decreased
payo to quality, and a decrease in the quality-price ratio.
Allard et al. (2009) explicitly consider competition in the physician services market. They
consider a repeated game between physicians and patients. The patient's health is determined
by observable medical care and physician eort. Physician eort is anything physicians do
that aects patient health. It can be thought of as quality. The patient observes his health ex
post, so physician eort is observable, but is non-contractible. In the static game physicians
will supply sub-optimal eort. However, in the repeated game there is an equilibrium in
which physicians supply optimal eort. This equilibrium obtains under certain conditions,
in particular, if patient switching costs are not too high and there is an excess supply of
physicians. If switching costs are high then eort will be suboptimal, but competition will
result in eort levels above the minimum.89 Again, there are parallels to the Dorfman and
Steiner intuition. In the Allard et al. model optimal eort occurs when patient switching
costs are not too high. This is similar to the quality elasticity of demand being suciently
high in the Dorfman and Steiner model. Sub-optimal eort occurs when switching costs are
high, analogous to a low quality elasticity of demand.
While there are no determinate conclusions from this framework, it does oer some useful
guidance for thinking about issues of competition in health care markets. For example,
the advent of managed care in the 1990s is commonly thought to have increased the price
elasticity of demand facing health care rms (hospitals in particular). This should have led to
decreased prices, and indeed seems to have done so. If there was no suciently countervailing
increase in the quality elasticity, then quality should have fallen.
Another change in health care markets is the recent emphasis on medical errors and quality
improvement. If that leads to the quality elasticity of demand increasing, then quality will
increase. If the price elasticity remains unchanged this will increase price (since increased
quality raises marginal cost), but price cost margins will remain unchanged.
89In addition, if there is uncertainty in the relationship between patient health and physician actions, then
physicians face some risk of patients switching even if they have supplied optimal eort. In this case there
physicians will supply supra-optimal eort.
71A study by Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) examined the relationship between market
structure and AMI and pneumonia mortality in Los Angeles county in the early 1990s for
both Medicare and HMO patients. We discussed the ndings for Medicare patients in the
previous section. We now turn to HMO patients. Gowrisankaran and Town nd that risk-
adjusted mortality is signicantly lower in less concentrated parts of Los Angeles county. This
implies that competition is quality increasing for HMO patients. With a standard model of
price and quality competition (see Gaynor, 2006b) this could occur if the quality elasticity
of demand is higher in less concentrated markets, or if the price elasticity is lower. Since we
generally think that elasticities are higher with more competitors, the former seems plausible
(and the latter does not).
Sohn and Rathouz (2003) study the impact of competition on risk-adjusted mortality for
patients receiving percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) in 116 hospitals
in California in 1995. They construct a \competition coecient" that varies between zero
and one depending on the degree of overlap in the patient pools of a pair of hospitals. Sohn
and Rathouz nd that mortality is lower for patients in hospitals facing more competition.
This eect is stronger in lower volume hospitals. Again, this result seems to imply that the
quality elasticity is higher in more competitive markets.
Mukamel et al. (2002) examine the impact of competition on risk-adjusted mortality for
California patients in 1982 and 1989. The two years cover the period before and after the
introduction of insurer selective contracting in California. They hypothesize that the in-
troduction of selective contracting increased price competition and that hospitals responded
by shifting resources from clinical activities, which are hard to observe, to hotel activities,
which are more easily observed. Mukamel et al. estimate the eects of the level of hospital
concentration (measured as the HHI) in the base year and the change in hospital concentra-
tion on the change in inpatient clinical expenditures, and then the impact of the change in
expenditures and the level of the hospital HHI in 1989 on the level of risk-adjusted mortality
in 1989. They nd that the change in the HHI had a negative and signicant impact on
both clinical and hotel expenditures for not-for-prot hospitals, but no signicant impact on
for-prot hospitals. The estimated relationship between clinical expenditures and mortality
is negative. Mukamel et al. nd that together these two results imply that increased compe-
tition from 1982-1989 led to increased mortality, operating via competition reducing clinical
expenditures on patients. The introduction of selective contracting is likely to have increased
the price elasticity of demand facing hospitals, without increasing the quality elasticity by a
similar proportion. In this case, the Dorfman and Steiner model predicts that quality will
fall.
Encinosa and Bernard (2005) use data on all inpatient discharges from Florida hospitals
from 1996 to 2000 to examine the impacts of nancial pressure on patient safety. Encinosa
and Bernard employ a newly available set of quality indicators developed by the Agency for
Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ). These indicators measure a variety of factors
72reecting clinical quality, including mortality, obstetric complications, adverse or iatrogenic
complications, wound infections, surgery complications, caesarean section, and inappropriate
surgery.90 Encinosa and Bernard estimate the impact of within hospital changes in lagged
operating prot margins91 on the probabilities of adverse patient safety events. They nd
that patients at hospitals in the lowest quartile of operating prot margins have signicantly
higher probabilities of adverse safety events than those in any of the higher quartiles. There
are no signicant dierences in the probability of adverse events between patients in the
highest, second-highest, or third-highest quartiles.92 Thus patients at hospitals that are
doing poorly nancially are at greater risk of suering from a patient safety problem than
those who are at hospitals that are doing better nancially. There seems to be no impact of
doing better nancially above a threshold (bottom quartile of operating margin).
This nding is roughly consistent with theory. We expect that quality will be positively
related to marginal prots, so the empirical nding that quality is lower at hospitals with low
prots seems likely. Standard theory would predict a continuous eect of prots on quality,
however, not a threshold. It is possible that this could be due to data limitations. Encinosa
and Bernard have to rely on accounting data, so they are unable to measure economic prots
or construct a measure of marginal prots.
There are also some issues with the econometrics. Encinosa and Bernard use hospital
dummies to control for hospital-specic unobserved factors. The estimating equations are
logits for the probabilities of adverse patient safety events. This is a nonlinear estimator, so
unlike least squares, hospital-specic eects are not dierenced away. As a consequence, it
isn't clear to what extent their estimates of the eects of prots on safety are truly purged of
potentially confounding hospital-specic eects. Another issue is that slope estimates from
nonlinear models with group xed eects are only consistent when the number of observations
per group goes to innity. In this context, that means that the number of years each hospital
is observed has to be large. Since the sample in this paper covers 5 years, it seems unlikely
this condition is met, hence the estimates may not be consistent.
While this study does not directly examine competition, it may have implications for the
impact of competition on quality. To the extent that competition reduces hospital operating
margins to low levels as in Encinosa and Bernard it may put patients at higher risk of adverse
safety events.
Propper et al. (2004) use an SCP approach to examine the eect of the eect of hospital
competition in the United Kingdom following reforms to the National Health Service in the
90Go to http://http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov for more information.
91The ratio of net operating prot to net operating revenue.
92The rst quartile covers patients at hospitals with margins below -0.5%. The second quartile covers
margins between -0.5% and 4.4%, the third between 4.4% and 9.3%, and the fourth covers margins greater
than 9.3%.
731990s. These reforms encouraged payer-driven competition among hospitals. Propper et al.
examine the impact of this payer-driven competition on mortality for AMI patients. They
examine the impact of a measure of market structure (roughly, the number of competitors)
on mortality over the period 1995-1998 and nd that mortality increases with the number of
competitors. This nding certainly contrasts with that of U.S. SCP studies, but (for better
or for worse) it is consistent with theory. The presence of more competitors can increase
quality elasticity, price elasticity, or both. If the price elasticity increases more than the
quality elasticity, then quality will fall. Whether this is the mechanism driving the result in
this paper can not be determined, although it provides some direction for future research.
As previously, the welfare impacts of this nding are unclear. If increasing the number of
competitors is associated with a decrease in market power, then a quality decrease may be
welfare improving. Alternatively, it could be harmful.
An interesting study is by Sari (2002). Sari uses the same quality indicators as Encinosa
and Bernard. Sari is one of the rst studies to employ these indicators rather than following
the common practice of using risk-adjusted mortality as a quality measure. He employs data
on hospitals in 16 states covering the period 1992-1997 and estimates the SCP model using
xed eects, random eects, and instrumental variables with xed eects. Sari nds that
quality is signicantly lower in more concentrated markets { he estimates that a 10 percent
increase in hospital market share leads to a 0.18 percent decrease in quality. He also nds
evidence that managed care penetration increases quality for some of the quality indicators,
although there is no statistically signicant relationship for others.
Ho and Hamilton (2000) and Capps (2005) are two papers that examine the impact of
hospital mergers on quality of care. Ho and Hamilton (2000) study 130 hospital mergers of
various types over the period 1992 to 1995. The quality measures they employ are inpatient
mortality, readmission rates, and early discharge of newborns. They employ hospital specic
xed eects to control for time invariant hospital characteristics that may be related to
merger. Ho and Hamilton nd no detectable impact of merger on mortality for either heart
attack or stroke patients. They do nd that some mergers increase readmission rates for heart
attack patients and the early discharge of newborns. It is unclear whether Ho and Hamilton
nd no eect because there truly is no eect or because they are unable to identify the eect
in the data. The eects of mergers are notoriously dicult to identify. First, there are not
a large number of mergers, so there is not a lot of statistical power with which to detect an
eect. Second, the identifying variation in this study comes from within-hospital variation
over time. If that is not the primary source of variation in outcomes then the estimates of
the parameters will be imprecise. Third, mergers are certainly endogenous. Mergers occur
for reasons that are often related to the outcome variables of interest. If mergers occur for
reasons related to hospitals' changing circumstances over time, then the hospital xed eects
will not control for endogeneity, so it will be dicult to obtain consistent estimates of a
merger eect.
74Capps (2005) uses the AHRQ quality indicators to examine the eect of hospital mergers
on quality. He compares merging to non-merging hospitals in New York state during 1995-
2000. There are 25 merging hospitals, and 246 total. Control groups are constructed in 2
ways. The rst method is to select non-merging hospitals that are similar to merging hospitals
in observable characteristics (e.g., teaching status, size, ownership, etc.). The second method
is to use propensity scores to identify a control group. The control group for a merging
hospital then consists of the ten non-merging hospitals that have predicted probabilities of
merging that are closest to the predicted probability of the merging hospital.
Using the rst method Capps nds no statistically signicant eect of mergers on most of
the quality indicators. There is no eect on 4 of 6 inpatient indicators for quality procedures,
no eect for indicators for 3 other surgical procedures, and no eect for 6 patient safety
indicators. Merger is found to have a negative eect on the inpatient quality indicators for 2
cardiac procedures: AMI and congestive heart failure (CHF). Merger is estimated to lead to
an additional 12 deaths per 1,000 AMI or CHF admissions in the year following the merger,
although there is no signicant eect in the second year after the merger. There are no
statistically signicant eects of merger on any of the quality indicators when propensity
scores are used to generate a control group. As with the Ho and Hamilton paper it is hard
to know how to interpret the overall lack of statistical signicance. Mergers may truly have
had no impact on hospital quality in New York state over this period, or it may just be very
dicult to precisely test the hypothesis.
Two very interesting recent papers use changes in regulation as a way to learn about the
eect of hospital competition on quality. Volpp et al. (2003) study the eect of the deregula-
tion of hospital prices in New Jersey to try and learn about the impact of the introduction of
price competition on hospital quality. In 1992 New Jersey deregulated hospital prices. The
neighboring state of New York had no change in its hospital regulatory regime. Volpp et al.
use data on AMI hospital admissions in New Jersey and New York from 1990 to 1996 to learn
about the eect of the deregulation. They look at the dierence in risk-adjusted inpatient
AMI mortality between New Jersey and New York before and after regulatory repeal. They
nd that mortality in New Jersey relative to New York increased after price deregulation. At
rst glance this result contrasts markedly with the SCP type studies previously discussed.
However, consider the impact of price deregulation. The biggest impact should be to increase
the price elasticity of demand, and decrease price.93 The quality elasticity seems unlikely to
be signicantly aected. The prediction of a standard model is that quality will fall when the
price elasticity of demand increases. It is impossible to say what the impact on welfare might
be. If the regulated prices were set too high, then this quality decrease is welfare increasing,
and vice versa.
A paper by Propper et al. (2003) employs a similar approach to Volpp et al. In this
93Unfortunately Volpp et al. do not have any evidence on the eect of deregulation on prices.
75paper Propper et al. (2003) examine the impacts of competitive reforms in the NHS on
mortality for AMI patients. Propper et al. (2003) use a dierent strategy in this paper than
in Propper et al. (2004). Here they use the change in regulation in the U.K. over the period
1991-1999, combined with geographic variation in the number of competitors.94 Competition
was introduced in 1991 and actively promoted up until 1995. It was downplayed after 1995
and actively discouraged from 1997 onwards. The impact of competition is identied by
dierences between hospitals facing competitors and those who are not between the time
periods when competition was encouraged versus when it was discouraged.
Propper et al. (2003) nd that competition reduces quality. The dierences in mortality
for hospitals in areas with competitors versus those with no competitors was higher dur-
ing the period when competition was promoted (1991-1995), than during the period when
competition was discouraged (1996-1998). The estimated cumulative eect of competition
over the entire period is to raise mortality rates by roughly the same amount as the cumu-
lative eect of the secular downward trend in heart attack mortality (presumably due to
technological change). This is a large impact. As with Volpp et al. (2003), these results can
be interpreted as consistent with economic theory, although that is not testable within the
framework employed in the paper. Also as before, the welfare inferences are unclear.
Howard (2005) is a paper that focuses on demand, as in the paper by Tay. Howard
models the demand for kidney transplantation facilities, focusing on the eect of quality on
consumer choice of facility. Howard examines the choices of all patients receiving transplants,
including Medicare patients, Medicaid patients, and those with private insurance.
Quality is measured as the dierence between expected and actual one year post-transplant
graft failure rates at a center. Howard assumes that there are no price dierences that aect
choice between transplant centers, thus price is omitted. The explanatory variables are the
quality measure, patients' distances from transplant centers, and patient characteristics. The
average estimated choice elasticity with respect to quality is -0.12. The quality elasticity for
privately insured patients is larger: -0.22.
These elasticity estimates are not particularly large. The low value of the average esti-
mated quality elasticity implies that this does not give transplant centers a large incentive to
compete on quality, as indicated by equation (23). Since Howard does not model the supply
side, his model doesn't directly predict the impacts of competition (it is not intended to do
so).
As with the Tay paper there are also some concerns about price and endogeneity. Howard
assumes that price has no impact on where patients obtain their transplants. This may be
true for Medicare, but it seems unlikely for patients who are privately insured. Privately
insured patients face very large dierences in out of pocket costs between providers that are
94Only variation in the number of competitors is used in Propper et al. (2004).
76in and out of their coverage networks. In addition, health insurance plans make decisions on
which providers to include in their networks based on price. Thus it seems as if price should
be included for those with private insurance. Further, if price is positively correlated with
quality, then its omission could lead to a downward bias in the estimated eect of quality on
demand. Patients may appear less responsive to quality dierences than they really are if
high quality transplant centers are also high cost to them. Endogeneity of quality may also
be an issue, for the same reasons as the Tay paper.
Abraham et al. (2007) has some welfare implications. Abraham et al. examine the de-
terminants of the number of hospitals in isolated markets in the U.S. for 1990. They do
not examine price or quality explicitly. Instead, they infer whether competition is increas-
ing by the population required to support another rm in the market. If the population
required to support another rm is increasing, then average prots available post-entry must
be decreasing, thus increasing the volume necessary to make entry protable. They nd that
market size is the primary determinant of the number of hospitals, and that the quantity
bought and sold in the market rises, and variable prots fall, as the number of hospitals in
a local market increases. This implies that the market is getting more competitive as the
number of hospitals increase. Further, it shows that entry isn't simply demand-stealing |
more hospitals increase demand. The reason is that quantity demanded can increase only if
price is lower or quality is higher. Since that does happen, people are consuming more and
must be better o.95 As a consequence, they conclude that competition increases with the
number of hospitals, and that competition is welfare improving.
Cutler et al. (2010) is a recent very interesting study that, like Abraham et al. utilizes
information on entry (in the coronary artery bypass graft surgery market, i.e., CABG) to
make inferences about the impacts of competition. Cutler et al. use the repeal of entry re-
stricting regulation (hospital certicate of need regulation; CON) in Pennsylvania to examine
the eect of entry of hospitals into the CABG surgery market. They hypothesize that overall
production is capacity constrained { cardiac surgeons are a scarce input and supply can't be
altered easily. As a consequence, entry won't lead to increased quantities of CABG surgery,
but may lead to improved quality, in particular, they hypothesize that it will increase the
market shares of high quality surgeons. This hypothesis is conrmed in the empirical anal-
ysis. They nd that in markets where entrants have 11-20 percent market shares of CABG
surgeries, high quality surgeons' market shares increased 2.1 percentage points more than for
standard quality surgeons. Overall, they conclude that entry led to increased quality, but
that there was no net eect of entry on social welfare. Their estimates of the gains from
reduced mortality due to entry are approximately oset by the estimated xed costs of entry.
This is one of the few papers with welfare results.
95As pointed out previously, increased aggregate demand is not necessary for increased quality to be welfare
enhancing.
77Escarce et al. (2006) examine the relationship between hospital concentration and patient
mortality for adults hospitalized for myocardial infarction, hip fracture, stroke, gastrointesti-
nal hemorrhage, congestive heart failure, or diabetes in California, New York, and Wisconsin.
They nd that the probability of death is lower is less concentrated markets in California
and New York, but not Wisconsin. This adds to the evidence that there can be substantial
quality competition among hospitals, but also that there can be substantial heterogeneity,
depending on market specics. It is possible that in Wisconsin price competition dominates
quality competition, although the study doesn't present evidence on that and of course there
could be other reasons for the result.
A dierent study by Rogowski et al. (2007) examines the same six conditions in the state
of California. In this study Rogowski et al. nd that mortality is lower in less concentrated
markets for three to ve of the six conditions, depending on the measure of concentration
employed. Interestingly, they nd no statistically signicant impact of market structure on
heart attack mortality, in direct contrast to many other studies which nd the opposite result.
Mutter et al. (2008) use national data on hospitals from the U.S. Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality's Hospital Cost and Utilization Project state inpatient databases to
examine the relationships between 38 dierent measures of inpatient quality and 12 dierent
measures of hospital market structure. They nd a variety of diering relationships: some
quality measures positively related to measures of market structure, some negatively, and
some not at all (insignicant). The use of national data is an improvement on prior studies
which only use data from single state. While the results seem somewhat murky, perhaps the
variety of patterns they uncover in the data is not surprising. First, since there is both price
and quality competition, anything can happen. Second, the use of multiple states, while
laudable, does introduce additional heterogeneity, which can be hard to measure. Third,
nding results in every direction isn't terribly surprising with such a large number of dierent
outcome measures.
Romano and Balan (2011) is an interesting recent study. Romano and Balan study the
impact on quality of care of a consummated merger between two hospitals in the Chicago
suburbs (Evanston Northwestern Hospital and Highland Park Hospital). This merger was
the subject of an antitrust suit by the Federal Trade Commission, and the authors provided
evidence on the case. This study uses the Inpatient Quality Indicators and Patient Safety
Indicators used by Encinosa and Bernard and by Sari. The authors use a dierence-in-
dierences methodology and compare the changes in quality measures at the two merged
hospitals before and after the merger to the changes at control hospitals over the same time
period. They nd no signicant impact of the merger on many quality measures, but there is
a signicant negative impact on some and a few with positive impacts. AMI, pneumonia, and
stroke mortality went up at Evanston Northwestern Hospital post-merger compared to control
hospitals, although there was no statistically signicant impact at Highland Park. There
was some improvement in quality for some nursing-sensitive quality measures: the incidence
78of decubitis ulcers (bedsores) fell at both merged entities, as did infections at Evanston
Northwestern. Conversely, the incidence of hip fractures rose at Evanston Northwestern.
Last, they found increases in some measures of obstetric outcomes (birth trauma to the
newborn, obstetric trauma to the mother), and decreases in some other measures. They
conclude that overall there is no reason to infer that the merger had salutary eects on
quality.
Mutter et al. (2011) expand on other studies by examining the impacts of multiple mergers
(42) in multiple (16) U.S. states. The authors use dierence-in-dierence analysis to contrast
changes in 25 dierent measures of quality (the AHRQ Inpatient Quality Indicators and
Patient Safety Indicators) at merging hospitals against changes at control hospitals over the
same time period. Mutter et al. nd mixed results { mergers result in increased, decreased or
no change in quality depending on the measure and the nature of the merger. For the majority
of cases, mergers have no impact on quality. For a few measures there are statistically
signicant impacts of mergers on quality, although there are both positive and negative
eects. Overall, the authors have a hard time nding statistically signicant impacts of
hospital mergers on quality, implying that on average there is no detectable eect. Their
results do indicate, however, that mergers can have either negative or positive quality impacts,
depending on the measure of quality and the specics of the merger. The nature of these
results has a lot in common with their previous study (Mutter et al., 2008), which focused on
measures of market structure, rather than merger. As with that study, while the results seem
somewhat murky, perhaps that is to be expected, given the large degree of heterogeneity in
hospital mergers, and the large number of outcome measures employed.
4.4.3 Studies of the Volume-Outcome Relationship
There have been a very large number of studies of the \volume-outcome" relationship, the
majority in the medical literature. These studies commonly nd a signicant correlation with
the volume a hospital does of a procedure and the medical outcomes of patients receiving the
procedure at that hospital. The obvious concern with studies of this kind is endogeneity. It
may be that hospitals that do more of a procedure are better at it, whether from learning by
doing or by making quality improving investments. It may also be true, however, that patients
are attracted to hospitals with the best outcomes. The studies in the medical literature are
unable to distinguish between these two alternatives.
This is important for assessing competition in the hospital sector and for antitrust enforce-
ment. If volume causes quality, then there may be some eciencies from improved patient
outcomes in more concentrated markets. This could also aect hospital merger evaluation. I
review three relatively recent studies below that present the strongest evidence to date on the
volume-outcome eect: Ho (2002), Gowrisankaran et al. (2004), and Gaynor et al. (2005).
The results of these studies are summarized in Table 12. [TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE]
79Ho (2002) examines the volume outcome relationship for PTCA using data from California
hospitals from 1984 to 1996. The outcomes she examines are mortality and emergency CABG.
She estimates the eects of hospital cumulative and annual volume on outcomes, employing
hospital and time xed eects. Ho nds substantial improvements in outcomes over time,
but a small eect of annual hospital volume on outcome. The eect of cumulative volume
on outcomes is imprecisely estimated.
Gowrisankaran et al. (2004) attempt to recover the causal relationship between volume
and outcome using instrumental variables. They study the volume-outcome relationship for
three surgical procedures: the Whipple procedure (removing tumors from the pancreas);
CABG; and repair of abdominal aortic aneurysm (this repairs weak spots in the abdominal
artery). They use data on hospitals from Florida from 1988 to 1999 and California from 1993
to 1997. The instrumental variables approach is to use patient distance from the hospital to
estimate patient choice of hospital and then construct predicted volume. Gowrisankaran et al.
nd that increasing volume causes better outcomes for all three procedures and nd signicant
and large eects of hospital volume on patient mortality. This implies that volume-outcome
eects can be important to consider when evaluating the impact of hospital competition.
If competition leads to reduced volume then outcomes will decline. If competition leads to
specialization then outcomes will improve.
Gaynor et al. (2005), in a similar paper, use instrumental variables techniques to estimate
the volume outcome relationship for CABG. They use data from California for 1983-1999.
Gaynor et al. nd a causal, and substantial, eect of volume on outcome. For example, if
CABGs could only be performed in hospitals with a volume of 200 or greater, the average
mortality rate from CABG would fall from 2.5 percent to 2.05 percent, saving 118 (statistical)
lives. In a related working paper by the same authors, Seider et al. (2000), simulate the eects
of two mergers: a hypothetical "standard merger", in which two out of ve rms with equal
market shares merge; and the actual merger of Alta Bates Medical Center and Summit
Medical Center in Oakland, California. They nd that, for larger hospital mergers (hospital
volumes > 140), the value of saved lives from the standard merger outweighs the loss of
consumer surplus from increased prices. For the Summit-Alta Bates merger, which does not,
however, have a large eect on volume, the eect is a net loss of $2.8 to $4.4 million. The
reason is that the increase in volume due to the merger is too small to have much eect on
outcomes, while the price increase reduces welfare.
Huckman and Pisano (2006) examine the slightly dierent question of the relationship
between volume and outcome for surgeons. Specically, they ask whether it is a surgeon's
volume at a particular hospital, or his/her overall volume that inuences surgical outcomes.
Examining cardiac bypass (CABG) cases in Pennsylvania in 1994 and 1995, they nd that
the mortality rate of a surgeons patients at a specic hospital improves signicantly with
increases in his or her volume at that hospital but not with increases in his or her volume
elsewhere. They do not specically address the possibility of endogeneity of volume, although
80concerns over this may be allayed somewhat by the ndings from Gowrisankaran et al. (2004)
and Gaynor et al. (2005) that fail to reject exogeneity (although Ramanarayanan (2008),
discussed below, rejects exogeneity in his study).
Ramanarayanan (2008) also attempts to identify physician specic volume-outcome ef-
fects for CABG surgery. Ramanarayanan's approach diers from Huckman and Pisano in
that he uses an instrumental variables strategy for identication (Huckman and Pisano use
lagged volume and lags of surgeon and hospital risk adjusted mortality to try to address
endogeneity concerns) and uses data from Florida for 1998-2006. The instrument is the
departure of a surgeon { this departure has the impact of exogenously shifting volume to
remaining physicians. Ramanarayanan nds that individual physician volume does have a
signicant impact on patient outcomes. Unlike Huckman and Pisano, he does nd that sur-
geon experience is somewhat portable across hospitals. However, it is not fully portable {
surgeon volume at the \home" hospital has a much bigger impact on outcomes than does
volume at other hospitals. The results from these two papers (Ramanarayanan, 2008; Huck-
man and Pisano, 2006) provide a more nuanced view on the volume-outcome relationship.
Physicians play an important role, but it's not simply the physician's volume that determines
outcomes. There are hospital specic aspects to the volume-outcome relationship, implying
that concentrating procedures at a hospital can play a signicant role in improved outcomes.
In a novel approach to try to identify learning eects, Huesch (2009) estimates the volume-
outcome relationship for 57 \new cardiac surgeons" (physicians who had completed their
residencies immediately before the beginning of the time period he examines). Huesch uses
the same data covering the same time period as does Ramanarayanan. He nds no evidence of
a volume-outcome relationship for these new cardiac surgeons. Indeed, allowing for forgetting,
he nds that the eects of prior experience do not carry over from one quarter to the next.
Huesch uses xed eects and instrumental variables methods, although he does not reject
exogeneity of volume for the new doctors he examines. This result stands in marked contrast
to Huckman and Pisano and Ramanarayanan. One would expect that new physicians would
be those doing the most learning. This isn't supported by the results of this study. It's
well known that learning by doing is dicult to identify empirically (see Thompson, 2010).
Huesch and Sakakibara (2009) point out that a number of possible mechanisms that could
be driving observed empirical volume-outcome relationships, and suggest further thought on
how to identify these specic mechanisms is in order.
4.5 Summary
The empirical literature on competition and quality in health care markets is for the most
part fairly recent, and has grown very rapidly. The results from empirical research are not
uniform. Most of the studies of Medicare patients show a positive impact of competition
on quality. This is not surprising, since economic theory for markets with regulated prices
81predicts such a result. However, the results from studies of markets where prices are set by
rms (e.g, privately insured patients) are much more variable. Some studies show increased
competition leading to increased quality, and some show the opposite. While this may appear
surprising, it is not. Economic theory predicts that quality may either increase or decrease
with increased competition when rms are setting both quality and price.
This rst generation of studies has provided a very valuable base of knowledge for further
research. The base that has been constructed, while extremely useful, does not allow for
normative analysis, for the most part. The results of these studies don't allow us to make in-
ferences about whether their estimated results imply that competition increased or decreased
social welfare.
These results also contain some useful lessons for research on competition and quality
in other industries, specically what can and cannot be learned via non-structural (SCP)
econometric approaches, and what is required to obtain more rened results.
A major next step for research in this area is sorting out the factors that determine
whether competition will lead to increased or decreased quality. Economic theory can be a
helpful guide for these next generation studies. While theoretical models of price and quality
determination are complex and usually yield indenite predictions, there is also some simple
intuition that can be gleaned from theory. Whether competition leads to increased or de-
creased quality will depend on its relative impacts on rms' price and quality elasticities of
demand. Future research can focus on trying to recover estimates of these key elements. Ad-
ditionally, studies of price regulated markets can refer back to theory to specify econometric
models that include the regulated price and marginal cost (or its determinants). In general,
the sorts of studies discussed above will allow for more precise positive analysis of the impact
of competition on quality in health care, and provide opportunities for normative analysis as
well.
We need more detailed models, however, in order to perform normative analysis. Thus,
an important, although formidable task, for future work is to pursue the estimation of more
complete econometric models of quality determination in health care markets. This means
trying to recover preferences and costs (i.e., demand and supply). The benet of this approach
is the ability to make clearer inferences about welfare, since estimates of preference and cost
parameters are in hand. The drawback is that such estimates are not easily obtained. In
particular, they usually can only be obtained at the cost of making untestable assumptions.
The quantity, and detail, of health care data may make some of the assumptions employed in
settings with sparser data unnecessary, however. Augmenting modern bargaining models of
price determination with quality choice may also be a fruitful approach to trying to identify
the price and quality eects of competition where prices are market determined. In the
previous section 4.3 we provided a preliminary sketch of what such a model might look
like. Clearly more work remains to be done, but this may be a promising avenue for future
82research.
5 Studies of Health Insurance Markets
5.1 Introduction
While a great deal of eort in health economics has been devoted to studying health in-
surance, most research has been focused on consumer behavior, or on the implications of
asymmetric information for selection and market outcomes (see Breyer et al., 2012, for cover-
age of these topics). Until recently there has been very little work on competition by health
insurance rms. Part of the reason for this has been the paucity of sucient data for given
markets to construct measures of prices or market shares in the U.S. and internationally.
For the U.S., there are detailed household level data (the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey,
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/) on health insurance decisions and prices, but these
data are from surveys of approximately 4,000 households selected to be nationally represen-
tative. As a consequence, they don't fully describe the choices in a given market, or catalog
the prices of alternatives, let alone the market shares of sellers. Other data (National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners, http://www.naic.org) do capture market shares, but at
the level of a state. Since the vast majority of health insurance restricts enrollees' choices to
a network of providers, most of whom are local, the geographic market for health insurance
is local, and smaller than a state. In addition, there are no comprehensive data on health
plans' networks of providers. The most comprehensive data on health insurance markets has
been for private insurance associated with the Medicare program (Medigap coverage, Medi-
care+Choice/Medicare Advantage). Internationally, some countries have enacted reforms
that have led to the creation or expansion of private health insurance markets (Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland). Data from those markets has become available over the last few
years.
Another reason has been the diculty of specifying a coherent model of competition in
this market due to its complexity. For the U.S., the majority of private health insurance
is provided by employers to their workers as a (pre-tax) fringe benet. Within this cate-
gory, some employers self-insure, and contract with insurers only to administer their plans
(including assembling a network of providers and negotiating terms with them). This is
typical of large employers. Other employers do purchase the underwriting of risk from in-
surers, as well as administration. Of those that purchase actual insurance, small employers
are faced with very dierent circumstances than large employers, mostly due to their smaller
risk pool. Thinking about demand here is complicated. First, employers are faced with
the task of somehow aggregating employees' preferences.96 Employers want to retain and
96Dafny et al. (2010) present evidence that employers' choices do not maximize employees' welfare, although
83attract productive employees, and so have to o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health insurance. Countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland do not have
this particular complicated institutional structure on the demand side, but have their own
institutional idiosyncracies that also present a challenge to economic modeling. Second, the
demand for a health insurance plan depends on its associated network of providers, as we
noted previously (this tends to be true in every country). Competition among health plans
is aected by their provider networks.
5.2 Empirical Studies
Empirical studies have taken a number of dierent forms. One group of studies have tried
to study the impacts of competition on outcome variables. This includes reduced form stud-
ies, SCP studies, and studies of entry. Another set of studies have written down complete
demand and supply side models of the health insurance market and proceeded with struc-
tural estimation. Yet another set of studies have estimated the elasticity of demand for an
insurance plan (as opposed to aggregate demand for insurance). These studies are relevant
to competition in insurance markets, since the elasticity faced by sellers plays a large role
in competition. In what follows, we review these studies. We divide them into studies of
competition and studies of demand elasticity.
5.2.1 Studies of the Impacts of Competition
Table 13 contains summaries of recent studies of health insurance market competition. This
table is organized in a similar way to the previous tables summarizing empirical studies of
hospital market competition. [TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE]
Dafny (2010) is one of the rst of some new studies on insurance market competition.
Dafny uses data from a benets consulting rm on the plans purchased and premiums paid
by a large number (776) of large employers over the period 1998-2005. While these data
are not necessarily complete by market or nationally representative, they do represent the
most extensive and comprehensive data set with prices and quantities for the insurance
market. Dafny's empirical approach is motivated by a bargaining model between insurers
and employers.97
they do not allow for eects of restricted choice on provider prices, and hence premiums. Also see Goldstein
and Pauly (1976).
97This is analogous to the bargaining model between insurers and hospitals that we presented in 3.1. We
did not specify a bargaining model between insurers and hospitals, although bargaining between these agents
surely occurs. This emphasizes the complexity of the institutional structure of insurance markets and the
dicult modeling choices researchers must confront.
84Her identication strategy is to examine the eect of shocks to employer protability
on the changes in the insurance premiums they pay. The idea is that if insurers possess
no market power then the premiums they charge will not vary with employer protability.
Only if insurers have market power will they be able to price discriminate based on employer
protability.98 Dafny nds strong evidence that premiums increase with the buyer's prof-
itability. She also interacts protability with the number of insurers in the market. As the
number of rms increases, market power should decline. Her results are consistent with this
hypothesis { the eect of employer protability on insurance premiums falls with the number
of rms in the market. This provides some evidence on competition in insurance markets
where previously there was none.
Of course, like any other study, it's possible that other factors could be driving the results.
In particular, premiums are not an ideal measure of the price of insurance. Premiums consist
of expected medical expenses, plus the insurer's administrative costs, plus any markup due
to market power. In essence, the premium is a measure of quantity of health insurance as
well as the price. Expected medical expenditures are the quantity { they will vary with
the generosity of the health insurance plan, the characteristics of the enrollees (sickness and
preferences for medical care), and provider prices. The part of the premium not due to
medical expenses, the \load" or \load factor" is the price of insurance.
As Dafny realizes, the issue here is that if employers who experience positive prot shocks
share some of the rents with employees via more generous insurance coverage then the ob-
served relationship between employer protability and health insurance premiums may be
quantity increases as opposed to price. One of her purposes in estimating the specication
with interactions between employer protability and insurance market structure is to test
for this possibility. The fact that this eect is larger in markets with fewer insurers suggests
that it's not primarily due to increased plan generosity.99 Dafny also includes a control for
plan design to try to control for generosity. Including this variable does not alter the re-
sults. It is notable that there are signicant eects of employer protability in insurance
premiums even for markets with 9-10 insurers (the eect is insignicant for markets with 10
or more insurers). It seems surprising that insurers would possess market power in markets
with 8-9 rivals (9-10 rms total). This empirical result does raise some doubts, but research
by Dranove et al. (2003) found patterns in 1997 suggesting there may be market power in
HMO markets with up to 6 rms. In any event, Dafny is a contribution that opens a line of
empirical research on competition in health insurance markets.
98Dafny is thinking in terms of a bargaining, as opposed to posted price model, but the basic intuition is
the same.
99More precisely, what Dafny nds is that the eect of increased protability for an employer is to increase
premiums in markets with few insurers by more than in markets with a large number of insurers, for the
same employer.
85Dafny et al. (2011b) take a more traditional SCP approach to examining health insurance
market competition. They employ the same dataset as in Dafny (2010), but examine how
the growth rate of an employer's health insurance premiums is aected by health insurance
market concentration (HHI). They include variables intended to control for factors that could
inuence medical spending or administrative costs (as opposed to markup): a demographic
factor, plan design factor, and the number of enrollees in a plan. Initial OLS regressions
reveal no signicant eect of insurer market concentration on premium growth. Of course,
the HHI may be endogenous. In order to deal with that problem Dafny et al. instrument
for the observed HHI with changes in local market concentration due to a large merger in
1999 between two national health insurers: Aetna and Prudential Healthcare. Using this
instrumental variables approach, they nd a signicant impact of the predicted change in
HHI due to the merger on the change in premiums. They nd that the cumulative eect of
insurer market consolidation on premiums is approximately 7 percent.
Dafny et al. also recognize that insurers may have bargaining power (market power in a
posted price world) with regard to providers. They therefore examine the eect of insurer
concentration on changes in earnings and employment for physicians and for nurses as a
way of testing for the presence of insurer monopsony power. They nd that the merger
reduced physician earnings growth on average by 3 percent, while nurses' earnings rose by
approximately 6-10ths of one percent. There is no signicant eect on physician employment,
while nurse employment grows as a result of the merger induced increase in concentration. It's
not clear if this is evidence of monopsony power, but it is consistent with plan concentration
leading to downward pressure on physician earnings and ultimately to substitution of nurses
for physicians. Overall, while the estimation results depend crucially on the use of the Aetna-
Prudential merger as an instrumental variable, they show evidence of a signicant relationship
between changes in insurer market concentration and changes in premiums, implying a link
between market structure and the exercise of market power.
Dranove et al. (2003) employ a modication of the methodologies of Brenahan and Reiss
(1991) devised by Mazzeo (2002) to examine competition among HMOs. They use data
from 1997 on the number of HMOs in local markets, distinguishing between HMOs that
are national and those that are not. They rst estimate threshold ratios (the ratio of the
population necessary to support n + 1 rms to that necessary to support n) for all HMOs
together. They nd somewhat puzzling results: the threshold ratio for 2 rms is 0.93 and for
3 rms is 1.58 (it declines thereafter). A threshold ratio of one indicates that it takes exactly
the same population (demand) to support the second rm as to support the rst. In the
Brenahan and Reiss framework this implies that there is no change in protability with the
entry of the second rm, i.e., there's no increase in competition in duopoly HMO markets
compared to monopoly. The threshold ratio above one for the third rm indicates that it
takes substantially more population (per rm) to support three HMOs than two, implying
that prot margins must be falling with the entry of the third rm (but not the second).
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be due to product dierentiation. If local HMOs don't compete strongly with national HMOs
(national employers may strongly prefer to buy from national HMOs and local employers from
local HMOs), then the estimates produced by pooling them together could be misleading.
Dranove et al. then employ the framework of Mazzeo (2002), allowing for the possibility of
any combination of any number of rms (up to 5) of each type. The parameter estimates
indicate that the prots of local HMOs are virtually unaected by the number of national
HMOs, and vice versa. By contrast, the presence of a second same-type HMO reduces
prots by approximately one-half. The eects of subsequent same type competitors on prots
are negative, but declining in magnitude. These results indicate that there is substantial
competition in HMO markets, but also substantial product dierentiation. Dranove et al.'s
results indicate that there is virtually no competition at all between national and local HMOs.
The studies by Dafny (2010); Dafny et al. (2011b); Dranove et al. (2003) nd evidence
that market structure aects conduct { more rms in a market is associated with tougher
competition. Some other studies call that relationship into question.
Frank and Lamiraud (2009) examine the functioning of health insurance markets in
Switzerland. Switzerland requires all residents to have health insurance. Health insurance is
privately supplied, but the market is heavily regulated. The government denes a standard-
ized benet for the required coverage, mandates guaranteed issue by insurers, adjusts the
payments insurers receive to compensate them for risk100, and provides public information
on prices. Frank and Lamiraud document a high degree of price dispersion in Swiss health
insurance markets, with little evidence of convergence over time. The number of health in-
surers has declined over time, but the mean number of health plans per canton rose from 40
in 1997 to 56 in 2004. Switching rates across plans were low: 4.8 percent in 1997, 2.1 percent
in 2000, then stabilizing at around 3 percent.
Frank and Lamiraud nd this puzzling, given the rather large price dierences across plans
with identical benets. They speculate that the presence of a large number of choices may
lead to decision overload. They make use of survey data on individuals and publicly reported
information on health insurance plans to estimate a model of individual health plan switching
and attempt to test these hypotheses. They nd that switching is signicantly larger in areas
with fewer plans, and that those who switched paid signicantly less than those staying with
the same plan (15.9 percent less; 33.18 CHF). These results don't seem consistent with price
competition getting tougher with the number of rms. Now, to be clear, the studies by
Dafny; Dafny et al.; Dranove et al. are on the large employer segment of the U.S. private
health insurance market. There, purchasing decisions are made by large corporations, so
one would presume that these decisions are likely to be rational. The Frank and Lamiraud
study examines the decisions of individual consumers in Switzerland. The most important
100Payments are adjusted up or down based on the expected medical expenses of the insurer's enrollee pool.
87di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likely to be aected by transactions costs or irrationality than are large corporations. Of
course, the institutions in the Swiss individual health insurance market and the U.S. large
employer market are also quite dierent, but it seems to us that the most likely reason for the
dierent patterns observed in these studies is due to the dierences between decision making
for individuals vs. that for large employers.
Similar patterns with regard to price dispersion have been documented in the U.S. market
for Medigap insurance and in the Netherlands health insurance market. Medigap is private
insurance purchased by Medicare beneciaries to cover the \gaps" in the Medicare coverage
provided by the government. The insurance covers coinsurance payments, deductibles, and
those items or services that are excluded from the publicly provided coverage (most notably
prescription drugs before the introduction of Medicare Part D).
Maestas et al. (2009) document substantial price variation in Medigap insurance markets,
even though plans are standardized.101 They apply the search model of Carlson and McAfee
(1983) and nd that insurers have substantial dierences in costs, and hence loading fees,
which contribute to the observed variation in prices. This price dispersion is an equilibrium
due to substantial search costs { Maestas et al. estimate an average search cost for consumers
in the market of $72 and a maximum of $144.
Bolhaar et al. (2010) also nd substantial price dispersion in the Netherlands market
for health insurance. This market is also subject to substantial regulation, including policy
standardization and the dissemination of information to consumers, so the existence of price
dispersion is somewhat surprising. They employ a unique dataset, the Dutch Health Care
Consumer Panel, which contains information on actual consumer search behavior. They nd
that more educated consumers and younger consumers are more likely to search. In the
Dutch system, there are also group contracts (e.g., an employment group). These are oered
at a discount. They nd a very strong correlation between an oer for a group contract and
the probability of search.
Starc (2010) models the Medigap market, allowing for adverse selection and market power.
She documents that the market is highly concentrated { the national 4 rm concentration
ratio is 83 percent (compared to 44 percent for private passenger automobile insurance or 34
percent for life insurance), and two rms (UnitedHealth, 46 percent and Mutual of Omaha,
24 percent) account for almost all of that. Starc documents substantial price dispersion for
Medigap policies, conrming Maestas et al., and documents a positive relationship between
premiums and market concentration, the same qualitative result as in Dafny et al. (2011b),
albeit for a very dierent market. A one percent increase in the two-rm concentration ratio
101Studies of quite a few other markets have found substantial price dispersion, even in what one might
think are competitive markets (e.g. Pratt et al., 1979; Dahlby and West, 1986; Gaynor and Polachek, 1994;
Sorensen, 2000).
88is associated with a 0.26 percent increase in premiums.
Starc estimates a structural model of insurance demand, claims, and seller costs (variable,
xed, sunk) using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
and the Medicare Current Beneciary Survey for 2006-2008. She estimates the average price
elasticity of demand to be -1.12. This is a very low elasticity for rm demand, especially
given the standardization of the products sold in this market. It's possible this is due to
aggregation { the NAIC data are at the level of the state and the true geographic market
is likely much smaller than that. It's also possible that the instruments are weak and that's
what's driving the seemingly low estimate. The estimate of the claim function (estimated
jointly with demand) reveals that insurer claims increase with premiums { a $100 increase
in premiums will lead to a $15 increase in claims. This indicates the presence of adverse
selection { higher risk consumers are less price sensitive. In the case of adverse selection,
claims are increasing in the premium charged by the insurer. As a consequence, insurers
facing adverse selection will charge lower markups of premiums over marginal costs than
they otherwise would. This is a classic case of the second best { two distortions are better
than one. The monopoly power of insurers is actually reduced by the \additional" distortion
of adverse selection.
Starc also recovers estimates of cost parameters. For variable costs this is done in the
usual manner, via a pricing equation and an assumption about conduct, but with the following
wrinkle to account for an institutional feature of health insurance markets. Health insurers are
subject to minimum loss ratio regulations by the federal government { 65 percent of premiums
collected are required to be paid out to enrollees as reimbursements for covered services. Starc
incorporates this into estimation as an inequality constraint on pricing (premium setting).
She estimates that United Health's variable (administrative) costs are about 6 percent of
premiums, while they are estimated to be 18 percent of premiums for Mutual of Omaha.
Estimates of bounds on xed or sunk costs can be recovered from the data. This employs
the following intuition. First, assume that Mutual of Omaha faces xed costs of entering
each local market (a state). United Health, by contrast, expends resources on promotion
(e.g., obtaining AARP's endorsement) entering the national market. These are sunk costs.
Second, we observe, for example, 1 rm employing Mutual of Omaha's strategy. This implies
that Mutual of Omaha is protable, and a second rm employing that strategy would not
be protable. Therefore the lower bound for Mutual's xed costs are the expected variable
prots for a second rm employing their strategy, and the upper bound is the expectation of
variable prots. The same exercise is performed to identify the bounds on the sunk costs of
entering the national market. The bounds on Mutual of Omaha's xed costs of entering a
state are estimated at approximately $445,000 and $ 796,000, implying xed costs of entering
all of the 50 state markets between $22 and $40 million. The bounds on United Health's
sunk costs of entering the national market are approximately $99 million and $488 million.
The standard errors on these estimates are very large.
89With these estimates in hand, Starc proceeds to welfare analysis. First, the impact of
adverse selection in insurers' pricing is computed by setting the derivative of claims with
respect to price to zero and then nding optimal prices.102 This increases premiums by 9
percent and reduces the size of the market (lowers insurance coverage) by 18 percent. Welfare
falls by 7 percent. This is interesting, because in this situation where there is market power,
welfare is improved by the presence of adverse selection. This is entirely the opposite of the
impact of adverse selection in a competitive insurance market. Starc goes on to calculate
the impact of setting premiums equal to average and to marginal claims. These lead to large
reductions in prices { 44 and 45 percent, respectively. The median compensating variation
to consumers is $644 ($670), and falls to $230 ($230) net of reduced producer prots.
These results emphasize the substantial market power exercised in this market. It points
out that insurance subsidies or mandates will mostly result in increased rents to sellers, with
little impact on welfare. Starc interprets the low demand elasticity and associated high degree
of market power as due to strong brand loyalty. The strong brand loyalty provides sellers
with a strong incentive to engaged in extensive marketing and promotion activities. Policies
to reduce brand eects, such as providing better consumer information, or attracting entry,
can substantially enhance welfare.
Another paper that models both adverse selection and market power in insurance markets
is Lustig (2010). Lustig examines the market for Medicare+Choice plans in 2000-2003.
Medicare+Choice are private managed care plans that Medicare beneciaries may choose as
an alternative to traditional Medicare (the current version of this program is called Medicare
Advantage). Lustig has a clever idea to identify adverse selection. Consumers' preferences
for plan generosity should increase plans' costs if there's adverse selection. He recovers
preferences from demand estimation, then estimates plans' cost function to test for adverse
selection. He nds that generosity preferences have a signicant impact on plan xed costs,
but not the marginal cost of plan generosity. Further, consumers' health risk has no signicant
impact on insurers' costs. This is a very clever test, and the results are interesting, but they
don't seem very supportive of adverse selection. It seems like generosity preferences should
aect insurers' marginal costs of generosity, as should consumers' health risks. Lustig then
goes on to do welfare analysis. In particular, he uses the model estimates to simulate welfare
when adverse selection is eliminated, then compares this to welfare measured at the allocation
observed in the data. This gain from eliminating adverse selection is simulated for markets
with increasing numbers of insurers (1,2,...,6,>6) to generate eects of competition. Lustig
nds that the gains to eliminating adverse selection increase monotonically in the number of
insurance rms. For example, in one of his simulations Lustig nds that removing adverse
selection eliminates 17 percent of the dierence in welfare between the observed and socially
102Recall that adverse selection is manifested as a positive impact of premiums on claims. This positive
relationship reduces the prot maximizing price for insurers, since setting a higher price attracts enrollees
who are higher risk and more expensive.
90optimal outcomes where there's a monopoly, while it eliminates 35 percent of the dierence
in a duopoly, and 50 percent where there are 6 or more rms. This implies that when there
is market power most of the welfare loss is due to the exercise of market power as opposed
to adverse selection.
An earlier paper by Town and Liu (2003) focuses on estimating the welfare associated
with Medicare+Choice, and conduct an analysis of the impact of competition on welfare.
Their model does not allow for adverse selection. They nd that the creation of the M+C
program resulted in approximately $15.6 billion in consumer surplus and $52 billion in prots
from 1993 to 2000 (in 2000 dollars). They nd evidence of competitive eects. Consumer
surplus increases in the number of plans in a county, and most of the increase in welfare is due
to increased premium competition. Comparing monopoly markets versus markets with four
rms, they nd that 81 percent of the dierence in welfare (higher in quadropoly markets)
is due to increased premium competition. Of the remainder, 3 percent is from increased
product variety and 8 percent from prescription drug coverage.
As stated previously, most of the literature on health insurance markets has focused on
market imperfections due to asymmetric information (Breyer et al., 2012). The smaller and
newer literature on market power in health insurance markets, which we have just been de-
scribing, abstracts away from issues of asymmetric information. The papers by Starc and
Lustig represent signicant innovations by modeling a health insurance market with adverse
selection and market power. While the models dier, and are applied to dierent markets
(Medigap, Medicare Advantage) both sets of results point to market power as the major
source of welfare loss in this market, as opposed to adverse selection. We should also note
that the studies by Starc (2010) and Lustig (2010) aren't necessarily inconsistent with the
studies by Dafny (2010), Dafny et al. (2011b), and Dranove et al. (2003). Both sets of studies
point to the existence of market power in health insurance, and market power decreasing in
the number of rms. It is also worth noting that these structural studies of health insurance
markets nd much larger estimates of demand responsiveness than have studies that estimate
demand using insurance choices by employees within a single rm. Those studies nd evi-
dence of substantial switching costs (Handel, 2010) or large (and persistent) plan preference
heterogeneity (Carlin and Town, 2009) that are associated with low estimates of demand
elasticity.
5.2.2 Studies of the Elasticity of Demand for Health Insurance
There have been many studies of the elasticity of demand for health insurance. We do not
attempt a complete review here. Our purpose is instead to report a few estimates as a means
of providing insight into the potential for competition in the health insurance market. If
the elasticity of demand facing a rm is low, then there's not much potential for market
91power.103 Most of the U.S. evidence comes from studies of employee choice among plans
within rms. The Carlin and Town and Handel studies are recent examples of that. Prior
work estimating demand elasticities using employee choice among plans at a single employer
found substantially larger demand responsiveness than the more recent studies (e.g., Cutler
and Reber (1998), -0.3 { 0.6; Royalty and Solomon (1999), -1 { -3.5; Strombom et al. (2002),
-0.84 { -6.59). Unfortunately these estimates are from choices within a rm. We don't really
know how much they tell us about the market. If they are informative they indicate that
rms do face demand for insurance products with some elasticity, but not much. Even an
elasticity of -6.59 implies that 15 percent of the price is markup (Lerner Index = 0.15), which
is a substantial amount of market power.
Table 14 summarizes some relevant studies. [TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] There are
some older studies of insurance choice in markets. Dowd and Feldman (1994) examine the
health plan choices of ve employers located in Minneapolis-St. Paul. The estimate a rm
demand elasticity of -7.9. Atherly et al. (2004) estimate the choices of Medicare beneciaries
among Medicare+Choice plans. They estimate a rm demand elasticity of -4.57. As we
noted previously, even a rm demand elasticity of () -8 implies a substantial markup (12.5
percent).
A number of recent studies estimate the elasticity of demand using choice among health
insurance plans in the Netherlands and in Germany. The Netherlands mandates that all
individuals purchase health insurance, which is sold by private rms. As in Switzerland,
benets are standardized (although there's supplemental coverage available) and there is
guaranteed issue. Insurers set their own community rated premiums. The specics of the
German system dier from that of the Netherlands, but the key factor is that individuals
have choice across insurers (referred to as sickness funds), and the amount that they pay
diers. van Dijk et al. (2008) use administrative data from the Netherlands, and estimate
the price elasticity of residual demand facing an insurance rm as ranging from -0.10 (for
women aged 55-64) to -0.38 (for mean aged 25-34). These are very low rm elasticities, which
seems to imply little potential for competition in the Dutch health insurance market. Since
no prot maximizing rm should operate in the inelastic portion of their demand curve, these
numbers seem too low to represent actual residual demand elasticities. Unfortunately van
Dijk et al. only have one year of actual data { they construct a synthetic panel from the
actual data, given institutional facts about the market. This may have something to do with
the low estimates of elasticities.
Schut et al. (2003) estimate demand elasticities for the Netherlands and for Germany.
They estimate the rm elasticity of demand for Germany to be -3.45 (in 1997-200). The
Dutch elasticity is estimated at most to be -0.41 (1998-2000). Again, this seems implausible
103A traditional measure of market power, the Lerner Index, which measures the ratio of the price-marginal
cost markup to price, is equal to the absolute value of the inverse of the rm's own-price elasticity of demand.
92as a rm elasticity of demand. Tamm et al. (2007) use panel data from Germany over the
period 2001-2004 and nd a short run price elasticity of approximately -0.5. The long run
elasticity is approximately -12.
Overall, the results that nd estimated rm demand elasticities below (minus) one are
hard to understand. Those that are greater than one in absolute value are what one would
expect. Nonetheless, those numbers, like the earlier estimates from the U.S., taken at face
value, indicate the presence of substantial market power on the part of insurers in the German
health insurance market.
5.3 Summary
There hasn't been much empirical research on competition in health insurance markets until
very recently, as the dates of most of the studies reviewed in this section demonstrate. Most
of the studies nd evidence that competition leads to lower prices. In the U.S., the papers
by Dafny and Starc present evidence that the markets for large employer insurance and
for Medigap are highly concentrated, leading to higher prices. The studies by Frank and
Lamiraud, Maestas et al., and Bolhaar et al. document substantial price dispersion and
search costs. The Frank and Lamiraud study suggests that consumers may be subject to
psychological biases that undermine the market mechanism. There are not many studies of
the elasticity of demand faced by insurance rms for their products in the market. Those
that exist for the U.S. and Germany do nd fairly substantial elasticities of demand, although
it should be noted that even those estimates imply that insurers possess substantial market
power. The demand elasticity estimates for the Netherlands are all below -1. Since rms
shouldn't be operating on the inelastic portions of their demand curves this presents a bit of
a puzzle. Further work is required to understand what's driving these estimates. If it truly
is consumer behavior, then more work has to be done understanding the demand side of this
market.
Overall, the studies reviewed in this section represent substantial additions to knowl-
edge. Further research is required on both the demand and supply sides of this market.
The Netherlands insurance market and the market for private health insurance in the U.S.
present opportunities for employing careful economic modeling to advance our understand-
ing of this complicated market. In addition, at present there are no studies of competition
in the U.S. (private) markets for small group or individual insurance (we presume due to
data limitations). Those are the markets most frequently referred to as functioning poorly.
Understanding how well these markets function, and the role played by competition, is an
important task for economic research.
936 Studies of Physician Services Markets
6.1 Introduction
Over the years a great deal of attention has been paid by health economists to issues regard-
ing physicians. The majority of that work has focused on the role of asymmetric information.
A great deal of that has been about the impact of asymmetric information on the market
relationships between patients and physicians, i.e., physician induced demand. Another com-
ponent has been focused on incentives and payment mechanisms for physicians. Relatively
little, however, has focused on competition per se. One of the reasons for that, perhaps, is the
fact that the majority of physician services markets have large numbers of sellers and entry
into a (local) market is relatively easy. It seems reasonable to characterize most markets for
physician services as monopolistically competitive, and a relatively mild form of monopolistic
competition at that.
There are some reasons, however, to think that the monopolistic competition model may
be an accurate depiction of these markets no longer. Insurers no longer allow their enrollees
to see any physician they like. Physicians must be members of the insurer's network. This
implies that entry into a market requires entry into an insurer's provider network (at least
one). This may be a more substantial cost associated with entry than existed previously.
Separately, the nature of competition also depends on the product markets. Markets for
more specialized services have fewer sellers. The costs of entry into a specic local market
may be higher due to the need for access to specialized labor and facilities. In any event,
the extent of competition in the aggregate is limited by the total stock of physicians who
can supply these specialized services. Given the limited entry of new physicians into the
specialties that supply these services there is only so much competition possible.
In addition, geographic markets may be fairly limited. They are almost certainly smaller
than an entire metropolitan area. As a consequence, buyers who wish to have physician
practices in their network in locations convenient for their enrollees may be facing fewer sellers
than it might appear. An additional factor is the possibility of monopsony power in physician
services markets. Insurance companies are large relative to physician practices. It may
appear that insurers may be able to exercise monopsony power as buyers. The monopolistic
competition model doesn't admit that possibility and thus isn't useful for considering this
issue. A posted price model of monopsony (or more accurately oligopsony) is an alternative,
but doesn't really capture the true nature of buyer and seller interchange in this market.
There is some recent theoretical work which considers the impact of competition among
physicians in an asymmetric information setting. Allard et al. (2009) examine physicians'
provision of care under information asymmetry in a dynamic game. Without repetition all
physicians provide minimum eort. With repetition, competition can serve to discipline
94physicians { it is even possible the physicians will supply optimal eort. Introducing patient
switching costs reduces the eect of competition, but it still serves to set a lower bound
on physician eort. Competition serves a socially useful role in disciplining shirking by
physicians in the face of asymmetric information.
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) analyze the case where there is a competitive market
with experts and discounters supplying consumers. Experts can diagnose and treat problems,
while discounters can only oer a treatment (without performing diagnosis). They show
that in a competitive market experts may refrain from diagnosis to prevent consumers from
obtaining a lower price for treatment from a discounter. In this setting, competition does
not enhance welfare.
The bargaining model we describe in Section 3.1 could also be applied to physicians,
although it does not include asymmetric information. It admits market power on either side
of the market through the bargaining abilities and threat points of the buyers and sellers.
However, at present data limitations (at least for the U.S.) preclude the estimation of such
a model. Indeed, the empirical literature on physician competition is quite sparse. This is
undoubtedly mostly due to lack of data with which to test hypotheses about competition. It
may also be that health economists' attention has been drawn elsewhere. There is no doubt
that there are interesting and important issues to address in this area.
6.2 Empirical Studies of Physician Services Markets
In what follows, we review the empirical literature on competition in physician services
markets. We focus mostly on research that has been published (or at least written) since the
previous volume of this Handbook came out. The papers are divided into two areas: entry
and market structure and studies of pricing conduct. Table 15 contains summary information
on these studies. [TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE]
6.2.1 Studies of Entry and Market Structure
Location theory implies that there will be a minimum population necessary for a given area to
support a physician of a particular specialty. The smaller the total number of physicians in a
given specialty, the greater the critical value of population. If the total number of physicians
expands, the minimum population necessary to support a physician will fall. This was rst
exposited and tested by Newhouse et al. (1982), who found that the size of a town aects
the probability of having a physician located there. They also make use of the fact that the
number of specialists in the U.S. increased dramatically over the decade of the 1970s. The
theory predicts that towns that did not previously have a specialist would gain them at a
greater rate than those that did. They nd that this is so.
95Rosenthal et al. (2005) revisit this hypothesis using data from the 1980s and 1990s. They
examine 23 states with low physician to population ratios. The total number of physicians
in these states double from 1970 to 1999. They nd that communities of all sizes gained
physicians over this period, but that the impact was larger for smaller communities, as
predicted by the theory.
A recent paper by Isabel and Paula (2010) examines some of these issues using data
for Portugal from 1996 and 2007. The total number of physicians in Portugal grew by
approximately 30 percent over that period and the number per capita grew by approximately
22 percent. They estimate a static model using 2007 data and nd that population size has
a large and signicant impact on the number of physicians per capita located in an area.
They also test a dynamic model and nd that areas that had more physicians per capita
in 1996 had lower growth in the number of physicians per capita. This is consistent with
the hypothesis of Newhouse et al. Brown (1993) nds conrmation of the hypothesis for
the Canadian province of Alberta, although the evidence is not overwhelming. A study by
Dionne et al. (1987) also found this to be true for the province of Qu ebec, Canada.104 The
results of these studies are consistent with competitive eects from entry.
A recent paper by Schaumans and Verboven (2008) examines the determinants of entry
in physician services markets in Belgium. They consider the entry decisions of pharmacies
as well. Pharmacies and physician practices provide complementary services { physicians
prescribe drugs and pharmacists dispense them. As a consequence, each type of rm benets
from the presence of the other. Both prescription drug prices and physician services prices
are heavily regulated in Belgium. Therefore, both pharmacies and physician practices only
in engage in nonprice competition (convenience, quality of service, quality of care, etc.). The
entry of physicians into local markets is free, but pharmacy entry is regulated { there is a
maximum number of pharmacies allowed in an area based on the local population. Schaumans
and Verboven adapt the models of Brenahan and Reiss (1991) and Mazzeo (2002) to allow for
entry restrictions for pharmacies and that products sold by the two types of rms (pharmacies
and physicians) may be strategic complements.105 As in the Brenahan and Reiss and Mazzeo
work, this is a static game and the outcomes in terms of market structure (numbers of rms of
both types), as opposed to rm identities, is what is modeled. They nd that the population
necessary to support a given number of rms increases approximately proportionately with
104Dionne et al. have the innovation of controlling for the number of good restaurants in a community.
They nd this to inuence physician location. It remains an open question if Qu ecois physicians are uniquely
responsive to restaurant quality { alas, no such data have been employed by researchers in other countries
(or other parts of Canada).
105Brenahan and Reiss (1991) test whether conduct changes with the number of rms in the market for
doctors, dentists, plumbers, and tire dealers located in isolated markets (mostly rural) in the U.S. They nd
evidence that competition among doctors gets tougher with the number of practices in a market, up until
the third. After three practices there is no further increase in the toughness of competition.
96the number of rms. As in Brenahan and Reiss, this implies that entry does not lead to
tougher competition. As mentioned previously, price competition isn't feasible for physicians
practices or pharmacies in Belgium. These results imply that they do not engage in more
intense price competition as more rms of their own type enter a market. They also nd
that the population necessary to support another physician practice falls with the number of
pharmacies, and vice versa. This supports the hypothesis of strategic complementarities.
Schaumans and Verboven then use the parameter estimates from the model to simulate
the impacts of policy reform toward pharmacies. They consider easing entry restrictions by
increasing the maximum number of pharmacies allowed in an area, and reducing pharmacies'
regulated markups. They nd that simply allowing free entry (no change in markups) would
increase the number of pharmacies by 173 percent. The complementarities between pharma-
cies and physician practices lead to a 7 percent increase in the number of physician practices
as a result of the entry liberalization for pharmacies. If pharmacy markups are reduced to
50 percent of their original levels then with free entry the number of pharmacies increases
by 44 percent and the number of physician practices increase by 6-10ths of 1 percent. Not
surprisingly, a drop in markups decreases the magnitude of entry, but it is still extensive.
The results of Schaumans and Verboven don't indicate conduct changing with the number
of rms, but this is a very heavily regulated environment, so it's unlikely the results are very
general except for other countries with similar regulatory environments.
6.2.2 Studies of Pricing Conduct
Gunning and Sickles (2007) estimate a structural model of pricing conduct by physician
practices. They employ the framework described in Bresnahan (1989) to estimate the conduct










The conduct parameter, , is a parameter to be estimated, along with demand and costs.
The value of  provides information about the toughness of competition. A value of  equal
to zero implied perfect competition (no markup). The farther that  is from zero, the farther
is conduct from competitive. Gunning and Sickles use data from the 1998 American Medical
Association Socioeconomic Monitoring Survey (AMASMS) to estimate this model. They
estimate average rm price elasticities of -1.75 to -2.35. Taken alone, these imply substantial
market power and substantial markups. Their overall estimate of the conduct parameter is
-1.34.
106Bresnahan's framework covers quantity or price setting. He refers to equation (37) as a \supply relation."
97They strongly reject the null hypothesis of perfect competition, but cannot reject the
hypothesis of Cournot conduct ( = 1). For generalist physicians the estimate of  is -1.87,
and the hypotheses of perfect competition and Cournot conduct are both rejected. While this
is a worthy exercise, the results are surprising. An estimate of a negative value of  implies
that physician practices are pricing below marginal cost. This seems implausible, especially if
one takes the elasticity estimates as valid. Those estimates indicate that physician practices
have substantial power to mark up price over marginal cost, but the conduct parameter
indicates that they do the opposite.
Identication of the conduct parameter requires a \demand rotator" (Bresnahan, 1989).
Suppose an exogenous variable rotates the demand curve around the equilibrium point. If
the market is perfectly competitive, there is no change in price (or quantity). If the market is
imperfectly competitive there will be a change. It's not clear what sort of exogenous variation
Gunning and Sickles have to rotate the demand curve. In addition, they estimate the cost
function as part of the model. This is an heroic attempt. It is not clear how to measure
the most important cost of a physician practice { physician opportunity cost. Since theta
is estimated from the pricing equation, bias in the estimation of cost will be transmitted to
the estimate of  if cost is estimated jointly with (37). As a consequence, it is possible that
diculties in consistently estimating the parameters of the cost function may be a source of
bias for estimating the conduct parameter.
An older paper by Wong (1996) uses a test devised by Panzar and Rosse (1987) for testing












where wi represents the price of factor i and R is the rm's reduced form revenue function,
which is a function of exogenous demand and cost shifters. The test statistic, , is the
elasticity of equilibrium rm revenue with regard to factor prices. In the case of monopoly,
the test statistic must be negative. If all factor prices increase, then marginal costs increase.
The rm will then optimally choose a lower quantity and a higher price. Since a monopolist
always operates on the elastic portion of their demand curve, revenues will fall. If the market
is perfect competitive, Panzar and Rosse argue that the value of the test statistic is one. If
factor prices increase, then the long run cost curves will increase, but the quantity at which
long run average cost reaches a minimum is unchanged. As a consequence, price will increase
by one percent, but quantity will remain unchanged, hence the value taken by  will be one.
The derivation of the test statistic under monopolistic competition implies that  will be
less than or equal to one if the market is monopolistically competitive.
Wong uses data from the AMASMS in 1991 to estimate the test statistic. He estimates
values of  of 0.83 for primary care, 0.76 for general and family practice, 0.94 for internal
98medicine, and 0.85 for surgery. All of these estimates are signicantly dierent from zero.
The test statistics for primary care, general and family practice, and surgery are all signif-
icantly dierent from one. Therefore he rejects the hypotheses of monopoly and of perfect
competition (except for internal medicine). The results are consistent with monopolistic
competition.
Bradford and Martin (2000) specify and model of physician partnerships, then derive and
estimate the reduced forms. In their model the partnership's choice of internal incentive
system (prot sharing) depends on whether the rm is demand constrained. When the
partnership is demand constrained, it's optimal to employ strong incentives to motivate
physicians to exert more eort which will bring in business. This means unequal prot
sharing, i.e., prot shares based on individuals' productivities. When the rm is not demand
constrained the opposite is true. This also applies to the number of physician partners
in a practice. More partners leads to weaker incentives and free riding, so their theory
predicts smaller partnerships in the presence of a demand constraint. They use data from
the Physician Practice Cost and Income Survey for 1986 to test their hypotheses.
They do nd evidence consistent with their theory. In addition, the rm chooses the
number of partners and the price they charge for their services. The nd that prot sharing,
partnership size, and price all respond to the number of physicians per capita in the market.
Physician partnerships are signicantly less likely to choose equal prot sharing the more
potential competition they face in a market due to more physicians per capita being present.
These rms also choose smaller size in response to more physicians per capita. Physician
practices in markets where there are more rivals (physicians per capita) also set lower prices.
Bradford and Martin also estimate a practice demand curve. They nd that demand is
responsive to the amount of physician time per visit in the practice, which they interpret
as quality. The parameter estimate implies that a physician spending 3 more minutes per
visit (at 10 percent increase) will lead to 9.1 more weekly visits to the practice. They also
nd that price decreases quantity demanded from the rm, although the implied elasticity
(-0.49) is less than one. Overall, the results of this study are consistent with physician rms'
conduct becoming more competitive in response to market structure.
Schneider et al. (2008a) estimate an SCP type model similar to what Shen et al. (2010)
and Moriya et al. (2010) do for the hospital industry. The examine the impact of HHIs for
physician organizations and for insurers in California on physician prices. While these models
are ad hoc, one can think of them as attempting to capture the impacts of relative bargaining
power on price, using buyer and seller HHIs as proxies for bargaining power. They nd that
physician market concentration is associated with signicantly higher prices. A 1 percent
increase in the physician HHI leads to 1-4 percent higher physician prices. Conversely, the
health insurer HHI has no statistically signicant impact on physician prices.
These results stand in sharp contrast to the ndings of Shen et al. and Moriya et al., who
99nd signicant impacts of insurer concentration on price (negative). Schneider et al. stands
out { there are very few studies that look at price competition in physician markets. The
results have to be interpreted with some caution, however. As noted elsewhere in this chapter,
SCP studies are vulnerable to problems associated with endogeneity of the HHI. The usual
practice is to nd some means to address this, commonly through the use of instruments of
xed eects. This issue is not addressed by Shen et al., so some caution must be applied
before making causal inference from the results of this study.
Eisenberg (2011) is a recent paper that examines monopsony power in the physician ser-
vices market. Eisenberg examines whether the U.S. Medicare program has monopsony power.
He uses nationally representative data on physicians in selected markets107 for selected years
from 1996 to 2008, along with data on Medicare physician reimbursement. The idea is that
Medicare physician payment rates are set administratively and should be exogenous to physi-
cian decisions108 Therefore variation in payment rates should trace out the physician supply
curve to Medicare. One diculty is that physicians in the U.S. sell both to Medicare and
to private insurers. If unobserved variation in the private market is correlated with Medi-
care payments then it will not be possible to estimate an unbiased causal eect of Medicare
payment on physician supply. Unfortunately private insurance prices are not observable in
the data. Eisenberg takes two approaches to deal with this problem. First, he includes a
number of characteristics of local markets that likely inuence the level of private insurer
payments, including a measure of the insurer HHI. As a supplementary strategy, he exam-
ines only physicians in contiguous counties that had dierent Medicare payment rates. The
idea is to reduce heterogeneity, including the private market.
Eisenberg estimates the impact of Medicare payment rates on the probabilities that physi-
cians will accept all, some, or no new Medicare patients. He nds that a 1 percent increase
in the Medicare payment rate increases the probability that a physician will accept all new
Medicare patients by 0.39 { 0.77 percent, reduces the probability they will only see some
new Medicare patients by 0.29 { 0.56 percent, and reduces the probability that they will see
no new Medicare patients by 0.83 { 1.62 percent. Physicians' participation responses are
inelastic, implying that Medicare possesses monopsony power with regard to physician par-
ticipation in the program. This study doesn't answer the question of whether Medicare has
monopsony power with regard to the supply of services, nor does it address whether Medi-
care exercises monopsony power (although this seems unlikely given political constraints and
government bureaucracy).
107The Community Tracking Survey of the Center for Studying Health System Change,
http://www.hschange.com/index.cgi?data=04.
108Medicare payments are based to some degree on physician practice costs but it seems unlikely that the
regulators are systematically capturing marginal costs in their payment rates.
1006.3 Summary
Empirical research on competition in physician services markets is sparse. The main reason
for that is lack of data. This is frustrating, since this is a very important market and
evidence is limited and often dated. Researchers in industrial organization have developed
sophisticated methods for the analysis of markets. Adapting these methods or inventing
new ones that address the idiosyncracies of physician services markets represents an exciting
opportunity. However, researchers will have to be entreprenurial and innovative in nding or
collecting data to estimate models of physician services markets.
7 Vertical Restraints and Monopsony
The previous sections have all dealt with issues of horizontal competition and market power {
hospitals competing against hospitals, insurers against insurers, physicians against physicians.
In this section we take on two dierent issues regarding market power { vertical restraints
and monopsony.
7.1 Vertical Restraints
7.1.1 Vertical Restraints - Theory
There is a small, but important, literature on vertical restraints in health care.109 As in
the general case, vertical integration can serve to achieve eciencies. It can eliminate dou-
ble marginalization, hold-up problems, transaction costs, and information asymmetries (im-
proved monitoring). In the case of hospitals and insurers, there are also important spillover
eects which integration can internalize. Insurers and hospitals make decisions over many
matters like pricing, information systems, etc. which aect each other. Integration can allow
for ecient coordination on such choices.110
It is also worth pointing out some other sources of potential eciencies beyond the usual
ones. Insurer may be able to obtain lower prices from hospitals, leading to improved consumer
welfare. Gal-Or (1997, 1999) shows that at an exclusionary equilibrium (all insurers and
hospitals are exclusive pairs), insurers obtain lower prices from hospitals in exchange for
109In health care the focus has been on vertical integration and exclusive dealing. We therefore restrict our
attention to these two forms of vertical restraint. We refer to vertical integration for the most part, but make
clear when exclusivity is important.
110Eggleston et al. (2004) study a model of vertical integration between hospitals and physicians and hos-
pitals and insurers. They nd that vertical integration does not necessarily increase net revenues.
101guaranteed larger volume and consumers are better o (provided that there isn't too much
dierentiation).
Another source of possible eciencies is the elimination of inecient substitution. If
there are multiple hospitals, say, and one hospital has greater market power than the others,
and thus higher markups, an insurer will ineciently substitute away from the hospital with
market power to the other hospitals. If hospitals are not perfect substitutes to patients then
this will result in a loss of utility.
It is also possible that vertical integration can lead to reduced prices. Suppose that
integration eliminates double marginalization and that the integrated rm is not exclusive,
i.e., it buys and sells with other market participants. Then other hospitals have to set their
prices at least as low as the marginal cost of the hospital in the integrated rm in order to
sell to the insurer in the integrated rm. If the hospital in the integrated rm wants to sell
to outside insurers, it has to set its price as low as the outside hospitals. So, it's possible
(but not necessary) that integration could lower prices via this mechanism.
The traditional concern with vertical integration, however, is that it can serve to enhance
or extend market power. An integrated insurer-hospital rm may nd it protable to exclude
rival insurers from access to the hospital, or charge them prices higher than the internal
transfer price of the integrated rm (raising rivals' costs) (see Ma, 1997).111 The same
could be true for excluding rival hospitals from access to the insurer in the integrated rm.
There may also be a horizontal aspect to the vertical integration, if, say, there are multiple
hospitals that join the integrated rm. This may have the standard anticompetitive eect of
horizontal merger increasing market power. Another horizontal eect is that integration may
facilitate collusion. If the insurer in the integrated rm buys from outside hospitals, it can
communicate pricing information between the hospital in the integrated rm and its rivals,
thereby facilitating collusion.
In an industry with uncertainty and with dierentiated products, like health care, in-
tegration can be inecient without being anticompetitive, simply by reducing choice. The
key here is exclusivity, not integration per se. If a hospital-insurer pair are exclusive, then
consumers' choices are restricted. When consumers choose an insurer they don't know what
kind of illness they will have should they fall ill, and therefore they have an option demand
for hospitals that can best treat any illness they might contract. Exclusivity restricts choice
111There have been some recent theoretical advances in this literature, using more general frameworks
than in previous work. These newer papers tend to nd anticompetitive eects of integration or exclusivity.
Bijlsma et al. (2009) show that there can be foreclosure and anticompetitive eects if there are uninsured
consumers. Douven et al. (2011) demonstrate foreclosure and anticompetitive eects using a more general
bargaining framework due to de Fontenay and Gans (2007). They show that any exclusionary equilibrium
is likely to be anticompetitive { a much stronger result than previous work. Halbersma and Katona (2011)
nd that vertical integration always harms consumers. The elimination of double marginalization results in
a softening of price competition between the insurers.
102and therefore results in a loss of utility, even if there is no anticompetitive eect. Gaynor
and Ma (1996) show a loss of consumer welfare from exclusive dealing in the absence of
foreclosure in such a situation.
In health care there is also the possibility of another eect on consumers | risk segmen-
tation. Consider the following situation. Let there be two dierentiated upstream hospitals:
H1 and H2. Let H1 oer specialized care for very ill patients, e.g., H1 is a tertiary care fa-
cility. Let H2 oer ordinary care, but nothing specialized, e.g., H2 is a primary care facility.
H1 has higher costs than H2. Let there be two downstream homogeneous insurers: I1 and I2.
There are two types of consumers: high risk and low risk. The high risk consumers have a
high probability of contracting a serious illness that will require treatment at a tertiary care
facility. The low risk consumers have a low probability of this happening. Suppose that I1
and H1 are integrated and exclusive (by implication I2 and H2 also are exclusive).112
We conjecture that there is an equilibrium with risk segmentation.113 I2 will oer insur-
ance at a lower premium, since H2 has lower costs. High risk consumers will want insurance
from I1 and low risk consumers from I2. Since there is risk segmentation, there is an eciency
loss (in addition to any welfare eects due to pricing and restriction on choice, as discussed
previously). This is a very informal argument { it may not be correct. But it points to a
factor to examine in health care markets.
7.1.2 A Model of Vertical Integration and Hospital Prices
The framework we laid out in Section 3.1 can be used to examine the impact of hospital-
insurer integration on hospital prices paid by independent insurers.114 In other industries,
vertical integration has been linked to an increase in rivals costs, and that is the phenomenon
we focus on here.115 More concretely, assume that hospital j is now owned by insurer m and,
for now, that the insurer does not contract with any other hospitals. The insurer's ownership
of the hospital changes the bargaining game by changing the agreement and disagreement
payos for the hospital.116 As previously in Section 3.1, the negotiations between the insurer
and hospital j take the other prices as given. Let m(ph
j) be the prot the insurer m earns as a
112Enhancement of market power is not the eect of interest here.
113Baranes and Bardey (2004) have a formal model where exclusivity leads to risk segmentation. The setup
of their model is quite dierent from what we have proposed here. They nd that exclusivity reduces hospital
dierentiation and intensies price competition. They conclude that exclusivity is welfare improving.
114Halbersma and Katona (2011) lay out a sketch of a potential empirical framework based on their model
in Appendix B of their paper.
115Hastings and Gilbert (2005) study the impact of vertical integration in the gasoline industry on rivals
prices.
116The structure of the payos for the insurer are unaected by the integration however the functional
relationships (e.g. Fh(Jh) and Fh(Jh   j   k)) will almost surely change.
103function of the price hospital j negotiates with insurer h holding all other prices constant.117
Assume that if there is an agreement @m
@ph
j
> 0 for all l { increasing the price hospital h
negotiates with other insurers raises their costs and therefore raises the prots of insurer m.
Disagreement prots for the vertically integrated hospital are denoted, m(D). We assume
that the insurer prots under a disagreement between hospital j and any other insurer are
greater than the insurer's prots under agreement. That is, m(D)  m(ph
j); 8ph
j < 1.
The hospital's agreement and disagreement outcomes are now:
Hagree = (pjh   cj)qjh(Jh) + m(ph
j)
Hdisagree = rj + m(D)
Because m is a function of ph there is no simple closed form relationship between hospital
price and and the other parameters of the model. However, it is straightforward to assess
the impact of integration on prices. As long as  > 0, hospital prices are decreasing in the
dierence between the hospital's agreement and disagreement outcomes. The more important
the agreement is to the hospital, the lower are prices. Here the dierence is (pjh cj)qjh(Jh) 
rj + (m(pl
j)   m(D)), which is smaller than in the non-integrated case. In addition, the
marginal return from increasing prices is now qjh(Jh) + @m
@pl
j
, which is greater than without
integration. These two eects work to force prices higher.
Similar logic shows that insurer m it will be able to negotiate lower rates with the other
hospitals in the market. If the insurer pays hospital j its marginal cost for providing care, then
the dierence in the agreement and disagreement values for insurer h when it is negotiating
with hospital k is: cjdkh +
 




l6=j;k plhdjlh. The dierence
between the agreement and disagreement values if the insurer owns hospital j is (pjh cj)dkh >
0, where pjh is the price the insurer and hospital j would have negotiated if they were not
jointly owned.
The intuition is straightforward. A vertically integrated insurer pays its hospital marginal
cost, which implies that under a disagreement with another hospital it will have lower dis-
agreement expenditures. To summarize, in this framework, vertical integration leads the
vertically integrated hospital to negotiate higher prices with other payers and the vertically
integrated insurer to negotiate lower prices with the other hospitals in the market.
117We assume that the insurer pays the hospital a transfer price equal to the marginal cost of care.
1047.1.3 Empirical Evidence on Vertical Restraints
There is very little evidence at present on the impact of vertical restraints on market power.
In part, that is because vertical integration has not been that common in health care. It
was quite rare until the mid-1990s, and then declined rapidly thereafter. Integration between
hospitals and physician practices peaked in 1996 at approximately 40 percent of all hospitals,
and declined thereafter (Burns and Pauly, 2002; Ciliberto, 2005). This pattern was repeated
with vertical integration of hospitals into the insurance market, although the extent of vertical
integration was never as great as between hospitals and physicians (Burns and Pauly, 2002).
This growth coincided with the growth of managed care, and in particular with the perceived
growth in managed care organizations' negotiating power with hospitals. Nonetheless, there
are reports that vertical integration and exclusive deals are on the increase in health care, in
part because of elements of the health reform law in the U.S. Burns et al. (2000) nd that
hospital-physician alliances increase with the number of HMOs in the market. They infer that
providers may be integrating in order to achieve or enhance market power. More recently,
Berenson et al. (2010) conducted 300 interviews with health care market participants, and
report that increased bargaining power through joint negotiations listed as one of several
reasons for hospital-physician alliances.
Certain types of vertical relations in health care have been the subject of signicant
antitrust scrutiny | exclusive dealing between physician practices and hospitals (usually for
a specialized service, e.g., radiology, anesthesiology, or pathology), and most-favored-nations
clauses between insurers and providers, which require the provider to give the insurer a rate
as low as it gives to any buyer (see Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1998; Haas-Wilson, 2003, for
reviews of vertical issues in health care).118
In spite of the interest in this topic, there is relatively little evidence on the eects of
vertical restraints in health care. The evidence there is comes from reduced form studies.
Ciliberto and Dranove (2005) and Cuellar and Gertler (2005) are the only two papers of
which we are aware which examine the competitive impacts of vertical integration in health
care. Both papers look at the eects of hospital-physician practice integration on hospital
prices. The two studies nd opposite results { Cuellar and Gertler nd evidence consistent
with anticompetitive eects of physician-hospital integration, while Ciliberto and Dranove
nd no such evidence. As Gaynor (2006a) points out, these seemingly contradictory results
118Complaints about exclusive contracts between hospitals and physician practices are the most numerous
type of antitrust case brought in health care. One of these cases was decided by the Supreme Court (Jeerson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2(1984)), and represents an important legal precedent on exclusive
dealing and tying. There have also been a number of cases on most-favored-nations clauses, e.g., Ocean State
Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1027 (1990) and Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marsheld Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
105are fully consistent with economic theory { vertical integration can be anticompetitive and
lead to higher prices or be eciency enhancing and have the opposite result.
Research on eciencies from integration is not very encouraging. Burns and Muller (2008)
review the empirical evidence on hospital-physician relationships. They nd little evidence
of an impact of integration on costs, quality, access or clinical integration. Madison (2004)
investigates the relationship between hospital-physician aliations and patient treatments,
expenditures, and outcomes using data on Medicare heart attack patients. She nds little
evidence of any impacts of hospital-physician relationships.
If integration between various types of providers or providers and insurers grows, there
may be continued interest (and more data) in these relationships. The model we sketched
out above in Section 7.1.2, or one like it, may provide a useful framework for future empirical
investigation.
7.2 Health Care Providers and Monopsony Power
It is well-known that market power in the purchase of health care inputs can (but does not
necessarily) lead to welfare loss.119 While the textbook depiction of monopsony results in a
reduction in output below the competitive equilibrium, other models of monopsony can yield
more ambiguous welfare results. Herndon (2002) shows that if sellers are forced into all-or-
nothing decisions by a buyer with monopsony power that there is no reduction in output and
no welfare loss. Consumers are better o, because the sellers' prices have been reduced with
no decrease in output. She argues that this model applies to health care, where insurers are
able to force such decisions on providers.
There is also a literature that examines why large purchasers (e.g. Walmart) are able to
negotiate more favorable terms with their suppliers (e.g., Snyder, 1996). Insurer economies
of scale may ultimately be based on their ability to exercise some monopsony power and
negotiate lower provider payment rates. The issue of the role of monopsony extends beyond
any individual antitrust case or the understanding of the provider price setting mechanism,
but is relevant for considering health system design. Health policy commenters have argued
that the relative cost advantage of single payer systems principally rests in their ability to
exercise monopsony power over providers.120
Health care providers sell their services to insurers and purchase labor and other inputs
in order to produce their services. Because of the role in the supply chain, health care
providers can both exercise monopsony power in the purchase of inputs (namely labor) or
119The analysis of monopsony power dates to Robinson (1933). Gaynor and Vogt (2000) provide a nice
review of the theory of monopsony and vertical foreclosure.
120For example, see Reinhardt et al. (2004) and Anderson et al. (2003).
106can be subject to monopsony power by insurers. The framework outlined above in Section
3.1 provides a lens through which one can examine the role of insurer bargaining power in
aecting provider prices. A hospital negotiating with a monopsonist insurer will face a large
discrepancy between its agreement and disagreement outcomes, which, in turn, implies that
the negotiated price will be lower than if there were other insurers in the market. In this
model, the mechanism through which this occurs is the increased volume of patients that
a monopsonist insurer brings to the hospital under an agreement. Higher volumes imply a
lower price.
The empirical literature examining monopsony generally examines the role of insurance
market concentration on provider prices. Much of this literature naturally overlaps with
the analysis of provider market concentration and provider prices. The typical analysis
will include measures of both insurer and provider market concentration as right hand side
variables. Shen et al. (2010) nd that hospital revenue was signicantly lower in markets with
high levels of HMO penetration and low hospital concentration. Moriya et al. (2010) nd that
that increases in insurance market concentration are signicantly associated with decreases in
hospital prices, whereas increases in hospital concentration are non-signicantly associated
with increases in prices, although the results are very sensitive to the inclusion of one or
two states. A hypothetical merger between two of ve equally sized insurers is estimated
to decrease hospital prices by 6.7%. However, given the fragility of the results, this eect
should be interpreted with caution. As mentioned previously, Schneider et al. (2008a) apply
a model similar to Shen et al. and Moriya et al. to the physician services market. In contrast
to the preceding papers, they nd no signicant impact of insurance market concentration
on physician prices. However, they nd that physician market concentration raises physician
prices signicantly.
A longstanding concern with hospital market power is that not only can they leverage
it into higher prices from insurers but they may be able to reduce nurses' wages below
competitive levels. Yett (1975) argued that the chronic shortage of nurses may result from
monopsony equilibrium. However, the importance of monopsony in the nursing market is
inversely related to the elasticity of labor supply. For a number of reasons, including the
large number of non-hospital nursing jobs and the large numbers of nurses that move into
and out of the labor force, that elasticity is likely to be high. Sullivan (1989) is one of the
early papers that uses the methods of the new empirical industrial organization (Bresnahan,
1989). He estimates the inverse elasticity of nurse labor supply to hospitals as 0.79 over a 1
year period and 0.26 over a three year period. He interprets these estimates as evidence of
substantial monopsony power on the part of hospitals.
More recently, the role of monopsony in the purchase of health care labor inputs has
received signicantly less attention. Staiger et al. (2010) rely on exogenous changes in Vet-
erans Aairs hospitals to identify the extent of hospital monopsony power. They nd very
inelastic labor supply curves and conclude that their results are consistent with the presence
107of monopsony power. Hirsch and Schumacher (2005) critique the Staiger et al. (2010) ap-
proach and use variation in hospital market structure over time to estimate a reduced form
wage regression. They nd no link between hospital market concentration and nurses wages
suggesting that hospitals do not exercise monopsony power.
Matsudaira (2010) uses the eects of a minimum stang law in California to estimate the
elasticity of labor supply in long term care facilities. Only those facilities whose stang was
below the required level had to hire additional sta. Matsudaira nds that these facilities
added sta with no corresponding increase in wages, implying a perfectly elastic labor supply
curve, and no monopsony power.
As mentioned previously, the recent study by Eisenberg (2011) examines whether Medi-
care has monopsony power as a purchaser of physician services by estimating the impact
of Medicare physician payment rates on physician willingness to participate in the program
by taking on new Medicare patients. He nds that physician participation with regard to
Medicare payment is positive, but inelastic, implying that Medicare has monopsony power
(whether they exercise it is another question).
To summarize, it is clear that the bargaining leverage of insurers, which is determined
by their size and the presence of alternative insurers, lowers provider prices. It is in that
sense that monopsony clearly aects the costs of health care provision. However, evidence of
monopsony in health care markets is quite limited.
8 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have attempted to lay out a framework for thinking about competition
in health care markets. In particular, we sketched out what a relatively simple model of
bargaining between insurers and providers might look like. Many of the market relation-
ships in health care can be captured with such a model. It provides an intuitive framework
for thinking about the economics of these markets as well as a springboard for developing
econometric models for estimation.
We also reviewed the recent literature on competition in health care markets. There
has been an explosion of work in this area since the publication of the rst volume of the
Handbook of Health Economics. Four developments in particular are worth noting.
One is the increasing use of modern structural models of industrial organization, adapted
to the specics of health care markets. The chapters by Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000)
and Gaynor and Vogt (2000) described structural models that might be estimated, but that
had not yet been executed at the time of the Handbook's publication. The models described
in those chapters, and more sophisticated models, were estimated only a few short years ago.
In addition, there has been increasing (and productive) interchange between health economics
108and industrial organization scholars, leading to more sophisticated and informative modeling
of health care markets.
Second is the volume of empirical work on hospital markets, particularly work on quality
competition. At the time of the writing of the rst volume of the handbook there was a fair
amount of non-structural work on hospital price competition, but virtually none on hospital
quality competition. That has changed dramatically.
Third is the entry of work on competition in health care markets in countries other than
the U.S., and by non-U.S. scholars working in this area. This is largely due to health system
reforms in countries like England, the Netherlands, and Switzerland designed to increase the
use of markets. This has become an important area of work internationally and is no longer
U.S.-centric.
Fourth is the very recent work on health insurance markets. This development is so recent
that most of the papers we cite in this chapter are as of yet unpublished. This expansion of
interest in this area is something that hopefully will continue.
It is disappointing that there is so little empirical research on competition in physician
services markets. In the U.S. this is largely due to data limitations. Hopefully scholars will
nd ways to surmount this problem and we will see the kinds of advances in knowledge about
this market that we've seen for hospital markets.
There are tremendous research opportunities for ambitious scholars interested in the eco-
nomics of health care markets. We expect to see further developments in thinking about the
economics of these markets and in devising estimable models for analysis.
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128Table 1: Hospital Market Concentra-
tion, U.S., 1987-2006a






a Source: American Hospital Associa-
tion. Data are for U.S. Metropolitan
Statistical Areas with population < 3
million.
b Herndahl-Hirschmann Index. Means
weighted by MSA population.
c Total change from the previous year
in the table.
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130Table 2: Hospital Market Structure, England, National Health Service,
1997-2007
Year # NHS Hospitalsa #Mergers HHI # Private Hospitalsb
1997 227 26 | |
1998 214 21 | |
1999 202 17 | |
2000 193 23 | |
2001 188 25 | |
2002 174 6 | |
2003 171 0 5,573 |
2004 171 0 5,561 3
2005 171 3 5,513 21
2006 168 3 5,459 32
2007 167 0 5,461 |
Total | 124 | |
a Source: U.K. Department of Health. Hospitals with fewer than 5,000
consultant episodes per year are excluded.
b Independent Sector Treatment Centres. These are private hospitals
with contracts with the NHS.
131Figure 3: Kernel density estimates for the distribution of HHI (all elective services)
 
132Table 3: Hospital Market Structure, The Netherlands,
1997-2010a















a Source: Netherlands Healthcare Authority.
b Total # of hospitals, including general hospitals, spe-
cialty hospitals, and university medical centers. The
vast majority are general hospitals.
c Independent Treatment Centers (ZBCs). These are
freestanding outpatient treatment centers, not part of
hospitals.
133Figure 4: Cumulative Distribution of LOCI, Netherlands, 2010  
Cumulative Percentage of Hospitals 
134Table 4: Insurance Market Concentration, U.S., 2004-
2008a,b
Year Median HHI Change Mean HHI Change
2004 3,544 | 3,939 |
2005 3,748 204 4,077 138
2006 2,986 -762 3,440 -637
2007 3,558 572 3,944 504
2008 3,276 -282 3,727 -217
a Source: These #s were graciously provided by David
Emmons. See American Medical Association (2010) for
more information on the data and calculations. Amer-
ican Medical Association (AMA) calculations for the
combined HMO+PPO markets using January 1st en-
rollment data from HealthLeaders-InterStudy's (HLIS)
Managed Market Surveyors HealthLeaders- Inter-
Study.
b MSA-level HHIs for HMO+PPO markets.
135Table 5: Large Employer Insurance Market Concentration, U.S., 1998-
2009a
Self + Fully Insured Fully Insured Only
Year Mean HHIb Change Mean HHIb Change
1998 2,172 | 2,984 |
1999 1,997 -175 2,835
2000 2,175 178 3,092
2001 2,093 -82 3,006
2002 2,280 187 3,158
2003 2,343 63 3,432
2004 2,519 176 3,706
2005 2,609 90 3,951
2006 2,740 131 4,072
2007 2,873 133 4,056
2008 2,916 43 4,201
2009 2,956 40 4,126
a Source: These #s were graciously provided by Leemore Dafny. The data
are for large multisite employers and do not represent the totality of the
insurance market. For more information on the data source, see Dafny
(2010).
b Weighted by # of enrollees.
Table 6: Small Group Insurance Market Structure, U.S.,
2000-2003a
Year Median Market Share, # of States with 5 rm
Largest Carrier concentration ratio  75%
2002 33% 19 (of 34; 56%)
2005 43% 26 (of 34; 77%)
2008 47% 34 (of 39; 87%)
a Source: Government Accountability Oce (2009).









a Source: Netherlands Healthcare Au-
thority.
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r
e
v
e
n
u
e
p
e
r
d
i
s
c
h
a
r
g
e
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
e
r
g
i
n
g
H
o
s
-
p
i
t
a
l
s
h
a
d
4
0
%
h
i
g
h
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
s
t
h
a
n
n
o
n
-
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
H
a
a
s
-
W
i
l
s
o
n
a
n
d
G
a
r
m
o
n
(
2
0
1
1
)
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
C
l
a
i
m
s
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
3
E
v
a
n
s
t
o
n
,
M
e
r
g
-
e
r
s
o
f
E
v
a
n
s
t
o
n
N
W
&
H
i
g
h
-
l
a
n
d
P
a
r
k
a
n
d
S
t
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
e
&
V
i
c
t
o
r
y
M
e
m
o
r
i
a
l
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
P
r
i
c
e
s
f
r
o
m
C
l
a
i
m
s
D
I
D
P
o
s
t
-
m
e
r
g
e
r
,
E
v
a
n
s
t
o
n
-
N
W
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
h
a
d
2
0
%
h
i
g
h
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
s
t
h
a
n
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
g
r
o
u
p
;
n
o
p
r
i
c
e
e

e
c
t
a
t
S
t
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
e
-
V
i
c
t
o
r
y
K
r
i
s
h
n
a
n
(
2
0
0
1
)
O
h
i
o
D
e
p
t
.
o
f
H
e
a
l
t
h
a
n
d
O
S
H
P
D
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
5
O
H
a
n
d
C
A
a
n
a
l
-
y
s
i
s
o
f
3
7
d
i

e
r
e
n
t
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
m
e
r
g
e
r
s
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
D
R
G
p
r
i
c
e
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
c
h
a
r
g
e
t
o
r
e
v
-
e
n
u
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
D
I
D
M
e
r
g
i
n
g
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
p
r
i
c
e
1
6
.
5
%
a
n
d
1
1
.
8
%
i
n
O
H
a
n
d
C
A
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
S
p
a
n
g
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
1
)
A
H
A
,
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
C
o
s
t
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
1
9
8
9
-
1
9
9
7
A
n
a
l
y
z
e
s
2
0
4
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
m
e
r
g
e
r
s
a
c
r
o
s
s
U
.
S
.
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
i
n
p
a
-
t
i
e
n
t
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
p
e
r
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
O
L
S
M
e
r
g
i
n
g
h
o
s
p
i
-
t
a
l
s
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
d
a
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
l
o
w
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
r
i
v
a
l
s
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(
2
0
1
1
)
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
C
l
a
i
m
s
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
2
S
F
B
a
y
A
r
e
a
,
C
A
S
u
t
t
e
r
/
S
u
m
m
i
t
m
e
r
g
e
r
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
R
i
s
k
-
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
i
n
-
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
p
r
i
c
e
f
r
o
m
c
l
a
i
m
s
D
I
D
S
u
m
m
i
t
p
r
i
c
e
s
i
n
-
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
2
8
.
4
%
t
o
4
4
.
2
%
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
t
o
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
g
r
o
u
p
T
h
o
m
p
s
o
n
(
2
0
1
1
)
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
C
l
a
i
m
s
1
9
9
7
-
9
8
&
2
0
0
1
-
0
2
W
i
l
m
i
n
g
t
o
n
,
N
C
N
e
w
H
a
n
o
v
e
r
-
C
a
p
e
F
e
a
r
1
9
9
8
m
e
r
g
e
r
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
R
i
s
k
-
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
i
n
-
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
p
r
i
c
e
f
r
o
m
c
l
a
i
m
s
D
I
D
3
o
f
4
i
n
s
u
r
e
r
s
e
x
-
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
d
a
l
a
r
g
e
p
r
i
c
e
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
;
1
i
n
s
u
r
e
r
e
x
p
e
r
i
-
e
n
c
e
a
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
p
r
i
c
e
s
T
o
w
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
6
)
C
P
S
,
A
H
A
a
n
d
I
n
t
e
r
S
t
u
d
y
,
1
9
9
1
-
2
0
0
3
E
n
t
i
r
e
U
.
S
.
N
o
t
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
-
b
l
e
R
a
t
e
o
f
U
n
i
n
s
u
r
-
a
n
c
e
D
I
D
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
m
e
r
g
e
r
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
t
h
e
u
n
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
r
a
t
e
b
y
.
3
p
e
r
-
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
S
a
c
h
e
r
a
n
d
V
i
t
a
(
2
0
0
1
)
O
S
H
P
D
d
a
t
a
,
1
9
8
6
-
1
9
9
6
S
a
n
t
a
C
r
u
z
,
C
A
M
e
r
g
e
r
o
f
D
o
m
i
n
i
c
a
n
a
n
d
W
a
t
s
o
n
v
i
l
l
e
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
n
e
t
r
e
v
-
e
n
u
e
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
p
e
r
i
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
a
c
u
t
e
-
c
a
r
e
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
D
I
D
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
n
e
t
r
e
v
-
e
n
u
e
f
r
o
m
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
p
a
y
e
r
s
D
o
m
i
n
i
-
c
a
n
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
p
r
i
c
e
s
w
e
r
e
2
2
%
h
i
g
h
e
r
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
m
e
r
g
e
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
N
o
t
e
:
L
i
s
t
s
o
n
l
y
t
h
o
s
e
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
a
f
t
e
r
2
0
0
0
.
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:
H
e
a
l
t
h
C
a
r
e
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
:
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
e
d
P
r
i
c
e
s
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
y
e
r
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
E

e
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
o
n
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
K
e
s
s
l
e
r
a
n
d
M
c
C
l
e
l
l
a
n
(
2
0
0
0
)
1
9
8
5
,
1
9
8
8
,
1
9
9
1
,
1
9
9
4
U
.
S
.
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
G
o
w
r
i
s
a
n
k
a
r
a
n
a
n
d
T
o
w
n
(
2
0
0
3
)
1
9
9
1
-
1
9
9
3
(
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
)
,
1
9
8
9
-
1
9
9
2
(
P
n
e
u
m
o
-
n
i
a
)
L
o
s
A
n
g
e
l
e
s
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
,
P
n
e
m
o
n
i
a
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
"
)
K
e
s
s
l
e
r
a
n
d
G
e
p
p
e
r
t
(
2
0
0
5
)
1
9
8
5
-
1
9
9
6
U
.
S
.
(
n
o
n
r
u
r
a
l
)
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
R
e
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
,
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
,
r
e
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
#
)
M
u
k
a
m
e
l
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
1
)
1
9
9
0
U
.
S
.
(
1
3
4
M
S
A
s
)
A
l
l
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
N
o
E

e
c
t
S
h
e
n
(
2
0
0
3
)
1
9
8
5
-
1
9
9
0
,
1
9
9
0
-
1
9
9
4
U
.
S
.
(
n
o
n
r
u
r
a
l
)
A
M
I
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
o
f
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
,
H
M
O
P
e
n
e
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
:
1
9
8
5
-
9
0
-
N
o
E

e
c
t
,
1
9
9
0
-
9
4
-
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
;
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
H
M
O
P
e
n
e
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
1
9
8
5
-
9
0
-
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
"
)
,
1
9
9
0
-
9
4
-
N
o
E

e
c
t
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1
0
,
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
y
e
r
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
E

e
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
o
n
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
T
a
y
(
2
0
0
3
)
1
9
9
4
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
,
O
r
e
g
o
n
,
W
a
s
h
i
n
g
t
o
n
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
M
e
d
i
c
a
r
e
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
D
e
m
a
n
d
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
G
a
y
n
o
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
0
)
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
,
2
0
0
7
/
0
8
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
,
A
l
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
N
H
S
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
C
o
o
p
e
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
0
)
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
,
2
0
0
7
/
0
8
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
N
H
S
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
P
r
o
p
p
e
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
0
)
2
0
0
6
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
,
E
m
e
r
g
e
n
c
y
S
u
r
g
e
r
y
N
H
S
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
o
f
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
"
!
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
G
a
y
n
o
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
1
)
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
,
2
0
0
7
/
0
8
E
n
g
l
a
n
d
C
o
r
o
n
a
r
y
A
r
t
e
r
y
B
y
p
a
s
s
G
r
a
f
t
N
H
S
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
D
e
m
a
n
d
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
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1
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:
H
e
a
l
t
h
C
a
r
e
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
:
M
a
r
k
e
t
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
P
r
i
c
e
s
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
y
e
r
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
E

e
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
o
n
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
G
o
w
r
i
s
a
n
k
a
r
a
n
a
n
d
T
o
w
n
(
2
0
0
3
)
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
:
1
9
9
1
-
1
9
9
3
,
P
n
e
u
m
o
n
i
a
:
1
9
8
9
-
1
9
9
2
L
o
s
A
n
g
e
l
e
s
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
,
P
n
e
m
o
n
i
a
H
M
O
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
S
o
h
n
a
n
d
R
a
t
h
o
u
z
(
2
0
0
3
)
1
9
9
5
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
P
T
C
A
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
C
o
e

c
i
e
n
t
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
M
u
k
a
m
e
l
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
2
)
1
9
8
2
,
1
9
8
9
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
A
l
l
,
A
M
I
,
C
H
F
,
P
n
e
u
m
o
n
i
a
,
S
t
r
o
k
e
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
"
)
E
n
c
i
n
o
s
a
a
n
d
B
e
r
n
a
r
d
(
2
0
0
5
)
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
0
F
l
o
r
i
d
a
A
l
l
,
N
u
r
s
i
n
g
,
S
u
r
g
e
r
y
A
l
l
P
a
t
i
e
n
t
S
a
f
e
t
y
E
v
e
n
t
L
o
w
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
M
a
r
g
i
n
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
a
f
e
t
y
e
v
e
n
t
s
"
)
P
r
o
p
p
e
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
1
9
9
5
-
1
9
9
8
U
.
K
.
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
N
H
S
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
"
)
S
a
r
i
(
2
0
0
2
)
1
9
9
1
-
1
9
9
7
1
6
S
t
a
t
e
s
A
l
l
A
l
l
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
H
H
I
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
"
)
H
o
a
n
d
H
a
m
i
l
t
o
n
(
2
0
0
0
)
1
9
9
2
-
1
9
9
5
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
,
S
t
r
o
k
e
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
,
R
e
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
M
e
r
g
e
r
N
o
E

e
c
t
:
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
:
R
e
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
(
#
)
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l
e
1
1
,
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
y
e
r
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
E

e
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
o
n
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
C
a
p
p
s
(
2
0
0
5
)
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
0
N
e
w
Y
o
r
k
A
l
l
A
l
l
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
M
e
r
g
e
r
N
o
E

e
c
t
:
1
3
i
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
&
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
a
f
e
t
y
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
:
1
y
e
a
r
p
o
s
t
-
m
e
r
g
e
r
i
n
-
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
f
o
r
A
M
I
,
H
e
a
r
t
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
"
)
V
o
l
p
p
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
1
9
9
0
-
1
9
9
5
N
e
w
J
e
r
s
e
y
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
P
r
i
c
e
D
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
"
)
P
r
o
p
p
e
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
1
9
9
1
-
1
9
9
9
U
.
K
.
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
N
H
S
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
D
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
"
)
H
o
w
a
r
d
(
2
0
0
5
)
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
2
U
.
S
.
K
i
d
n
e
y
T
r
a
n
s
p
l
a
n
t
A
l
l
G
r
a
f
t
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
D
e
m
a
n
d
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
s
m
a
l
l
)
(
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
"
)
A
b
r
a
h
a
m
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
7
)
1
9
9
0
U
.
S
.
A
l
l
A
l
l
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
d
#
o
f
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
"
)
C
u
t
l
e
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
0
)
1
9
9
4
,
1
9
9
5
,
2
0
0
0
,
2
0
0
2
,
2
0
0
3
P
e
n
n
s
y
l
-
v
a
n
i
a
C
A
B
G
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
E
n
t
r
a
n
t
s
'
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
h
a
r
e
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
h
i
g
h
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
(
l
o
w
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
)
p
h
y
s
i
c
i
a
n
s
"
)
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a
b
l
e
1
1
,
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
y
e
r
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
E

e
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
o
n
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
E
s
c
a
r
c
e
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
6
)
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
9
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
,
N
e
w
Y
o
r
k
,
W
i
s
c
o
n
-
s
i
n
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
,
H
i
p
F
r
a
c
t
u
r
e
,
S
t
r
o
k
e
,
G
a
s
t
r
o
i
n
-
t
e
s
t
i
n
a
l
H
e
m
o
r
-
r
h
a
g
e
,
C
o
n
g
e
s
t
i
v
e
H
e
a
r
t
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
,
D
i
a
b
e
t
e
s
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
H
H
I
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
{
C
A
,
N
Y
,
N
o
E

e
c
t
{
W
I
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
;
0
)
R
o
g
o
w
s
k
i
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
7
)
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
9
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
H
e
a
r
t
A
t
t
a
c
k
,
H
i
p
F
r
a
c
t
u
r
e
,
S
t
r
o
k
e
,
G
a
s
t
r
o
i
n
-
t
e
s
t
i
n
a
l
H
e
m
o
r
-
r
h
a
g
e
,
C
o
n
g
e
s
t
i
v
e
H
e
a
r
t
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
,
D
i
a
b
e
t
e
s
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
1
-
H
H
I
,
1
-
3

r
m
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
i
o
,
#
o
f
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
3
-
5
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
)
,
N
o
E

e
c
t
(
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
;
0
)
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a
b
l
e
1
1
,
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
y
e
r
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
E

e
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
o
n
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
u
t
t
e
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
8
)
1
9
9
7
U
.
S
.
A
l
l
A
l
l
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
P
a
t
i
e
n
t
S
a
f
e
t
y
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
V
a
r
i
o
u
s
(
H
H
I
,
#
o
f
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
o
r
s
,
.
.
.
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
,
N
o
E

e
c
t
,
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
"
;
0
;
#
)
R
o
m
a
n
o
a
n
d
B
a
l
a
n
(
2
0
1
1
)
1
9
9
8
-
9
9
,
2
0
0
1
-
0
3
C
h
i
c
a
g
o
P
M
S
A
A
l
l
A
l
l
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
P
a
t
i
e
n
t
S
a
f
e
t
y
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
M
e
r
g
e
r
N
o
E

e
c
t
,
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
0
;
"
)
M
u
t
t
e
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
1
)
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
,
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
2
1
6
U
.
S
.
s
t
a
t
e
s
A
l
l
A
l
l
2
5
I
n
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
P
a
t
i
e
n
t
S
a
f
e
t
y
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
4
2
M
e
r
g
e
r
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
,
N
o
E

e
c
t
,
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
"
;
0
;
#
)
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a
b
l
e
1
2
:
H
e
a
l
t
h
C
a
r
e
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
:
V
o
l
u
m
e
-
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
P
a
y
e
r
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
a
c
t
o
r
A

e
c
t
i
n
g
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
E

e
c
t
o
n
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
H
o
(
2
0
0
2
)
1
9
8
4
-
1
9
8
6
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
P
T
C
A
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
,
C
A
B
G
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
s
m
a
l
l
)
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
"
!
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
G
o
w
r
i
s
a
n
k
a
r
a
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
(
C
A
)
,
1
9
8
8
-
1
9
9
9
(
F
L
)
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
,
F
l
o
r
i
d
a
W
h
i
p
p
l
e
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
,
C
A
B
G
,
A
b
d
o
m
i
n
a
l
A
o
r
t
i
c
A
n
e
u
r
y
s
m
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
"
!
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
G
a
y
n
o
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
5
)
1
9
8
3
-
1
9
9
9
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
C
A
B
G
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
"
!
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
H
u
c
k
m
a
n
a
n
d
P
i
s
a
n
o
(
2
0
0
6
)
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
5
P
e
n
n
s
y
l
-
v
a
n
i
a
C
A
B
G
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
(
P
h
y
s
i
-
c
i
a
n
)
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
"
!
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
R
a
m
a
n
a
r
a
y
a
n
a
n
(
2
0
0
8
)
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
6
F
l
o
r
i
d
a
C
A
B
G
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
(
P
h
y
s
i
-
c
i
a
n
)
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
"
!
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
#
)
H
u
e
s
c
h
(
2
0
0
9
)
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
6
F
l
o
r
i
d
a
C
A
B
G
A
l
l
M
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
S
u
r
g
i
c
a
l
V
o
l
u
m
e
(
N
e
w
S
u
r
g
e
o
n
s
)
N
o
E

e
c
t
(
v
o
l
u
m
e
"
9
m
o
r
t
a
l
i
t
y
)
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l
e
1
3
:
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
M
a
r
k
e
t
:
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
P
a
y
e
r
s
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
E

e
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
D
a
f
n
y
(
2
0
1
0
)
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
5
U
.
S
.
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
F
o
r
m
;
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
-
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
B
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
,
L
a
r
g
e
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
s
#
o
f

r
m
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
"
)
D
a
f
n
y
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
1
b
)
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
5
U
.
S
.
S
C
P
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
,
L
a
r
g
e
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
H
H
I
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
"
)
D
r
a
n
o
v
e
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
1
9
9
7
U
.
S
.
E
n
t
r
y
M
o
d
e
l
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
H
M
O
s
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
t
o
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
a
n
o
t
h
e
r

r
m
#
o
f
H
M
O
s
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
u
p
a
r
r
o
w
)
p
r
o

t
s
#
)
F
r
a
n
k
a
n
d
L
a
m
i
r
a
u
d
(
2
0
0
9
)
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
0
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
H
e
a
l
t
h
P
l
a
n
S
w
i
t
c
h
i
n
g
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
H
e
a
l
t
h
I
n
s
u
r
e
r
s
E

e
c
t
o
f
#
o
f
p
l
a
n
s
o
n
p
r
o
b
.
o
f
s
w
i
t
c
h
i
n
g
#
o
f
p
l
a
n
s
D
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
(
#
p
l
a
n
s
"
)
s
w
i
t
c
h
i
n
g
#
)
M
a
e
s
t
a
s
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
9
)
2
0
0
4
U
.
S
.
P
r
i
c
e
D
i
s
p
e
r
s
i
o
n
;
C
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
S
e
a
r
c
h
M
e
d
i
g
a
p
P
r
i
c
e
D
i
s
-
p
e
r
s
i
o
n
;
C
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
S
e
a
r
c
h
N
A
N
A
;
9
p
r
i
c
e
d
i
s
p
e
r
s
i
o
n
;
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
s
e
a
r
c
h
c
o
s
t
s
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a
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l
e
1
3
,
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
S
t
u
d
y
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
A
r
e
a
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
P
a
y
e
r
s
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
E

e
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
B
o
l
h
a
a
r
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
0
)
2
0
0
5
-
2
0
0
6
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
P
r
i
c
e
D
i
s
p
e
r
s
i
o
n
;
S
e
a
r
c
h
C
o
s
t
s
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
h
e
a
l
t
h
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
P
r
i
c
e
D
i
s
-
p
e
r
s
i
o
n
;
S
e
a
r
c
h
C
o
s
t
s
N
A
N
A
;
9
p
r
i
c
e
d
i
s
p
e
r
s
i
o
n
;
e
d
u
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